NATIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE ANDEAN PACT: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LATIN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

By

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By 1973, six Latin American nations -- Bolivia, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela -- had each made a commitment to the Andean Pact. Each of these six nations supports the Pact in varying ways, to different degrees and for differing reasons. The purpose of this study is to describe and explain the patterns of national support exhibited by the Andean Pact's six member nations.

National support for the Andean Pact is conceptualized here as a multi-dimensional phenomenon. The dimensions analyzed include national activity in the Pact, supportive attitudes of national decision-makers, implementation of group decisions on the national level, and the extent to which foreign policy behavior is influenced by Andean Pact membership. The findings demonstrate that these dimensions are empirically, as well as conceptually, distinct. It was hypothesized that members would support different Pact programs to varying degrees. Four specific Pact programs are analyzed: trade liberalization measures, industrial programming, the Statute on the Common Treatment of Foreign Capital, and the proposed Andean Tribunal of Justice. The findings confirm the view that support for these programs is independent of national support for the Pact as a whole.

In seeking to explain patterns of national support for the Andean Pact, both integration theory and the literature on the comparative study of foreign policy are used in constructing an analytical framework. It was hypothesized that three groups of factors were important in explaining national decisions to support the Andean Pact: factors which determine national capabilities, factors which determine interest or desire to support the Pact, and dynamic factors deriving from the process of cooperation itself. Specific hypotheses relating each of the independent variables to support for the Andean Pact are formulated and tested. Both events data and perceptual data deriving from interviews with governmental officials in the six member nations are utilized in describing support for the Andean Pact and in testing the hypotheses.

Factors hypothesized to determine national capabilities of support (gross domestic product, governmental revenues, and political structure) were found to be most useful in explaining implementation of Pact programs. Factors hypothesized to determine national interest or desire to support the Pact (perceptions of shared problems, economic development goals, foreign investment, and the structure of the economy) were found to be most useful in explaining which Pact programs are supported by the nation. Finally, the dynamic factors (perceived benefits deriving from the Pact, perceptions of equitable distribution of benefits, and changes in sub-regional transactions) were found to be related to general patterns of activity and supportive attitudes toward the Andean Pact.

The findings presented in this study confirm the utility of comparing foreign policies toward a single target. A multi-data source approach was found to be useful in presenting a more complete view of national

foreign policy behavior. The conclusions of this study question the simplicity found in many studies of integration which treat support for the integration scheme as uni-dimensional and undifferentiated by program.

CHAPTER I
THE ANDEAN PACT AS A REGIONAL COOPERATION SCHEME

The Goals of this Study

By 1973, six Latin American nations -- Bolivia, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela -- had each made a commitment to the Andean Pact. Each of these nations supports the Andean Pact to varying degrees depending on the benefits perceived as deriving from that support. The purpose of this study is to compare the foreign policies of each of these six nations toward a single target, the Andean Pact, and to analyze the factors which determine a nation's participation in and support for the Andean Pact.

The signers of the agreement creating the Andean Pact sought to create a mechanism for common action that would deal with the members' problems of economic underdevelopment and provide a basis through which the members could improve their status in the international and regional systems. The Andean Pact was designed to avoid many of the problems which had plagued the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA). At the same time, the Andean Pact was not intended to alienate its members from LAFTA. Rather the creation of the Andean Pact was viewed, rhetorically at least, as a move to strengthen the larger regional organization.

Integration in the Andean context is a multi-dimensional phenomenon. In addition to tariff-reduction programs and harmonization of economic and social policies, the Andean Pact created a number of mechanisms to

further a broad range of goals through cooperative action on both the national and international levels. The Pact has formulated decisions in a wide variety of areas including the allocation of industry in the subregion, common treatment of foreign investment, harmonization of social security programs, establishment of a joint external tariff, and coordination of financial policies.

Since its creation seven years ago, the Andean Pact has been viewed alternately as a panacea for the region's developmental problems and as just another self-perpetuating bureaucracy, having little revelance to the needs of the subregion. Certainly the optimism of the late 1960s has dissipated in the face of the very real problems of trying to work out agreements which involve sacrifice of national economic goals. Negotiations have bogged down on several occasions and harsh accusations have characterized at least some of the relationships within the Pact. Critics of the Andean Pact maintain that it has become a means by which foreign companies can take advantage of an expanded market. But yet, agreements have been reached, compromises have been made in sensitive areas, and group decisions have been translated into national laws. Governmental officials in all of the countries maintain that the Andean Pact is working and that it will continue to function in the years ahead.

This study is not intended as an analysis of the potential for success of the Andean Pact; indeed, such a definitive analysis could only be made far in the future. Rather this work is conceived as a comparative analysis of the national foreign policies of the six member nations toward the Andean Pact.

The central questions of this study are concerned with the ways

member nations support the Andean Pact and the factors that determine their support. Axline (1971: 163-64) maintains that the study of economic unions offers a number of advantages for the comparative study of foreign policy. These groups offer a homogeneous limited context in which foreign policy can be studied by controlling the effects of some external variables. Furthermore, since each of the nations is a member of the Andean Pact, each is "forced" to exhibit some kind of foreign policy behavior toward the organization. This behavior may range theoretically from complying only with the obligations necessary for maintenance of membership in the group to active lobbying for expansion of the group's activities and functions.

This study does not pretend to be a definitive analysis of factors explaining support for all regional integration schemes. The fact that only one case -- the Andean Pact -- is analyzed precludes such an ambitious undertaking. Rather, it is hoped that this study will be of theoretical value in assessing the applicability of concepts and hypotheses derived from other integration attempts to the case of the Andean Pact.

The purpose of this chapter is to develop an analytical framework for the study of national support for the Andean Pact. The concept of support is examined, followed by a discussion of the study's substantive context. The analytical framework is then developed and the hypotheses of the study are specified. A presentation of the methodology employed in this analysis concludes this chapter.

The Concept of Support

In describing and explaining foreign policy behavior toward the Andean Pact, David Easton's concept of support is utilized. While the Andean Pact cannot be considered as a political system in Eastonian terms,[1] the conceptualization of support by Easton seems particularly appropriate for this analysis.

In Easton's model of a political system, inputs into the system are characterized as being either demands or supports. Demands are those requests for action regarding an authoritative allocation of values. Supports are those actions in which a member acts on behalf of the system or in which he orients himself toward the goals, interests, and actions of the system (1957: 390). These two types of inputs are, of course, related; as Easton (1965: 51) points out, "in the normal course of events, by the very act of voicing a demand or proposing it for serious discussion, a member will imply that he supports it [the system] in some measure."

Support is viewed as essential to the survival of a political system. Without support, the political system is unable to undertake the transformation of demands into binding political decisions. Furthermore, support for the system must be more diffuse than support for a specific issue or action considered important to the actor. As Easton (1957: 394) points out:

> If a system is to absorb a variety of demands and negotiate some sort of settlement among them, it is not enough for the members of the system to support only their own demands and the particular government that will undertake to promote these demands. For the demands to be processed into outputs, it is equally essential that the members of the system stand ready to support the existence of a political community and some stable rules of common action.

Easton (1957: 390) distinguishes between two types of supportive behavior: overt and covert. Overt support consists of those "actions promoting the goals, interests, and actions of another person [or in this case, group]." Covert support is a state of mind or a "deep-seated set of attitudes and predispositions or a readiness to act on behalf of some other person [or group]." Both types of support are considered crucial for the maintenance of the system.

While the Andean Pact is not conceived here as a political system, the concept of support is useful in attempting to describe and explain foreign policy behavior toward the Andean Pact. The concept of support focuses attention on the difference between overt support in terms of verbal and non-verbal behavior toward the Pact and covert support in terms of governmental attitudes toward the Pact. Furthermore, by focusing on support, the study of national foreign policy toward the Andean Pact is placed in a broader perspective. National support is vital to the continued functioning of the Andean Pact. Without the support of its members, the Pact would not be able to make decisions, reach agreements, or otherwise carry out its goals.

The Substantive Context

There are two bodies of literature which are useful in attempting to construct a theoretical framework for the comparative study of the foreign policies of the six Andean nations toward the Andean Pact: the literature on integration and on the comparative study of foreign policy. Notable contributions have been made in both of these areas in seeking to explain the factors leading to the establishment and success of regional groupings and to the reasons for national support for such groupings.

The literature on integration dates back to the 1950s and is based largely on the European experience. It is theoretically rich and certainly, as Pentland (1973) notes, many of these theories had a practical application in the development of the European Economic Community. By and large, however, the literature on integration has not been subjected to rigorous empirical testing. The study of integration is now characterized by a multitude of studies and frameworks having little relationship to each other. "Many scholars have been energetic and imaginative in devising remedies for this condition. There is no shortage of prestigious candidates to provide an overall framework for the study of integration. Essentially each of the proposals centres on a single organizing concept, from which is derived a macro-analytical framework" (Pentland, 1973: 15). This study seeks to test some of the hypotheses derived from the integration literature in suggesting the relative importance of factors leading to national support for an integration or cooperation scheme, and at the same time, to suggest certain modifications which will enable the integration theories to be applied to other areas of the world, and specifically, to more limited attempts at regional cooperation.

The literature on the comparative study of foreign policy is more recent in origin. Until the mid-1960s, the study of foreign policy was dominated by the case study approach in which a wide range of variables were used in describing and explaining the foreign policy behavior of a particular nation. With the publication of Rosenau's (1966) article on the need for pre-theories of foreign policy, the comparative study of foreign policy took a new turn and the field became gradually dominated by empirical studies which focused on the question of explaining the foreign policy behavior of a large number of nations through a more

limited number of variables. In general, students of comparative foreign policy make substantial contributions in seeking to explain the relationship between various attributes of a nation and its foreign policy behavior. However, for the most part, comparative studies of foreign policy tend to describe, classify, and explain the general foreign policy behavior of a particular nation or group of nations instead of focusing on the foreign policy behavior of a group of nations toward one particular target.[2]

This study seeks to combine the advantages of looking at more than one nation's behavior and the strengths of the case study approach by focusing on a manageable number of nations (six) with respect to one particular type of cooperative foreign policy behavior -- support for the Andean Pact.

Both of these bodies of literature -- integration theory and the comparative analysis of foreign policy -- make substantial contributions to the study of support for the Andean Pact. Both of these areas also have certain weaknesses which must be overcome in carrying out the present study. In the following section, an attempt is made to examine and correct the limitations of each approach in developing an integrated framework of analysis.

Integration Theory

The Andean Pact is frequently referred to as a movement toward economic integration and thus would logically seem to be a candidate for the application of the integration theory. The literature on integration is important in that it suggests a number of factors which were important in the development of the European case and seeks to relate these factors to each other. However, there are two main

limitations to the utility of integration theories in studying the Andean Pact: 1) Most of the integration theories are concerned with something more than the regional cooperation that characterizes the goals of the Andean Pact. Economic and political integration are accorded an important, if not dominant, position. 2) Much of the integration literature is concerned with analyzing the aggregate characteristics of the region or subregion as a whole with relatively few hypotheses relating to the national political level of analysis. As Gordon and Moore (1976: 10) point out: "the lack of analytical focus on the nation-state makes much of the integration literature only indirectly related to the development of foreign policy theory." Neither of these limitations is insurmountable. The broad definitions of integration proposed in the literature will be modified to increase their applicability to the Andean Pact. Analogously, some of the factors considered important in explaining the development of regional integration endeavors will be recast on the national level.

Many of the definitions of integration derived from the Western European case are simply too broad to be applicable to Latin America and other non-industrialized regions. In perhaps the classic formulation of integration, Haas (1971: 10) defines integration as being "the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations, and political activities toward a new and larger center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over pre-existing national states." Haas and Schmitter (1966: 261) argue that "definite political implications can be associated with most movements toward economic integration even when the chief actors themselves are not aware of these political implications."

The idea that economic cooperation will someday lead to an Andean political state is at the present time a far-fetched dream of a few intellectuals. Even more modest definitions of integration cannot be applied to the Andean Pact. Deutsch et al. (1957) suggest that the existence of a pluralistic security community requires only that the threat of war among members is no longer present. Yet, rumors of a possible war between Chile and Peru in 1975, though probably unfounded, certainly indicate a lack of basic trust on at least some grounds.

In this study, the Andean Pact is not considered a movement toward political integration but rather a regional cooperation scheme, that is, a group effort to cooperate and harmonize policies in certain specified areas. The consideration of the Andean Pact as a regional cooperation scheme focuses attention on one particular type of cooperative behavior, willingness to support joint decisions on economic and social programs. Furthermore, the use of the term regional cooperation scheme instead of economic integration serves to clarify exactly what we are talking about: a group of nations acting together to further common goals in certain specified areas.

The integration literature suggests a number of factors which have been useful in explaining decisions by European nations to participate in integration schemes. The debate on the approach to be used in studying the European case within the framework of integration theory is valuable in that it points to the need for a framework in which the relative importance of various factors is included. While functionalists such as Mitrany (1966: 62) argue that political integration follows automatically from increasing cooperation on technical matters, neo-functionalists such as Haas (1966, 1971) look to the formation of transnational pluralist

groups and the sharing of values among elites. Other scholars, such as Deutsch et al. (1957), stress the importance of communications and transactions in developing a feeling of community while de-emphasizing the role of political action. Still others (e.g. Etzioni, 1965, 1969) emphasize the role of external threats as crucial stimuli to the creation of supranational institutions, which are considered important for the development of integration.

While most integration theorists have concentrated their attention on the European experience, a few scholars have examined attempts at regional unity in other areas of the world. These analyses have questioned the applicability of the functionalist logic to underdeveloped countries. Nye (1966: 406) notes that the "East African experience suggests that political union does not follow automatically from economic union." He argues that in the European case, time is on the side of the integrationists in that loyalties gradually shift toward a new center as a result of cooperation on economic issues. But Nye (1966: 407) maintains that "in under-developed countries time is not an ally. There is too much demand for change for social and economic forces to work undisturbed. Moreover, the under-developed economies have not begun to generate the range of industries, the skilled manpower, and their accompanying ideologies characteristic of developed European economies." Hence, Nye challenges the Haas-Schmitter argument that economic union leads inevitably to political union, arguing, in effect, that this relationship cannot hold in underdeveloped countries because economic issues in such nations are highly politicized issues. For the most part, however, the literature on both African and Latin American attempts at economic unity tends to be descriptive in nature.[3] Furthermore, most analyses

describe these attempts -- either implicitly or explicitly -- in terms of the European functionalist approach.[4]

This study is concerned with the national political level of analysis: what makes one government take a very active role in the Andean Pact while another is reluctant to comply with even minimal requirements? Since most of the integration theories are concerned with the regional level of analysis, it is necessary to consider how the variables considered important on a regional level affect the formation of national foreign policy. Thus, the effect of increasing transactions on national perceptions is considered important for this study, rather than the overall level of transactions in the subregion. Similarly, it is necessary to examine the effects of perceived common problems of decision-makers rather than the effects of shared elite values on the success of a regional community.

Integration theory also focuses attention on the relative importance of economic versus political variables in explaining national policies toward the Andean Pact. The discussion of the process of integration suggests that there are certain dynamic or feedback factors which affect national decisions to support a regional cooperation scheme. These dynamic factors include the perceptions of benefits deriving from the regional cooperation scheme, perceptions of the equitable distribution of benefits, and the effects of changing patterns of transactions within the group.

For purposes of this study, four factors or groups of factors suggested by the integration theories seem applicable to the analysis of national foreign policy behavior in a regional cooperation scheme: 1) shared values and common perceptions, 2) transactions, 3) external

factors, and 4) certain dynamic factors in the actual process of integration. Discussion of the hypotheses deriving from these factors is postponed until the section following the discussion of the comparative foreign policy literature.

The Comparative Study of Foreign Policy

Foreign policy may be defined as the strategies national decision-makers employ to manipulate their environment. Basically the comparative study of foreign policy seeks to account for the causes and consequences of foreign policy behavior. Various types of factors have been used in seeking to explain foreign policy behavior. Perhaps the most common approach has been to determine the effect of societal variables or national attributes on foreign policy behavior. Maurice East (1973), for example, examined the effect of size on foreign policy behavior while John Clark et al. (1971) looked at national attributes associated with support for the United Nations. Rosenau and Hoggard (1971, 1974) looked at dyadic relationships and found that national attributes -- size, economic development, and political attributes -- were more important in explaining foreign policy behavior in dyadic relationships than were relational or external attributes -- distance, homogeneity, balance. Other scholars have sought to weigh the relative importance of societal and governmental variables in explaining foreign policy variation. Moore (1974), for example, found substantial differences in the relative impact of societal and governmental variables between open and closed nations. Still others have suggested that the structure of the international system is an important factor in explaining national foreign policy behavior. Cantori and Spiegel (1970) have discussed foreign

policy behavior in terms of the international system, suggesting that the effect of external powers in the politics of subordinate systems is an important, if not determining, factor.

Another trend in the comparative study of foreign policy has been to differentiate among several general issue areas. Rosenau (1967) suggested that nations may behave quite differently in different issue areas. Empirical support for this idea, however, has been mixed (e.g. Wittkopf et al., 1974; Wittkopf and Ferris, 1974).

Several factors useful for studying the foreign policy behavior of the Andean nations toward the Andean Pact can be drawn from the literature on the comparative analysis of foreign policy. Size and level of economic development have been shown to be important factors in explaining the general foreign policy behavior of nations; certainly it is logical to expect that they will play important roles in explaining foreign policy behavior toward a regional cooperation scheme. In the case of the Andean Pact, there is relatively little variation in the size of the member nations; however, there is considerable variation in levels of economic development among members.

Political factors have generally been found to be of lesser importance in explaining foreign policy behavior. However, given the fact that integration theory stresses the role of political decisions, political factors are expected to be important in explaining foreign policy behavior toward a regional cooperation scheme. A common theme in both integration theory and the literature on the comparative study of foreign policy is the effect of external actors on the foreign policy behavior of nations. Etzioni (1965) notes that the threat of a common enemy may be an important factor leading to group unity. Thus, external influences

are expected to be important factors in explaining the foreign policies of nations toward a regional cooperation scheme.

Finally, the issue-area concept seems to warrant another appraisal. In analyzing support for the Andean Pact, four Pact programs are considered: trade liberalization measures, industrial programming measures, Decision 24 (Statute on the Common Treatment of Foreign Capital), and the proposed Andean Tribunal of Justice. These four areas are by no means the only areas in which joint action has been undertaken by the Andean Pact members. However, officials in the Andean Pact and observers of the subregional group maintain that these are the most important issues facing the Andean Pact today. National policies of support for these four programs and for the Andean Pact as a whole will be analyzed in an attempt to explain varying degrees of support.

An Integrated Framework for Analysis

The purpose of this section is to develop an integrated analytical framework which will explain foreign policy behavior toward a regional cooperation scheme. In developing this framework, the dependent variable, support for a regional cooperation scheme, is first defined and the actors in that scheme are specified. A discussion of the assumptions of this framework about national support for a regional cooperation scheme is followed by a set of interrelated hypotheses to be tested in the subsequent analysis.

Support for a Regional Cooperation Scheme

National support for the Andean Pact is defined as those activities and attitudes which are intended to 1) help maintain the continued functioning of the Pact, 2) further the goals of the group, or 3)

promote the expansion of the regional cooperation scheme's jurisdiction or authority. This definition of support is admittedly broad, encompassing virtually all actions in which national actors seek to influence the Andean Pact. Furthermore, this definition encompasses those activities which Easton differentiates from support as being demands.

The distinction made by Easton between supports and demands is an artificial one in the context of the Andean Pact. If demands are requests for action, three types of requests made by Andean Pact members of the Andean Pact may be considered. There are demands for the expansion of Pact activities or the creation of new subregional institutions, or suggestions for better ways of implementing group decisions. These actions are clearly supportive in the context of the definition given above -- they are designed to increase the extent of Pact activities. A second type of demand is found in the Andean situation -- those in which a national actor asks that group decisions not be applied in his particular case or that the Pact's activities be restricted. These demands indicate lack of support for the regional cooperation scheme. Finally, in a very few cases, there are "neutral" demands -- requests for information or requests that a matter be studied further. These demands may also be considered supportive in that they are made on the basis of confidence in the Pact's ability to respond.

To retain membership in the Pact, a certain minimal level of support is necessary. Members must comply with joint decisions and with the provisions of the original agreement in terms of attending certain kinds of meetings and providing specified levels of financial backing. Thus far, each of the six member nations has fulfilled these conditions of minimum support. This study is primarily concerned with describing

and explaining national actions above and beyond this minimal level of support. The ways in which nations support the Andean Pact and the factors determining this support are the central questions of this analysis.

The participants in this regional cooperation scheme are the national governments which have made the commitment to regional action. While governments may seek to maximize internal political support for their foreign policy decisions by involving other sectors of the population, support for a regional cooperation scheme is ultimately carried out by governments. Universities, for example, may sponsor seminars on the "role of the university in Andean integration," but their conclusions are concerned with convincing governments, or educating governmental decision-makers, or preparing studies which governments can use to make better decisions. There are, of course, certain limits to referring to governments as monolithic bodies. Certainly in the fieldwork carried out in the member countries, wide divergencies of opinion were found within the member governments -- divergencies based on the agency or office of the official, his ideological leanings, and other factors. However, in spite of these internal divergencies, an identifiable governmental policy could always be discerned.

The concept of national support for an international group is not a new one. Previous studies (Clark et al., 1971; Alker, 1964) have sought to describe and explain national policies of support for the United Nations (UN). On a conceptual level, these studies and the present one are dealing with the same phenomenon. However, studies examining support for the UN use indicators such as size of delegations, financial contributions, and voting records on certain kinds of issues (usually

supranational issues or decisions which would increase the authority or scope of UN jurisdiction). These indicators cannot, for the most part, be applied to the study of support for the Andean Pact. The size and composition of national delegations to Andean Pact meetings vary greatly depending on the issues under consideration. Financial support for the scheme's activities is precisely determined by prior agreement. Formal votes in Andean Pact meetings are rarely taken; rather, as will be discussed in Chapter II, decisions are generally made through consensus. In the few cases where formal votes are recorded, the results are not made public.

This study uses four indicators of support for the Andean Pact -- indicators which correspond to different dimensions of participation. They are level of activity, supportive attitudes, effect of Andean Pact membership on foreign policy behavior, and the degree of implementation of Pact projects.

A Four-Dimensional View of Support for the Andean Pact

Support for a regional cooperation scheme is hypothesized here to be a four-dimensional phenomenon. Members have a certain level of activity toward the Pact. They hold certain supportive attitudes toward the scheme. They implement group programs to some extent on a national level. And their foreign policy behavior is influenced by their Pact membership to some degree. These dimensions are obviously related. Nations exhibiting high levels of activity should also exhibit high levels of supportive attitudes. The extent to which a national government implements the Andean Pact's programs will influence both the level of activity and the degree of supportive attitudes toward the Pact.

Similarly, nations that are active and supportive toward the Andean Pact will exhibit increased awareness of the Pact in their general foreign policy behavior. The relationships between these four dimensions will be explored in Chapter III.

Activity

One indicator of national support is the nation's level of activity toward the Andean Pact. Activity is defined here as that observable behavior undertaken by a government toward the Andean Pact with the intention of supporting -- or not supporting -- the Pact's goals, decisions, or jurisdiction. The level of activity demonstrates the government's willingness to bear the costs of integration and to participate actively in terms of supporting group decisions and devising new areas for joint activity. Activity may be verbal as in public statements about the Andean Pact or proposals to expand the Pact's authority. Activity may also be non-verbal such as attending, organizing, and hosting group meetings. A nation's level of activity is considered as one indicator of its support for the Andean Pact. Activity corresponds to Easton's concept of overt support in that it is manifest, observable behavior.

Supportive attitudes

A second indicator of support consists of those supportive attitudes held by national decision-makers with respect to the Andean Pact. This indicator corresponds to what Easton calls covert support. Supportive attitudes are defined as those positive orientations of the Andean Pact held by national decision-makers. The supportive attitudes examined here deal with the importance the national governments assign to the Andean Pact and its activities. While a correlation is expected to

exist between supportive attitudes and the level of activity exhibited by a nation toward the Andean Pact, these two dimensions are conceptually distinct in that the former indicates observable behavior while the latter indicates a predisposition to support the Pact.

Implementation

A third dimension of support for the regional cooperation scheme is the extent to which Andean Pact programs and decisions are being carried out on a national level. As Puchala (1975) points out, very little attention has been directed to the process of national implementation of group decisions. Yet the success of a regional cooperation scheme ultimately depends on the extent to which members carry out group agreements. Implementation includes acts such as national seminars to inform elements of the population about the Andean Pact and its programs, carrying out feasibility studies and encouraging production in industries assigned by the Pact, and complying with group decisions on tariff-reductions and policy harmonization.

Impact of membership on foreign policy behavior

A final dimension of support for the Andean Pact is the extent to which a nation's general foreign policy behavior is influenced by its membership in the Andean Pact. A theme in integration theory is that as nations participate in a regional grouping, their foreign policy behavior will become increasingly oriented toward the group. Members will be "forced" to hammer out a collective position toward the rest of the world (Nye, 1971; Schmitter, 1969a, 1970a). The impact of Andean Pact membership on the foreign policy behavior of its members may take the form of reliance on joint foreign policy statements,

consultation among members on foreign policy issues, references to Pact membership in dealing with nations outside the region, and the strengthening of bilateral relationships among members.

These four indicators or dimensions of national support for the Andean Pact are examined with respect to national foreign policy behavior toward the Pact in general. In addition, these indicators are useful in describing national policies of support with respect to the four areas under consideration: trade liberalization measures, industrial programming measures, the Statute on the Common Treatment of Foreign Capital, and the proposed Andean Tribunal of Justice.

The dependent variable of this study, support for a regional cooperation scheme, consists of those actions undertaken by a member government with respect to the activities, goals, and jurisdiction of the Andean Pact. National support will be manifested along different dimensions and to differing degrees depending on the issues under consideration. This conceptualization of support for the Andean Pact as a four-dimensional phenomenon will be empirically examined in Chapter III. In the section below, the question of factors explaining national support for the Andean Pact is examined.

Explaining Support for a Regional Cooperation Scheme

Each member nation of the Andean Pact has certain economic, political, and social characteristics which are hypothesized to influence its foreign policy behavior toward the Andean Pact. These characteristics -- or background conditions -- set limits to the support it can extend toward the Andean Pact. In addition to these background conditions, the process of regional cooperation itself generates other characteristics

which affect the continued support a nation exhibits toward the Andean Pact. These two sets of characteristics -- the relatively static background conditions and the dynamic process conditions -- interact to produce national policies of support for the regional cooperation scheme.[5] From the literature on integration and on the comparative study of foreign policy, certain factors were suggested as influencing national foreign policy behavior toward a regional cooperation scheme. The purpose of this section is to relate these factors into an overall framework of analysis.

The background conditions to be analyzed are: level of economic development, political characteristics of the regime, and ties with external actors. The dynamic factors incorporate the experiences a nation derives from participation in the cooperation scheme: perceptions of tangible benefits, increase in transactions with other members, and perceptions of equitable distribution of benefits.

Most of the studies of comparative foreign policy focus only on the role of background conditions in explaining foreign policy behavior. While integration theory has devoted more attention to the dynamic factors influencing regional unity, few studies have sought to assess the relative importance of these groups of factors.[6] Thus, this analysis seeks to determine the ways in which the background conditions and the dynamic factors interact in formulating foreign policy toward the Andean Pact.

The background conditions will largely determine how the processual factors are evaluated. Thus, the level of economic development has a considerable impact on the importance assigned to the need for equitable distribution of costs and benefits. Similarly, the regime's political

attitudes will be related to its perceptions of tangible benefits deriving from support for a regional cooperation scheme.

The dynamic factors will likewise affect governmental perceptions of the regional cooperation scheme. If the outcomes of national support for the regional cooperation scheme are considered beneficial by those national officials who formulate foreign policy toward the Pact, that national support will be reinforced. Similarly, if the outcomes of that national support for a regional cooperation scheme are perceived as disadvantageous to the goals or interests of the nation, national support will be weakened. It is suggested here that the dynamic factors influence foreign policy behavior toward the Andean Pact in terms of the perceptions of decision-makers and must be examined within the context of these perceptions. While Bolivia, for example, may have received tangible benefits regarding industrial production, these benefits must be perceived by decision-makers in order for them to have a positive effect on Bolivian support for the Andean Pact. Furthermore, decision-makers view benefits deriving from support in relationship to the benefits they perceive other members obtaining. Thus, it is not sufficient to compare simply the benefits and costs of support through the use of objective indicators. Officials must perceive that the benefits are occurring and that they are comparable with those received by other members.

Implicit in this discussion of background conditions and dynamic factors are certain assumptions about why nations support a regional cooperation scheme and about the interactions among these determining factors. These assumptions form the basis for the formation of more specific hypotheses to be tested in this analysis. These assumptions

may be summarized as follows:[7]

1. A nation will support a regional cooperation scheme to the extent that the scheme agrees with its own interests.
1-A The more often support for the regional cooperation scheme has led to, or contributed to, the realization of a nation's interests, the greater the likelihood that the nation will continue its support.

2. A nation will support a regional cooperation scheme to the extent that the behavior of the other members is important to the nation for the realization of its goals.
2-A The more frequently a nation interacts with other members, the more important their behavior will become for the realization of the nation's goals.

3. A nation will support a regional cooperation scheme to the extent that the benefits of membership are perceived as outweighing the costs.
3-A The more a nation perceives that the benefits deriving from a regional cooperation scheme are being equitably distributed, the more it will support the regional cooperation scheme.

The determination of a nation's interests or goals in the regional cooperation scheme is hypothesized to be a function of the economic development goals of the government, the extent to which foreign investment is considered necessary for the attainment of those goals, and governmental decision-makers' perceptions of shared problems within the regional cooperation scheme. Background conditions considered important in determining a nation's capabilities to support a regional cooperation scheme include the level of economic development, the financial resources available to the government, and the structure of the government.

A government must have not only the desire to participate but also the capability of supporting the group's decisions. Attention has been focused on the idea of capabilities by theorists analyzing integration in underdeveloped countries. Hansen (1969: 26) summarizes two of the

major theorists' assessments for the potential for success of integration schemes in underdeveloped countries:

> Etzioni, for example, tentatively suggests that limited horizons, lack of administrative and political skills, and preoccupation with problems of domestic modernization all represent major barriers to successful integration efforts. . . .Deutsch's "capabilities" approach also produces pessimistic observations on regional integration among underdeveloped nations. In most such states, domestic "loads," derived from as well as necessitating social, political, and economic change, are already overstraining capabilities. In these circumstances it is difficult to imagine that a growth in the capacity for "responsiveness" among member units to each others' needs will keep pace with the increasing burdens imposed by integration schemes.

In his perceptive analysis of the Central American case, Fagan (1970: vii) points out that "the two major theoretical approaches based on Western Europe's experience -- transactionalists and functionalists -- seem only to be able to predict the failure of integrative efforts in developing countries. The reasons for these predictions are clear. Developing countries have a low resource base which seemed to impose sharp limits on the capability to defer benefits from common markets, to postpone the gratification of expectations."

On a conceptual level, the distinction between desire and capability to support a regional cooperation scheme seems clear. However, the two concepts are interrelated. A government's desire to support a regional cooperation scheme will be influenced by the capabilities it has to undertake such support. Conversely, a nation will be willing to allocate more of its scarce resources to support a regional cooperation scheme when it perceives that it is in its best interest to do so.

In the following section, the hypothesized relationships between support for a regional cooperation scheme and the various background and dynamic factors are presented.

The Hypotheses

The level of economic development is expected to affect support by determining national capabilities in terms of total resources available and by determining which issues within the regional program will be emphasized by a given government. It is hypothesized that there will be a direct relationship between level of economic development and support for a regional cooperation scheme. This relationship is expected to exist for two reasons: 1) the more resources available to a government, the more likely the government will be able to carry out programs of the regional cooperation scheme, and 2) the more developed the economy, the more sectors or areas theoretically available for joint action.

H_1 The higher the level of national economic development, the more likely the nation will be to support a regional cooperation scheme.

A second factor hypothesized to affect the determination of national capabilities is the resources available to the government. The financial and technological capabilities of government are expected to affect national support for a regional cooperation scheme in that the more such capabilities the government possesses, the more able it will be to carry out the studies necessary for bargaining within the group and the more able it will be to implement programs. Most of the decisions of the regional cooperation schemes are left up to national bureaucracies for implementation; if the bureaucracies do not have the resources to implement them, few of the benefits (or costs) will be felt.

H_2 The more financial resources available to the government, the more likely that nation will be to support a regional cooperation scheme.

A final factor hypothesized to affect the determination of national capabilities is the structure of the government. Highly centralized governments with little or no opposition will be able to implement decisions rapidly and completely, while more open societies will require longer time periods to adopt programs and more effort will be expended at convincing opposition. This hypothesis runs counter to the assumptions found in much of the literature on integration, which stresses the need for pluralism and broad-based political support (e.g. Haas, 1971). However, in the case of efforts at regional development, it appears that regional cooperation schemes are viewed by the general population as just another governmental policy, and the major decisions are made by the national governments. Thus, the fewer the restrictions on the national government, the more it will be able to implement its desired policies.

H_3 The more centralized the government, and the more controlled the opposition, the more likely a nation will be to support a regional cooperation scheme.

These three factors -- level of economic development, governmental resources, and the structure of government are hypothesized as affecting national support for a regional cooperation scheme by determining national capabilities. However, these factors are clearly not sufficient to explain national support. Cases exist, for example, where highly centralized governments capable of supporting a regional cooperation scheme have neither the interest nor the desire to do so. The analysis of factors determining national interests in supporting a regional cooperation scheme is thus considered crucial for this study. Three factors are hypothesized to affect national interest in a regional

cooperation scheme: the economic development goals of the regime, the perceived role of foreign investment in achieving those goals, and the perceptions of national decision-makers that there are shared problems in the subregion.

All governments of underdeveloped nations seek to promote economic development. Yet governments hold very different views as to the type of economic development desired. The types of economic development goals held by a regime are expected to influence national support for a regional cooperation scheme. The more decision-makers perceive that their economic development goals are compatible with the purposes of the regional cooperation scheme, the more they will support that scheme. The type of economic development desired by a regime will affect the extent to which the government will participate in programs of the regional cooperation scheme designed to accelerate that type of economic development. In the case of the Andean Pact, governments that emphasize attaining economic development through expansion of trade and stimulus to existing industry will be more active in trade liberalization measures. Governments that place a high premium on the development of new, heavy industry will be more active in programs of industrial planning.

H_4 The more emphasis a government places on increasing exports as a means of promoting economic development, the more likely it will be to support trade liberalization measures.

H_5 The more emphasis a government places on the development of heavy industry as a means of promoting economic development, the more likely it will be to support industrial programming.

The importance attached to foreign investment as a means of realizing a government's economic development goals is another factor considered important in explaining support for a regional cooperation scheme. When

a government perceives that foreign investment is vital to national economic development, it will be reluctant to take steps to antagonize that foreign investment. In the case of a regional cooperation scheme this may manifest itself in a reluctance to support provisions on foreign investment which may antagonize investors.

H_6 The greater the perceived importance of foreign investment for the realization of economic development goals, the less likely that nation is to support decisions of a regional cooperation scheme to limit foreign investment.

A final factor considered important in explaining national support for a regional cooperation scheme is the attitudes of the government toward the other members. Elite value complementarity is frequently cited as a factor conducive (or essential) to the formation of a regional community (Deutsch et al., 1957). Certainly the perception that shared problems exist is expected to encourage further participation. This factor seems especially important in the context of the Andean countries. Given traditional political ties and trade patterns, Latin American nations historically appear to have looked on each other as rivals for the favor of the United States. As one author states, "the bonds that connect each Latin American republic with the United States are more powerful than the ones with sister republics that share the same traditions and cultures" (Espartaco, 1969: 53). Certainly one of the reasons for LAFTA's failure was the lack of a feeling among members that economic problems were shared (e.g. Wionczek, 1966). Similarly, one of the chief justifications for the formation of the Andean Pact was the fact that its members shared common problems and perceptions on how those problems should be solved. The extent to which Pact members perceive that their

problems are shared by the members of the group is suggested to be an important factor in explaining support for a regional cooperation scheme.

H_7 The more national decision-makers perceive that there are shared problems within the group, the more likely they will be to support a regional cooperation scheme.

Up to this point, only those background conditions considered important in explaining national support for a regional cooperation scheme have been examined. It has been suggested that these factors affect national support by determining national interests and capabilities to support a regional cooperation scheme. It is also necessary to consider those dynamic factors hypothesized to affect national support: perceptions of tangible benefits accruing from the regional cooperation scheme, increasing transactions with other members, and perceptions of equitable distribution of benefits.

For nations to maintain their support for a regional cooperation scheme, they must perceive that the benefits of that support outweigh the costs. The benefits must not only exist objectively but also be perceived by national decision-makers. Perceived benefits may include factors such as increased opportunities for industrial development, encouragement of existing manufacturing establishments, political benefits deriving from membership in a subregional bloc, and increased efficiency through harmonization of policies.

H_8 The more decision-makers perceive the benefits of support for a regional cooperation scheme as outweighing the costs, the more likely that nation will be to support a regional cooperation scheme.

A recurrent theme in the literature on European integration is the

importance of regional transactions (Deutsch et al., 1957; Deutsch, 1968; Russett, 1967; Haas, 1971; Puchala, 1970b). It is usually hypothesized that an economic union will be more successful if there exists within the region a high rate of transactions before the time of the union. It is also maintained that increased transactions encourage feelings of interdependence and satisfaction with the union. As Haas (1971: 10-11) states, "members of regional groupings perceive themselves as being increasingly interdependent as the volume and rate of transactions between them rises as compared to third countries." However, it is sometimes difficult to determine if increased transactions are thought to be a cause of integration or an effect, since an increase in regional trade is usually one of the objectives of the union. In the case of the Andean Pact, it is somewhat easier to postulate the relationship between transactions and support since the level of subregional transactions existing prior to the creation of the Andean Pact was uniformly low; subregional trade, for example, rarely reached five percent of a nation's total trade. It is hypothesized that as transactions within the subregion increase, feelings of interdependence among decision-makers will increase, thus reinforcing national policies of support for the Andean Pact.

H_9 The greater the increase in transactions between a nation and other members of a regional cooperation scheme, the more likely that nation will be to support the scheme.

The equitable distribution of costs and benefits is another factor frequently suggested as essential to the success of integration schemes. As the Secretariat of the UN Council on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) stated in a report cited by Sloan (1971: 150), "probably the most important reason for the failure of integration schemes or for the

reluctance to enter into them is the insufficient consideration given to this problem of the fair share of ensuing gain." Fagan (1970) argues that many of the Central American Common Market's problems stem from members' dissatisfaction with the distribution of benefits within the group. Similarly Ghai (1965) analyzes the distribution of benefits in the East African Federation. He attributes Tanganyika's decision to withdraw from the group as the result of the fact that Tanganyika was not deriving benefits from membership while the other members were. It is hypothesized here that a nation will support a regional cooperation scheme to the extent that it perceives that costs and benefits of membership are being distributed fairly and equitably.

H_{10} The more a nation perceives that benefits and costs deriving from the regional cooperation scheme are being distributed in an equitable manner, the more likely it will be to support that scheme.

The Data

Fieldwork

The data on the perceptions of decision-makers were obtained through personal interviews carried out in the six member countries of the Andean Pact from January through August, 1975. These interviews, lasting from thirty minutes to two hours, were open-ended in format and were generally successful in elucidating the types of information desired. While the research plan called for ten interviews in each of the countries, different degrees of success in gaining access led to a somewhat different distribution of interviews: Bolivia - 9; Colombia - 12; Chile - 6; Ecuador - 10; Peru - 23; Venezuela - 5. In addition, approximately ten interviews were obtained from outside observers including the U.S. representative to the

Andean Pact, representatives of various international organizations, the Andean Pact's Junta, and the Corporación Andina de Fomento. With the exception of Chile, interviews with members of the private sector were included in each of the countries. An attempt was made to ensure the comparability of the interview data by selecting técnicos of roughly similar status in the various national offices of integration. Most of the interviews were carried out with heads of departments within the national offices of integration -- e.g. with the chief of the judicial department or the person charged with overseeing industrial programming decisions. Officials of business organizations such as the Chamber of Commerce or industrialists directly affected by Andean Pact provisions were selected.

The data obtained from the interviews are used primarily in measuring the dependent variable, support for the Andean Pact. Respondents were asked to characterize the attitudes of their governments toward the Andean Pact along a number of dimensions, including degree of optimism, satisfaction, implementation, support for various programs and Andean Pact organs, trends in national participation and degree of perceived political commitment. In an attempt to use the "reputational approach," respondents were also asked questions relating to the participation of other nations. They were asked to describe the level of activity of each of the other nations and then to rank order the nations in terms of that activity. In addition, respondents were asked questions relating to several of the independent variables including the extent and type of domestic opposition and support, the extent to which economic and political problems are shared among the member countries, perceptions of the distribution of benefits of integration, perceptions of dependency on the United States,

the role of foreign investment in the Andean Pact, perceptions of constraints to national support, and perceived problems in economic cooperation with other members. Because the interviews were open-ended in format and a great deal of probing was used, it is difficult to present a definitive interview schedule. However, the general questionnaire is presented in Appendix 1.

Event Data

Since the officials interviewed were not, for the most part, top foreign policy makers and since this study is concerned with national attitudes and actions, the interview data are supplemented by event data. Event or interaction analysis has received a great deal of attention in recent years in the field of international relations. Originally formulated by McClelland (1968) in the World Event/Interaction Survey (WEIS), foreign policy acts were abstracted from the New York Times and then coded along a number of dimensions. Encouraged perhaps by the possibility of using hard data to describe trends in foreign policy behavior, other researchers began collecting and using events data sets both on an international level (e.g. Rummel, 1966; Azar, 1973) and on a regional level (Burrowes and Spector, 1970; McGowan, 1968, 1973; McGowan and Gottwald, 1975; Wittkopf et al., 1974).

Analysis using events data has been fruitful both in describing foreign policy behavior and to a lesser extent in testing hypotheses (McGowan, 1973). McClelland and Hoggard (1969: 713) define interactions as "single action items of a non-routine, extraordinary character that in some characteristic sense are directed across a national boundary and have, in most instances, a specific foreign target." The general

procedure in event data analysis is as follows: 1) events are abstracted from a news source in accordance with the definition of a foreign policy events (which depends on the study being carried out), 2) the events are coded along a variety of dimensions, and 3) aggregated along those dimensions. For the purposes of this study, the abstraction and coding scheme used is based on the one developed by Ferris et al. (1973) for the Latin American Transaction/Interaction Survey (LATINS) project. Events were first abstracted from a regional periodical, Grupo Andino, which is published monthly by the Junta of the Acuerdo de Cartagena. This periodical reports activities of the Andean Pact, activities of national actors directed toward the Pact, and activities of members directed toward one another. After abstracting the events in subject-verb-object form, each event was coded according to actor, date, target, type of action, issue area, actor and target categories, unilateral/multilateral nature of act, Andean dimension and issue, and source. The guidelines used in coding these data are presented in Appendix 2. The time period covered is 1971 and October 1973 through November 1975. The 1971 data were collected for comparative purposes, to allow for the analysis of trends in support for the Andean Pact.

Various other types of data are used in testing the hypotheses. Transaction data, for example, including measures of trade, tourist flows, and public financial transfers, are used to measure patterns of transactions. Comparative analysis of national legislation is used in examining implementation of group decisions.

Summary

In this chapter a framework for the analysis of national support for a regional cooperation scheme has been developed. Support for a

regional cooperation scheme was defined as that behavior a nation exhibits toward the scheme for the purposes of influencing the scheme's goals or activities. It was suggested that there are four dimensions to support for a regional cooperation scheme: 1) activity, 2) supportive attitudes, 3) implementation of group decisions, and 4) the extent to which membership in the scheme influences other foreign policy behavior. It was further hypothesized that nations would not support all of the activities of a regional cooperation scheme equally and that, in fact, different issues of support could be identified.

The framework suggests that national support for a regional cooperation scheme is the product of the relationship between certain background conditions and dynamic factors. The background conditions are those national characteristics that determine a nation's desire to support a regional cooperation scheme as well as its capability of doing so. The dynamic factors are those experiences deriving from the regional cooperation scheme itself. While the background conditions in effect determine what a nation hopes to "get out" of its support for a regional cooperation scheme, the dynamic factors provide feedback as to how well those expectations are being met.

This framework has specified a number of variables considered important in explaining national support for a regional cooperation scheme. The analysis of national support for the Andean Pact will be carried out through the use of this framework. Chapter II presents a substantive background of the Andean Pact's history and organization. The dimensions of support by the six member nations toward the Andean Pact are analyzed in Chapter III. The operationalization of the hypotheses and their testing is included in Chapter IV. In the concluding chapter, the question of the utility of this analytical framework in

explaining national support for a regional cooperation scheme is explored.

NOTES
CHAPTER I

1. Easton defines a political system as "those interactions through which values are authoritatively allocated for a society" (1966: 21). The Andean Pact does not meet these criteria for a political system in that the members of the group are nations. The Pact may seek to allocate values for the group but its authority depends absolutely, at least at the present time, on the willingness of the members to accept and implement this allocation.

The problems of using systems analysis are considerable, even when the unit of analysis is a national polity. The boundaries of a political system are difficult to determine. The whole notion of equilibrium in political life is difficult to assess. The model of the political system focuses attention on the systems' inputs and outputs with relatively little emphasis placed on the actual process of decision-making. These problems are multiplied considerably in extending the concept of political systems to entities other than national governments.

Although we are in a sense rejecting the overall political systems theory for application to the case of the Andean Pact, certain of the concepts and relationships suggested by Easton are useful in analyzing subregional relationships.

2. An exception here is the literature on national behavior toward the United Nations (Wittkopf, 1973; Alker, 1964; Russett, 1966; Walbek, 1971; Clark et al., 1971; Vincent, 1968). In these studies emphasis is placed on accounting for variation in foreign policy behavior toward the UN.

3. See, for example: Krause and Mathis, 1969; Angarita, 1973; Morales, 1974; Milenky, 1973; Avery and Cochrane, n.d.; Banfield, 1965; Newman, 1965. Notable exceptions are Fagan (1970) and Schmitter (1972). Both of these authors analyze the CACM, finding that European models do not apply to this case.

4. Haas and Schmitter (1971) for example, look at interest groups in Latin America in seeking to analyze the extent of pluralism in LAFTA. They note that the proliferation of these groups is clouded by their passivity and symbolic existence. Yet, if we consider that some 40 percent of all Latin American exports are exported by American affiliates (Barnet and Muller, 1974: 157), the more important question seems to be the effect of these transnational, foreign companies.

5. This distinction between background and dynamic factors was first made by Haas and Schmitter (1966: 266). They argued that three

groups of factors are influential in explaining the success of an integration scheme: background conditions (size of member units, rates of interunit transaction, extent of social pluralism within the units, and elite complementarity), conditions existing at the time of union (degree of shared government purposes and powers delegated to the union), and process factors (decision-making style, post-integration rates of transactions, and the adaptability of governments in situations of disappointment and crisis).

Wilkinson (1969) "suggests that determinants of foreign policy can be grouped into one of three general categories: capability, will and prescription, and residuals. The first category includes variables that measure essentially resource capacity of a nation, variables that other analysts have found to correlate highly with a SIZE dimension. The second category, will and prescription, includes variables that measure various facets and characteristics of national leadership, while the residual category includes such measures of the national polity as political institutions, culture, and style" (as cited by Gordon and Moore, 1976: 1).

6. Barrera and Haas (1969) attempt to specify the relative importance of variables conducive to regional integration but they rely wholly on the evaluations of expert judges. Similarly Haas and Schmitter (1966) rate the potential for success of the European Economic Community, the East African Federation, and the Central American Common Market by evaluating the three groups of factors (see Note 5) in terms of high, low, and mixed quantities.

7. The need for clearly specifying the assumptions or postulates upon which further analysis is based is emphasized by DeVree (1972).

CHAPTER II
HISTORY AND ORGANIZATION OF THE ANDEAN PACT

For several decades, socio-economic integration has been postulated as a viable solution to Latin American underdevelopment, receiving support from such international organizations as the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) and the Organization of American States (OAS). In the early 1960s, the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) and the Central American Common Market (CACM) were established in hopes of accelerating development through common action. Both of these organizations were conceived and planned in an atmosphere of great enthusiasm and both are now in considerable disarray. The Andean Pact can in part be viewed as an outgrowth of the disillusionment with LAFTA.

LAFTA, composed of most of the South American countries and Mexico, sought to establish a free common market, with tariff reductions to be implemented for a wide range of products. But the process of reducing tariffs and of agreeing on which products should be included proved to be much more difficult than originally expected. Negotiations bogged down and progress in developing a common schedule for tariff reductions was painfully slow. Every detail of the tariff reduction schedule had to be negotiated -- which meant that eleven nations had to arrive at a consensus on basic goals and priorities. As negotiations slowed down and eventually stalled, it became obvious that LAFTA was a failure.

A number of explanations have been given for LAFTA's failure. Alexander (1968: 27) argues that Latin American nations turned to

integration schemes as "an easy way out of dealing with the more difficult problem of expanding markets." Prebisch (1971: 224) suggests that the lack of a coherent regional economic policy and of adequate planning mechanisms were prime reasons for the failure of LAFTA. Many authors have noted problems resulting from differences among nations in terms of developmental needs. Uruguay and Mexico, for example, faced different types of problems and could hardly be expected to agree on priorities for industrial development (Wionczek, 1966). The three largest LAFTA members, Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, increased trade among themselves but showed less interest in expanding their relationships with the smaller nations. An intermediate group composed of countries with insufficient markets -- Chile, Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela -- suffered unfavorable trade balances in intra-LAFTA trade and became increasingly disenchanted with LAFTA.

The Development of the Andean Pact

On August 16, 1966, at the invitation of Colombian president Carlos Lleras Restrepo, the presidents of Chile, Venezuela, Colombia and representatives of Peru and Ecuador met in Colombia to discuss ways of improving the situation. At the end of the meeting the Declaration of Bogota was signed which expressed the desire of these countries to accelerate joint action toward the goal of economic integration on a subregional level. These five nations argued that progress in LAFTA had been too slow and that only through the union of more homogeneous countries could economic integration succeed. They advocated an accelerated and irreversible program of tariff reductions, joint industrial planning, and the development of a common negotiating group. Furthermore, they maintained that success on a subregional level would stimulate economic integration for the region as a whole.

In 1967, a Joint Commission was established to formulate a concrete proposal for the subregional integration scheme. At this time, Bolivia expressed interest in belonging to such a group and sent a representative to participate in negotiations. In September 1967, the Council of Ministers of Foreign Relations of LAFTA approved in Resolutions 202 and 203 the bases for the establishment of an Andean subregional agreement.

In 1968, the Corporación Andina de Fomento (CAF) was formed with headquarters in Caracas. Later that year, representatives of the six nations met in Cartagena, Colombia to draw up a final subregional integration agreement. During the negotiations Chile and Colombia followed a line of immediate free trade orientation, while Venezuela, together with Peru, and, to a lesser extent, Ecuador, wanted longer time periods for compliance and more safeguard clauses (Hurtado, 1975: 42). The final document was a compromise between these factions and was signed on May 26, 1969, by representatives of Bolivia, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, and Peru. The agreement entered into force on October 16, 1969, when LAFTA's permanent committee received the official ratification of the Peruvian government. Under the agreement, the accord would go into effect when three of the signatories ratified the agreement. Colombia (September 9) and Chile (September 10) had already communicated their ratifications and Ecuador (November 21) and Bolivia (November 27) soon followed. Venezuelan representatives argued that special concessions were necessary for Venezuela's incorporation into the group and did not sign the original agreement (Bonderud, 1976).

Perhaps the most lucid explanation of the reasons for the emergence of the Andean Pact is that given by Germánico Salgado, presently a member of the Pact's permanent professional organization. He maintains

(Salgado, 1970a: 178) that the principal catalysts for the formation of the Andean Pact were the following changes in attitudes on the part of the Andean Pact nations:

1. increasing disenchantment with the polarization of trade among the larger LAFTA members;
2. the desire to increase the negotiating capacity of nations of medium and lesser relative development;
3. the growing conviction that integration must incorporate joint industrial programming and policy; and
4. the realization that most Latin American countries were reluctant to modify the LAFTA treaty.

The Acuerdo de Cartagena was a much more ambitious plan than the former attempts at Latin American cooperation. Regional unity was to be sought in a wide variety of sectors and was to be achieved through the following mechanisms:

1. harmonization of economic and social policies and coordination of national legislation;
2. intensification of the subregional industrialization process and the implementation of sectoral programs of industrial development;
3. an accelerated, automatic and irreversible program of trade liberalization;
4. a common external tariff;
5. development of the agricultural sector;
6. physical integration in terms of developing joint programs for infrastructure development;
7. channelling resources from within and outside the subregion to provide the financing and investment required for integration; and
8. preferential treatment for Bolivia and Ecuador in recognition of their relative lesser economic development.

The Organization of the Andean Pact

The Comisión

Two primary organs were established to carry out the goals of the Acuerdo de Cartagena: the Comisión and the Junta. The Comisión, composed of high-level representatives from each member country, meets at least three times a year in Lima to formulate the general policy of the Andean Pact. The Junta is a permanent technical organ, charged with drawing up proposals for subregional common action and ensuring uniform implementation of joint programs.

Representatives of the Andean Pact Comisión are the heads of the national integration offices of the member countries. They are thus constantly involved with the implementation of Andean Pact programs. Because they spend the bulk of their time in their own capitals, they also have a more realistic conception of what programs are politically acceptable and are more likely to have the political contacts to ensure their success. This contrasts with LAFTA where each member maintains a permanent mission in Montevideo, headed by a diplomat of usually ambassadorial status. As a consequence, LAFTA negotiations have little meaning as representatives must constantly check with their governments for instructions.

The Andean Pact also differs from LAFTA in its decision-making mechanisms. The Andean Pact provides for a veto in four types of decisions: structural changes in the subregional agreement, designation of members of the Junta, industrial programming decisions, and preferential treatment for Bolivia and Ecuador.[1] However, all other decisions require only a two-thirds vote. This differs from the voting provisions of LAFTA where unanimity is required on most issues.

A real effort is made in Comisión meetings to avoid show-down votes through compromise. The members seek to formulate decisions which will be politically acceptable in all of the member countries -- realizing that if a nation is unhappy with a particular decision, it probably will not implement it. The meetings themselves are closed to the public, and unlike LAFTA, representatives of the private sector are not allowed to attend. The size of the delegations varies widely depending on the issues under discussion; usually twenty to thirty delegates from each country attend the meetings. Again, unlike LAFTA, these delegates are not drawn from the diplomatic corps but from various ministries and agencies. Most representatives know each other well and the Comisión meetings are generally informal. During the times the meetings are in session, representatives spend most of their time with each other, either in meetings or social gatherings.

The Junta

The Junta is the professional technical organ of the Pact charged with formulating proposals and seeing that they are implemented. It is composed of three members who are designated by the Comisión for a period of three years and who can be re-appointed. In Decision 9, the Comisión prohibited members of the Junta from taking instructions from any government, receiving awards or honors from any country and from holding any other position (paid or not). Members of the Junta are not permitted to be away from Lima for more than sixty days at a time. The coordinator of the Junta is rotated annually (as is the presidency of the Comisión). The current members of the Junta -- Germánico Salgado, Felipe Salazar Santos, and Salvador Lluch Soler -- are natives of Andean countries. They have all had extensive

experience in Latin American international organizations and are held in high esteem by both their own governments and those of the other members.

The Junta has a staff of approximately 50 tecnicos and 150 support personnel. The formal powers of the Junta are extensive: it carries out studies, formulates proposals, determines whether members are complying with joint decisions, and calls meetings. In addition, there are a number of cases where the Comisión can only make decisions based on the Junta's proposals. Thus, the Junta sets many of the limits for Comisión activity. The Junta is also empowered to make resolutions in order to interpret various decisions and to grant extensions and exemptions to members.

Andean Pact business is actually conducted largely by technical officials meeting at regular intervals with the Junta. In preparing the proposal for the metalworking sector, for example, the Junta met with official experts from each of the member countries both individually and jointly before drawing up its proposal for the Comisión.

Auxiliary Organs

In addition to these two main organs of the Andean Pact, there are a number of auxiliary organs. The Comité Asesor Económico-Social (CAES) was intended to serve as a direct link between labor and business interests in each of the six countries and the Junta. In actuality, CAES does very little and has only met a few times. The Junta seems to prefer using other means for dealing with national sectors, especially the meetings of various Andean non-governmental groups and more importantly, the regularized ministerial meetings. The reasons for this preference are obvious: ministers can actually set policies while labor leaders can only make suggestions.

On a ministerial level, there is a trend toward institutionalization.

The Ministers of Education formed the Convenio Andrés Bello in early 1970, establishing a permanent executive secretariat in Bogota. This group has been most successful in attempting to harmonize educational and cultural policies. The Convenio Simón Rodriguez was formed in 1971 by the Ministers of Labor with headquarters in Quito and the Convenio Hipólito Unanúe, composed of the Ministers of Health, has been meeting regularly since 1971, although a permanent secretariat has not yet been established. These groups work closely with the Junta in seeking to harmonize policies in various fields. While some of their activities seem to correspond to Schmitter's (1970b) spill-around concept in that they represent no real increase in scope or level of integration, in other cases real progress seems to be being accomplished. For instance, standardization of textbooks, of social security of migrants, and of health statistics, while not directly related to the progress of economic development, serve to reinforce the spirit of cooperation. Non-institutionalized meetings of ministers also offer the Junta opportunities to meet with governmental officials. The Ministers of Foreign Relations, of Industry, and of Communications meet regularly.

The Corporación Andina de Fomento (CAF), with headquarters in Caracas, is the Pact's financial institution and is charged with financing many integration projects and with extending special concessions to Bolivia and Ecuador. From the date of its creation in 1968 through May 1975, the CAF had made grants totalling $103,000,000. The distribution by country is presented in Table 1.

These, then, are the principal organizational structures of the Andean Pact. The designers of the Andean Pact sought to remedy much of the organizational weakness of LAFTA by ensuring that national political actors

Table 1. Grants of the Corporación Andina de Fomento, 1968 through May, 1975, by country, in U.S. dollars.

Recipient country	Number of Programs	Percent of Total Grants	Total Amount
Peru	10	27	27,125,200
Chile	17	23	23,690,000
Ecuador	19	22	22,660,000
Bolivia	19	15	15,450,000
Colombia	5	10	10,300,000
Venezuela	3	3	3,774,800
TOTAL	73	100	103,000,000

Source: Grupo Andino, 45 (May 1975) 10.

were accorded a dominant position in subregional decision-making, by largely eliminating diplomats from the process, and by establishing a strong Junta.

Implementation of Pact Programs

Perhaps the weakest stage in the process of subregional cooperation is that of national implementation of group decisions. At the present time, implementation is overseen in two ways. The Junta, charged with overseeing implementation, travels, consults, and studies national legislation and issues directives concerning implementation and interpretation. Each of the national offices of integration has a judicial section charged with seeing that Pact decisions are implemented in their countries. They

also keep a strict eye out on the other countries, making sure that programs are being implemented in the other nations. If it is felt that one country is not implementing decisions in accord with the Pact's provisions, complaints are made to the Junta and, frequently, if the Junta does not act in a manner deemed satisfactory to the "accusing nation," unilateral measures are taken. For example, Colombia protested Ecuadorian exports of Japanese ball point pens to other Pact members under advantages offered by the Pact. In retaliation, Colombia began increasing bureaucratic problems for Ecuadorian goods and individuals on the border. Ecuador protested and eventually the matter was resolved. All of the nations have taken such steps at one time or another.

A more serious problem occurred in 1974 when the other five countries felt that Chile was not implementing Decision 24 (Statute on Common Treatment of Foreign Investment). Furthermore, they charged that Chilean Law 600 contradicted the spirit and letter of the law. Chile sent a special delegation to the other five countries seeking support for its position, arguing that it was in a unique situation and that an exception was needed. But at a Comisión meeting in the fall of 1974, the other five countries in effect issued an ultimatum, saying that Chile should either comply with the decision or withdraw from the Pact. Chile said it would comply and the Junta monitored the situation, finding that Chile was in fact complying satisfactorily with the decision. This case illustrates both the strength of the Pact -- in the sense that Chile was forced to comply with the group's decision -- and its weakness. Controversy over Decision 24 and Chile's compliance slowed down progress in other areas for months and left a residue of bitterness on the part of the Chileans.

A further effect of the Chilean controversy is that it changed the

Junta's 1971 proposal for an Andean Tribunal of Justice from just another program into a dynamic issue, convincing many that a regularized means for conflict-resolution was needed. The Junta's proposal for an Andean Tribunal of Justice would create an independent and autonomous judicial organ charged with arbitrating disputes among members. The Tribunal would have three functions: 1) to resolve controversies which arise concerning the Acuerdo, the Comisión's decisions, and the Junta's resolutions, 2) to ensure that all national legislation conforms to the limits established by the Junta, and 3) to provide a uniform and cohesive interpretation of the Acuerdo, instead of leaving it up to each government with a resulting variety of interpretations.

The proposal has not yet been adopted, although most of the countries feel that a Tribunal is needed, especially in light of recent controversies. The Chileans and the Peruvians remain concerned that such an organization would infringe on their national sovereignty. They favor inclusion of some statement recognizing the sovereignty of national decisions over subregional ones which would, of course, nullify the reasons for creating such an organ.

The Andean Pact: Potential and Accomplishments

The Andean Pact is based on the premise that by working together the six countries will be able to make better use of the region's resources. An expanded market will allow members to use economies of scale; joint planning in industry will permit more efficient utilization of the subregion's resources and prevent duplication of costly projects; harmonization of economic and social policies will lead to an improved standard of living in the subregion; and the six countries will increase their

negotiating capacity within the international system by working as a group.

Tables 2 and 3 present economic and social indicators of the six Andean Pact nations.

Table 2. Area and Population of the Andean Pact Members, 1975.

Nation	Area (km^2)	Percent Area	Population (Millions)	Population per km^2	Percent Population
Bolivia	1,098,581	20.1	5.41	5	7.1
Colombia	1,138,914	20.8	25.89	23	34.0
Chile	756,900	13.8	10.23	13	13.4
Ecuador	283,561	5.2	7.09	25	9.3
Peru	1,285,216	23.5	15.32	12	20.1
Venezuela	912,050	16.7	12.21	13	16.0
TOTAL	5,475,222	100.0	76.15	14	100.0

Source: Venezuela, Instituto de Comercio Exterior. Notas del ICE, 1, 3 (April 1975) 4.

While these tables show that the potential of the group is much larger than that of any of the nations separately, they also indicate great disparities among the member nations. Venezuela's infant mortality rate is less than a third of that of Bolivia. Venezuela consumes over twenty times as much energy as does Bolivia. While the differences are most striking between Venezuela and Bolivia, there are substantial differences among the other members. While only 7.6 percent of Chile's Gross Domestic

Table 3. Economic and Social Indicators of the Andean Pact Members, circa 1974.

	Bolivia	Colombia	Chile	Ecuador	Peru	Venezuela
Percent literate	39.2	78.5	81.5	77.0	67.7	77.1
Percent urban	30.5	63.8	79.0	41.3	61.8	80.6
Infant mortality rate*	154.0	67.9	65.2	81.9	65.1	50.2
Life expectancy	46.0	51.0	63.3	56.6	62.0	66.4
Population growth rate (1960-74)	2.6	2.8	2.3	2.9	2.5	3.4
GDP**	1.2	9.1	8.2	2.1	7.4	13.2
Participation of agricultural sector in GDP, as percent.	15.2	26.7	7.6	22.3	17.1	6.7
Participation of manufacturing sector in GDP, as percent	13.8	20.5	26.7	17.4	18.4	17.3
Energy consumption, 10^{13} Kcal.	.8	10.7	9.6	1.4	6.2	18.4
Oil consumption, Thousands of barrels	4,654	55,381	37,535	10,324	36,518	92,548

* per 1,000 live births
** Billions of U.S. dollars

Source: Inter-American Development Bank. Economic and Social Progress in Latin America. Annual Report 1974. Washington: Inter-American Development Bank, 1974.

Product (GDP) is derived from the agricultural sector, the corresponding percentage for Colombia is 26.7. These differences are very important in assessing the Andean Pact's potential. One of the main theses of the Andean Pact is to stimulate equitable economic development -- that is, to give added benefits to Ecuador and Bolivia to allow them to "catch up" with the other nations -- and at the same time to achieve balanced growth, ensuring that no one country reaps all of the benefits of integration. The data on social and economic indicators of the members suggest that the achievement of such equitable economic development will be difficult to achieve.

Historically, the nations of the Andean Pact have had low levels of trade with each other. Latin American trade has been dominated by the United States. Table 4 illustrates the tremendous difference between the percentage of Andean trade directed toward the subregion and the percentage of Andean trade directed toward the U.S. in the mid-1960s. While more recent trade figures will be examined in Chapter IV in an attempt to characterize changes in subregional transactions, it is clear that the Andean Pact members faced considerable obstacles in changing the historical trade patterns depicted in Table 4.

These data indicate that while there may be potential in joint economic planning, the problems of overcoming subregional disparities and historical transaction ties as well as the common problems of underdevelopment are great. The mechanisms of the Andean Pact designed to overcome these problems are: 1) trade liberalization, 2) industrial programming, 3) common external tariff, 4) harmonization of economic policies, and 5) preferential treatment for Bolivia and Ecuador.

Table 4. Trade within the Andean Pact and between Andean Pact nations and the U.S., 1965 (In U.S. Thousand Dollars).

	Bolivia	Colombia	Chile	Ecuador	Peru	Venezuela
Exports to Andean Pact countries	1,235	13,195	43,550	10,243	31,296	34,985
Exports to U.S.	56,238	248,738	237,194	74,275	224,691	898,409
Percentage of total exports to Andean Pact countries	.9	2.4	7.2	7.7	4.7	1.2
Percentage of total exports to U.S.	42.6	46.1	39.3	56.2	33.7	30.4
Imports from Andean Pact countries	3,974	14,677	11,078	16,546	18,478	12,533
Imports from U.S.	58,502	216,915	213,122	66,196	290,037	663,480
Percentage of total imports from Andean Pact countries	2.9	2.9	3.2	1.6	2.6	1.0
Percentage of total imports from U.S.	43.7	47.8	31.0	40.0	40.4	51.6

Source: Organización de Estados Americanos. Instituto InterAmericano de Estadística. América en Cifras 1972. Situacion Económica: Comercio, Transporte, Comunicaciones y Turismo. Washington, D.C.: Organización de Estados Americanos. 1972. Pp. 42, 52-53, 94-95, 126-27.

Trade Liberalization

As in most integration attempts, the reduction of tariffs among members receives a great deal of emphasis within the Andean Pact. Unlike LAFTA where each tariff reduction had to be negotiated product by product, the Andean Pact established an automatic and irreversible program of tariff reductions. While this feature made the initial decision of what products were to be included more difficult, the subsequent tariff reductions have proceeded more smoothly than reductions in LAFTA. The tariff reduction program covers a total of 5,900 groups of products in five lists:

1. Products not produced in the Andean Pact nations and for which no production is planned for fifteen years. Internal tariffs on these 343 items were cut to zero on February 28, 1971. The reason for these tariff reductions is that they provide incentives to develop industry for items not produced in the subregion. In addition, 34 of these products were assigned to Bolivia and 39 to Ecuador under Decision 28. These two nations were granted exclusive rights for the production of these goods for a period of four to six years, after which time any nation can begin production.

2. Products included in industrial programming. These include some 600 items or 2,000 products. Nations assigned a product under an industrial programming decision may export this product to the other members without tariffs. Nations producing a product assigned to another nation in industrial programming pay the same tariffs as non-member nations.

3. Products on the LAFTA common list. 175 products have already come into force with Chile, Colombia, and Peru eliminating all tariffs on February 28, 1971. This does not apply to Bolivia and Ecuador.

4. Products under the automatic tariff reduction program. This is a catch-all group of 3,470 products ranging from milk and eggs to sulphuric acid, textiles, and washing machines. A uniform initial tariff level on imports from within the region was established on January 1, 1971, with 10 percent reductions to take place annually until 1980. So far, the reductions have occurred on schedule.

5. Lists of exceptions. The number of products to be excepted and the timetable for dropping them varies by country. All exceptions, except for Bolivia and Ecuador, must be dropped by 1985.

So far, tariff reductions have occurred on schedule. Junta officials are not allowing any nation to extend the final date for zero tariffs by pleading special circumstances. Chile, for example, which was permitted to drop out of the reductions for two years, will have to pick up where Colombia and Peru are. When the final instrument for Venezuelan trade liberalization participation is signed, Venezuela will have to remove immediately tariffs on some 1,300 products and will have to cut tariffs by thirty percent on other products. Some problems in implementation have occurred, especially on borders where officials may not know exactly how much duty to charge. A more serious problem is the fact that while all countries want to increase their exports to the subregion, no one seems particularly interested in increasing imports.

Industrial Programming

Industrial programming, one of the Andean Pact's most innovative programs, is an attempt to provide industrial planning and production on a subregional level. Industrial programming is to be carried out in the following sectors: metalworking; petrochemicals; glass, pulp, and paper; dye-stuffs; pesticides and fertilizers; automobiles; steel; pharmaceutical products; and electronic projects. At the present time agreements have been reached only in the metalworking, automobile, and petrochemical programs. The Junta has presented proposals on most of the other sectoral programs. Each program contains its own procedure for trade liberalization and its own conditions and deadlines. Existing

specialization in the individual countries and comparative advantage as well as equitable distribution of benefits are the principal determinants of plant assignment.

Agreement on assignments in industrial programming has been very difficult to reach since each member sees the production of these products as essential to national development or national security. Frequently too there is a great deal of pressure from the private sector in affected areas. Negotiations begin with meetings between the Junta and governmental experts from each country after which time the Junta draws up proposals for the Comisión's consideration. The politics involved in negotiations are complex. Representatives will usually demand more than they actually expect to receive, hoping to benefit in the ensuing compromise. Similarly, there is a tendency to rush studies and production before assignments are made in order to be in a favorable negotiating position.

As mentioned earlier, each industrial programming decision contains its own timetable, restrictions, and provisions for tariff-reductions. The case of metalworking is an example. "Each member country has committed itself not to encourage new investment in those manufacturing activities which have been assigned to other countries. No state assistance will be given for such investments, nor preferential credit treatment, tariff incentive or exchange rate incentive. These commitments will be in effect until December, 1982 for products assigned to Colombia, Peru, Chile, and Venezuela and until December, 1987 for products assigned to Ecuador and Bolivia" (Fullmer, 1973: 4).

Common External Tariff

The Acuerdo de Cartagena provides for the creation of a Common External Tariff to be applied uniformly by Colombia, Chile, Peru, and Venezuela no later than December 31, 1980 and by Bolivia and Ecuador no later than December 31, 1985. The purpose of the Common External Tariff is two-fold: 1) to establish adequate protection for subregional production and 2) to stimulate the efficiency of subregional industry. A limited version of the tariff -- the Common Minimum External Tariff -- went into effect on January 1, 1972. Under its provisions, members are required to raise national tariffs to a common minimal level and are not permitted to lower existing tariffs to below the minimum level.

Negotiations on the Common External Tariff have proceeded very slowly. For some members, lowering tariffs reduces the governmental revenues. For others, raising tariffs on certain goods (e.g. farm equipment) is viewed as detrimental to national economic development. The difficulty in reaching agreement on the Common External Tariff is essentially the product of the tariff's conflicting objectives. On the one hand, the tariff is to discourage inefficient production and on the other hand, it is to protect subregional industries. The key criterion in the development of the Common External Tariff is thus the "allowable level of inefficiency" which fixes the maximum amount by which prices of locally manufactured goods can exceed international prices. Since one of the main problems in the Andean countries is unemployment, an attempt is being made to favor labor-intensive industry through the Common External Tariff. Basic foodstuffs and capital goods which are not produced in the subregion but which are urgently needed will have low tariffs as will products of "social interest" such as medical equipment and books

Schweitzer, 1974: 74). The Common External Tariff is thus intended to serve as an inducement for the economic development of the subregion.

Harmonization of Economic Policies

A number of agreements have been reached in the harmonization of economic policies including a double taxation agreement, a uniform Andean tariff classification (NABANDINA), rules to control fair trade practices, harmonization of industrial promotion legislation, regulations for tourist and commercial traffic, regulations establishing the formation of subregional multinational enterprises, harmonization of monetary and exchange rate policies, industrial property rules, and coordination of export promotion measures.

One of the most controversial decisions of the Andean Pact was the Statute on Common Treatment of Foreign Capital and Technology (Decision 24). The main provisions of the Statute are:

1. All foreign enterprises existing prior to December 31, 1971 which intend to take advantage of the Andean Pact's tariff reductions must become mixed companies. Mixed companies are defined as those having more than 51 percent local capital.

2. All new foreign enterprises must gradually convert to mixed enterprise status, whether or not they intend to take advantage of the tariff-reductions.

3. New foreign investment is prohibited in certain areas including banking, insurance, communications, public services, and internal transportation. Existing foreign investment in these sectors must transform themselves into national companies by offering 80 percent of their stock for sale to national investors.

4. Take-overs of national firms by foreign enterprises are prohibited.

5. Foreign capital may be freely repatriated and profits derived from it may be remitted within certain limits (14 percent in most cases.) Reinvested profits are treated as new foreign investment and are subject to the regulations as such.

6. A foreign enterprise cannot contract a new foreign debt except when specifically so authorized by the government.

7. Foreign companies in extractive industries are not required to reduce their equity to a minority position but may operate under concessions for periods not to exceed 20 years. Participation of foreign enterprises in petroleum and natural gas exploration and exploitation preferably will be in the form of association with state enterprises. Member governments will not allow depletion allowances for tax purposes for those foreign companies operating in extractive industries.

8. A foreign parent company may not receive royalty payments for its technological contribution to its subsidiary foreign enterprise in the subregion. Its technological contribution to the subsidiary may not be capitalized and tax deductions may not be claimed for technological contributions.

9. The reduction of foreign ownership to 49 percent must be effected within 15 years in Chile, Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela and within 22 years in Bolivia and Ecuador. Firms which have a 30 percent participation in their capital and in which the government minority partner has certain veto powers are considered mixed companies and are not required to reduce the foreign equity to 49 percent. (Huelin, 1973; Fullmer, 1973: 6-7)

When Decision 24 was initially discussed in 1970, there was a great deal of concern that the passage of such a decision would limit new foreign investment and that the national economies would suffer greatly. At the present time, however, virtually all of the countries feel that this is not happening. National representatives stress the fact that Decision 24 actually works to the benefit of the foreign investor in that it spells out clearly the conditions under which foreign investment must take place. Foreign companies, though at first alarmed, seem to have accepted the fact that the provisions of Decision 24 are just and are being uniformly applied. In a survey by Meeker (1971), prominent businesses working in the Andean region indicated that Decision 24 made little difference in their activities.

At the present time there is some debate in the Andean Pact over

whether or not it would be advisable to change certain of the Statute's provisions -- specifically provisions limiting the remittance of profits to 14 percent. At the same time there is a deeply held consensus that the common treatment of foreign investment is absolutely essential to the Andean Pact. Many representatives noted that the Andean countries no longer compete with each other for foreign investment.

Preferential Treatment for Bolivia and Ecuador

In recognition of their lesser development, preferential treatment for Bolivia and Ecuador was to be extended in each of the various mechanisms of the Andean Pact. In Decisions 28 and 29, the Andean Pact agreed to assign certain products to Bolivia and Ecuador for their exclusive production in the subregion. Tariffs were reduced to zero for these products by the other four nations. CAF is charged with seeing that Bolivia and Ecuador receive preferential treatment in financing integration projects. Recently a special fund was created to help Bolivia implement Andean Pact programs. Bolivia and Ecuador are supposed to be given preferential treatment in industrial programming assignments. For the most part, preferential treatment for Bolivia and Ecuador has consisted in longer time periods for compliance with Andean Pact provisions and shorter time periods for the enjoyment of benefits deriving from tariff-reductions on products produced in the two countries. Table 5 presents a summary of the main provisions for preferential treatment for Bolivia and Ecuador. As will be discussed in the following chapter, these provisions are viewed as inadequate by many representatives in both nations.

National Positions in the Andean Pact

In the following chapter, the results of the fieldwork are presented

Table 6. Timetable of Compliance with Andean Pact Decisions for Bolivia and Ecuador in Comparison with the Other Andean Pact Members.

	Bolivia and Ecuador	Chile, Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela
Special list of products not produced in the subregion freed of duty as of	2/28/71	1981
List of products of Bolivia and Ecuador, freed of duty as of	1/1/71	1981
General trade liberalization program, products freed of duty as of	1974	1981
Products not finally included in sectoral industrial development programs, freed as of	1976	1981
Special preferences for 23 products of particular interest in effect from	4/1/71 to 1981	none
General trade liberalization program must remove all tariffs by	1986	1981
List of exceptions must be terminated by	1991	1986
Sectoral industrial development programs must have tariffs removed by	additional five year period	
Common External Tariff must enter into force by	1986	1981
Minimum common external tariff must be in force by	not applicable	1976

Source: Anderson and Company. The Andean Common Market (ANCOM). Lima. 1973.

in a systematic manner in delineating patterns of support for the Andean Pact. Before presenting those findings, a brief description of each country's position -- as obtained from the interviews -- is presented. This description is intended to serve as a substantive backdrop to later analysis as well as to capture some of the impressions which are inevitably lost in the process of aggregating attitudinal data.

Bolivia

The dominant concern of all the officials interviewed was with the Andean Pact's provisions for special treatment for Bolivia. They feel that Bolivia is a special case and requires special treatment within the Andean Pact on two counts: as the least developed country within the group and as the only nation which does not have an outlet to the sea. While generally professing optimism about what the Andean Pact can do to help Bolivian development, officials expressed concern that the other countries are reaping the benefits of integration and that Bolivia may be left behind. There is a great deal of dissatisfaction with the Andean Pact's provisions for special treatment for Bolivia, little identification with Ecuador as the other least-developed country, and a propensity to propose schemes within the Pact that would benefit Bolivia.

Bolivia is much more concerned with LAFTA than are most of the other Andean countries, which is understandable given the fact that the bulk of Bolivia's trade with Latin America is with non-Andean Pact LAFTA members. Industrial programming was usually viewed as just a part of the overall program of the Andean Pact. Bolivians are dissatisfied with the assignments received under industrial programming. One of the common themes in the literature on Bolivian participation in the Pact is that Bolivia is

seeking to use the Andean Pact to obtain an outlet to the sea. However, this goal was found to influence Bolivian participation on an indirect level. Bolivia uses the desire for an outlet to the sea in an attempt to gain special concessions in negotiations (e.g. "since they won't give us a port, they have to give us special treatment because our transportation costs are so high"). Concern was expressed by the officials regarding Venezuela's entrance into the Pact. Officials questioned Venezuela's motives in joining the group, suggesting that Venezuela is seeking to use the Pact to further its goal of becoming a world power. Officials also felt that Bolivia would be hurt by the increased competition resulting from Venezuela's membership in the Pact.

Chile

The Chilean view of the Andean Pact appears to have changed greatly in the last ten years. Chile was indisputably one of the initial proponents of the Andean Pact, insisting on the necessity of industrial programming, the need for equilibrated development, and the importance of the Andean Pact in forming a common negotiating front vis-a-vis other Latin American nations and the industrialized countries (Frei, 1974). Currently in Chile there is a lack of definition of Chilean policy toward the Pact, a tremendous concern with trade liberalization and relatively little interest in industrial programming, serious doubts about the proposed Common External Tariff, and a certain defensiveness in discussing the Chilean position toward Decision 24. Venezuelan entrance was generally not perceived as any kind of a threat, but rather as an advantage for Chile in expanding the market for Chilean exports. There was little concern with the problem of differing levels of development within the

Pact and the preferential treatment for Bolivia and Ecuador was judged as adequate.

Colombia

Like Chile, Colombia was one of the early leaders of the Andean Pact, taking an active role in pushing for wider expansion of Pact activities, more automaticity of programs and more rapid schedules of compliance. Currently in Colombia there seems to be great satisfaction with the Andean Pact's trade liberalization programs and somewhat mixed emotions about the importance of industrial programming. Many Colombian tecnícos were on the defensive, reaffirming their belief in the essential nature of the industrial programming measures. At the time of the interviews (July 1975) other Andean nations were accusing Colombia of creating obstacles for industrial programming decisions, and being unwilling to compromise. About half of the respondents expressed the view that Colombia was not asking too much in industrial programming negotiations but rather that Colombia felt it could no longer take a sacrificial position. These tecnicos explained that in the past Colombia had sacrificed on a number of issues in order to achieve subregional agreements, but that Colombia could now no longer afford to take such a position. Some respondents stated frankly that industrial programming was not helping Colombian development and that Colombia's active participation in the Pact depended on the continuing tariff reductions.

Perhaps the most surprising finding in examining Colombian decisions regarding the Andean Pact is the very close collaboration of the government with the private sector in formulating Colombian positions. This collaboration was very open; both public and private representatives stressed the

advantages of working together. As in other nations, most tecnicos viewed Decision 24 (Statute on the Common Treatment of Foreign Capital) as essential in principle though many suggested the need for modification of certain points. The proposed Tribunal was supported heartily by almost everyone interviewed. Colombians still see themselves as playing a very active leadership role in the Pact and are optimistic about the future.

Ecuador

The dominant impressions of Ecuador's perspective toward the Andean Pact gained from the field research are that Ecuadorians are enthusiastic, optimistic, and satisfied with the provisions of preferential treatment. Virtually everyone interviewed felt that the Andean Pact offered tremendous developmental benefits to Ecuador and that the future of the Andean Pact was bright. While there were a few complaints about the preferential treatment, there was none of the bitter dissatisfaction found in Bolivia. While most of the respondents agreed that the philosophy of Decision 24 was essential to the Andean Pact, there was a consensus that the decision was too rigid and that some of the provisions would have to be modified. The respondents unanimously expressed the view that industrial programming was absolutely essential to Ecuador's participation in the Pact. The advantages of industrial programming were generally felt to be expansion of industry to enable Ecuador to take full advantage of the tariff provisions. When asked what benefits had accrued to Ecuador as a result of the Andean Pact, expanded trade was most often cited. The role of foreign investment was repeatedly stressed. Decision 24 was felt to be detrimental to Ecuador because it limited foreign investment. Trade problems with

Peru and Venezuela were frequently referred to, but while Venezuela's entrance was acknowledged to have caused problems, it was generally concluded that the expanded market offered by Venezuela more than offset these problems.

Peru

Peru's position in the Andean Pact seems to be one of emphasis on industrial programming and Decision 24. Tecnicos interviewed felt that these two programs are the most important of the Andean Pact and expressed fear that they were being weakened by other nations. There was concern that other members are not as committed to industrial programming and are seeking to delay negotiations. Foreign investment was frequently emphasized in connection with the fear that foreign enterprises were taking advantage of Decision 24's loopholes and that the decision needed to be more fairly and strictly applied. When asked about trade liberalization provisions, most tecnicos conceded that they were necessary to the overall development of the Pact but felt that they were decidedly secondary in terms of priorities. While Peru was not perceived as benefitting from tariff reduction measures, most felt that this was a temporary situation which would correct itself over time. Most tecnicos stressed the fact that Peru was taking an active role in pushing for agreement in virtually all sectors.

Most of the tecnicos expressed satisfaction with the Andean Pact. However, there was a sense of frustration that the Pact was not moving fast enough and the other members were allowing negotiations to bog down over trivial matters. Consequently, most tecnicos were pessimistic in discussing the future of the Pact -- questioning the members' abilities

to make and implement the far-reaching decisions necessary to the Pact's goals. In Peru, more than most of the other countries, there is great concern with the Pact's political role. Peruvians seemed very concerned with the question of unequal levels of development, stressing the need for Bolivia especially to be given incentives to catch up. Many, however, felt that Bolivia was unable to take advantage of the incentives for which it was continually asking.

Venezuela

After talking with tecnicos in the other five countries on their perceptions of the Venezuelan entrance, it was interesting and somewhat surprising to talk with Venezuelan officials. While tecnicos in other countries stress Venezuela's foreign reserves and tremendous financial power, Venezuelans perceive that they are at a disadvantageous position vis-a-vis the other members in terms of economic and industrial development. Several noted that Venezuelan industry was actually in third or fourth place in the subregion -- after Chile, Colombia, and perhaps Peru. There was some fear that trade liberalization measures would be disasterous for Venezuela; officials expressed concern that Venezuela would be unable to compete with other members of the group, given Venezuela's higher production costs. Venezuela was also perceived as sacrificing greatly in industrial programming negotiations, giving up petrochemical assignments, for example, when expensive plants for these products had already been constructed. However, as outside observers have noted, Venezuelans are constructing many of these plants for export to countries outside the subregion, almost as a form of insurance.

Venezuelans stressed the importance of industrial programming in

their national development goals, emphasizing that it was really the only area where Venezuela could expect immediate economic benefits. Like the Peruvians, the Venezuelans seemed quite adamant on the need for strict implementation of Decision 24. Also like the Peruvians, the Venezuelans stressed the importance of political benefits to be derived from the Andean Pact. It was frequently assumed that Venezuela, though the most recent member of the group, was the Andean Pact's "natural" leader. When asked about charges of Venezuelan imperialism, the standard reply seemed to be that Venezuela is not imperialist, but rather generous in its willingness to commit great sums of money to various Andean Pact projects.

Summary

The development of the Andean Pact may be viewed as a reaction to the slow pace of negotiations in LAFTA. Conditions were incorporated into the Pact to overcome LAFTA's most obvious shortcomings: an attempt was made to provide for balanced growth within the subregion, tariff-reduction programs were designed to be largely automatic, industrial programming was included to serve as an added stimulus to economic development, and the central organs of the Pact were given more authority than those of LAFTA. Whether or not these changes will be sufficient to carry out the Andean Pact's goals remains uncertain at this point. It is clear, however, that the Andean Pact is an innovative attempt at regional cooperation -- innovative in terms of both the scope of cooperation envisaged and the achievements attained thus far.

The discussion of national positions in the Andean Pact, based on the interviews, leads to certain expectations about relative support for the Andean Pact. In the next chapter, patterns of support for the Andean

Pact will be presented using other data sources in addition to the interview responses. At this point, however, it appears that Venezuela and Peru will emerge as the most supportive members of the group. Colombia is expected to be supportive of trade liberalization measures. Bolivia is not expected to exhibit a great deal of support due to its position as the group's least-developed member. Nor is Chile expected to be very active, given its tremendous economic difficulties at the present time. The case of Ecuador is somewhat ambiguous; while a consideration of its relative economic status would lead us to expect a generally low level of activity toward the Pact, the enthusiasm and optimism manifested by the officials interviewed suggest that perhaps Ecuador is taking a supportive role in the Andean Pact. With these observations as a background, the analysis now turns to a consideration of patterns of support for the Andean Pact.

NOTES
CHAPTER II

1. Under the provisions of the Consenso de Lima (Decision 70) in which Venezuela was formally incorporated into the group, the veto power of the member nations was increased to include decisions relating to the Common External Tariff. This veto is intended to be used only in those situations in which monetary policies prevent the fair application of the common tariff. This provision was included at Venezuela's insistence, which expressed fear that Venezuela would be at a disadvantage if asked to enforce the same tariff as countries having no monetary controls and inflation.

CHAPTER III
DIMENSIONS OF SUPPORT FOR THE ANDEAN PACT

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the dimensions of support for the Andean Pact exhibited by the six member nations. Patterns of support for the Andean Pact as a whole will be analyzed followed by an examination of national support for each of the four issues under consideration. The dimensions of support to be considered are levels of activity, supportive attitudes, national implementation of Pact decisions and influence on foreign policy behavior arising out of membership in the group. The relationships among these four dimensions of support will be explored in the final section of this chapter.

A number of indicators are used in measuring support for the Andean Pact and for the four issues under consideration. Table 6 summarizes the measures used for each of the components of support and includes the table number, where applicable, in which the data are presented. As shown in Table 6, a number of indicators refer to officials' evaluations as determined from the interviews. These interviews were coded after the data were collected. The coding scheme used in measuring officials' evaluations of their own governments' activity is included in the text in order to demonstrate how these data were coded. The coding scheme for the remaining indicators are presented in Appendix 1.

Table 6. Indicators used in Measuring Support for the Andean Pact, by Dimension and Issue.

	Activity	Supportive Attitudes	Impact on foreign policy behavior	Implementation
General Support for the Andean Pact	Officials' evaluations of their own governments' activity and activity of other members (7 & 8) Public statements of support (9) Actions directed toward the Andean Pact (10) Characteristics of national integration offices (11)	Officials' evaluations of political support (12) Officials' evaluations of governmental optimism (13)	Patterns of subregional interactions (14-17) Willingness to use subregional caucuses	Officials' evaluations of implementation (18) Public statements on implementation (19) Actions of implementation (19) Requests for exemptions (20) CAF loans forfeited (21)
Trade Liberalization Measures (TL)	Officials' evaluations of activity (23)	Officials' evaluations of importance assigned TL (24)		Officials' evaluations of TL implementation (25) Number of official trade missions sent to other members (26)
Industrial Programming Measures (IP)	Officials' evaluations of activity (27)	Officials' evaluations of importance assigned IP (28)		Officials' evaluations of implementation of IP (29) Actions to implement IP (30)

Table 6. (continued)

Activity	Supportive Attitudes	Impact on foreign policy behavior	Implementation
Decision 24	Officials' evaluations of importance assigned Decision 24 (31)		Officials' evaluations of implementation of Decision 24 (32) Comparative legislation (33)
Tribunal	Officials' evaluations of support for Tribunal (34)		

National Activity toward the Andean Pact

In discussing the level of activity toward the Andean Pact, the concern of this study is with what each member is doing and saying with respect to the Andean Pact. The activity of a nation is considered observable behavior a nation carries out toward the subregional group. Activity may be negative (as in criticism or accusation) or positive (as in making proposals or hosting meetings).

Members' activity toward the Andean Pact is measured in four ways: 1) the evaluations of governmental officials as to their own nation's activity and the activity of other members; 2) public statements of support and criticism; 3) national actions of support; and 4) budgetary and personnel characteristics of the national office of integration.

In the interviews, officials were asked to describe their own government's behavior toward the Andean Pact. Although an attempt was made to structure the responses in terms of "most active" to "least active," respondents rarely were so succinct in their descriptions. After the data were collected, four general categories of activity level emerged:

1. Most active. Responses were coded into this group when respondents described their government's activity as "most active," "very active," "leader of the group," "takes most of the initiative," or "the other members look to us to lead the way."

2. Very active. Responses were coded into this group when respondents described their government's activity as being very active or most active but attached qualifying statements to that activity. Typical responses in this group were "we are very active in industrial programming but don't take too much initiative in other areas;" or "we're very active except for questions dealing with tariff reduction." Although many of the same words were used to describe activity in both the "most active" and the "very active" groups, in the latter case the descriptions were inevitably followed by a qualifier of some sort.

3. Active. Responses were coded into this group when officials stressed that their governments were complying fully with all of the obligations of the group but were not taking the initiative in any area. Typical responses in this group were "we're taking an active role in the Pact but we're certainly not a leader," or "we're complying fully with the Pact's provisions and are playing an active role, but you couldn't really say we're taking the initiative."

4. Minimally active. Responses were coded into this category when officials stressed that their governments were not taking an active role. This response was always accompanied by an explanation of national problems limiting action. Typical responses included "no, we're not very active. We can't be because of our tremendous economic difficulties," or "we'd like to be active but we just don't have the resources to play an active role."

A summary of the statements of officials with regards to governmental activity is presented in Table 7, using the four categories described above. For descriptive purposes, numbers are assigned to each category and mean activity scores are calculated for each of the members.

Although the responses of officials from each country range over two or even three categories, there is some consensus among officials as to the level of activity of their governments toward the Andean Pact. In terms of officials' perceptions, the level of activity of the six nations can be ordered as follows: Venezuela, Peru, Colombia, Ecuador, Chile, and Bolivia. It is interesting to note the difference between Bolivian and Ecuadorian perceptions. Although these two countries are the least developed in the group, Ecuadorian officials ascribe a much higher level of activity to their government than do Bolivians.

Respondents were also asked to describe the level of activity of the other members of the Andean Pact. The results, displayed in Table 8, include not only governmental officials but ten outside observers who were also asked to describe the level of activity of the six nations.

Table 7. Officials' Evaluations of Their Governments' Activity in the Andean Pact.

	Number of Respondents	Number of officials describing their governments' activity as: Most Active (4)	Very Active (3)	Active (2)	Minimally Active (1)	Mean
Bolivia	7	0	0	2	5	1.29
Colombia	11	4	4	3	0	3.09
Chile	5	0	1	2	2	1.80
Ecuador	9	2	3	4	0	2.78
Peru	19	5	14	0	0	3.26
Venezuela	4	3	1	0	0	3.75

Mean* = 2.66
Standard deviation = .853

*In this and all subsequent tables, the overall mean and standard deviation of the mean scores in the last column are presented at the bottom of the table.

The rank-orders produced by these two measures of governmental activity correspond exactly (Kendall's tau = 1), indicating that officials' opinions of their own governments' activity parallels the opinions of others. There was a slight tendency for officials to describe their own governments' national activity as higher than the evaluations of officials from other nations, as is demonstrated in the difference between the overall means. This difference was most striking in the case of Ecuador. While Ecuadorian officials stressed their government's commitment to the Andean Pact, officials in other nations emphasized Ecuador's low level of

Table 8. Officials' Evaluations of the Activity of Other Andean Pact Nations.

	Total Responses	Most Active (4)	Very Active (3)	Active (2)	Minimally Active (1)	Mean
Bolivia	58	0	0	20	38	1.35
Colombia	54	7	27	20	0	2.74
Chile	65	0	2	20	43	1.37
Ecuador	56	0	7	34	15	1.86
Peru	46	16	22	8	0	3.17
Venezuela	61	37	20	4	0	3.54

Mean = 2.34
Standard deviation = .863

industrialization and its inability to implement programs.

A second indicator used to measure the level of national activity is the extent to which officials make public statements about the Andean Pact. Data for this indicator were obtained from the event analysis. In the coding scheme used, national verbal behavior toward the Andean Pact included public statements or support or criticism. Statements were coded as being negative, neutral, or positive, depending on whether their (presumed) intention was to support the Andean Pact's activities and goals. A complete discussion of the coding scheme used in analyzing the event data is presented in Appendix 2. Table 9 summarizes the distribution of verbal activity of the Andean Pact members toward the Andean Pact and its organs.

Table 9. Verbal Behavior Toward the Andean Pact by its Members, 30 month period from 1971-1975.

From:	Total Number of Verbal Acts toward the Andean Pact	Negative Acts No.	Negative Acts %	Neutral Acts No.	Neutral Acts %	Positive Acts No.	Positive Acts %
Bolivia	60	0	0	6	10	54	90
Colombia	59	6	10	5	8	48	81
Chile	57	6	10	6	10	45	79
Ecuador	58	1	2	7	12	50	86
Peru	70	1	1	6	9	63	90
Venezuela	85	6	1	10	12	69	81
Mean	65	3	5	7	10	55	85
Std. Dev.		2.7		1.6		8.5	

In terms of activity as measured by verbal behavior toward the Andean Pact, Venezuela is the most active member followed by Peru, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Chile. While the vast majority of verbal acts directed by members toward the Andean Pact are cooperative (or positive), Peru and Bolivia appear to be the most supportive, although the proportionate differences between these actors and the remaining Pact members are not great. Venezuela tends to use neutral statements more than any other member. A surprising finding is that Bolivia is much more active and more cooperative than the evaluation data would lead us to expect.

While verbal behavior indicates what national officials are saying

about the Andean Pact, non-verbal behavior encompasses those concrete actions in which an Andean Pact member does something to influence the Andean Pact. Non-verbal behavior includes such actions as hosting meetings, meeting with Andean Pact officials, extending financial support above the minimum necessary and carrying out agreements. Table 10 presents the summary of national non-verbal acts by members toward the Andean Pact as gleaned from the events data.

Table 10. Non-Verbal Positive Behavior toward the Andean Pact by its Members, 30 month period from 1971-1975.

	Number of Non-Verbal Acts toward Andean Pact	Total Number of Acts toward the Andean Pact (verbal and non-verbal)	Non-verbal Acts directed toward the Andean Pact as a Percentage of all acts
Bolivia	64	124	51.6
Colombia	53	112	47.3
Chile	44	101	43.6
Ecuador	50	108	46.3
Peru	90	160	56.2
Venezuela	48	133	36.1
Mean	58	123	
Std. Dev.	15.5	19.6	

In terms of positive non-verbal behavior, Peru is clearly the most active member of the Pact. Venezuela, though more active verbally, exhibits less absolute number of acts and a smaller percentage of total

non-verbal acts than any other member except Chile. This seems to give credence to the view occasionally expressed in interviews that Venezuela "talks a lot but doesn't do much." Again, a surprising finding is the high number of actions undertaken by Bolivia in comparison with the generally low evaluation of officials of Bolivia's activity in the Pact.

The status of the national integration offices is another indicator of the importance the government assigns to participation in the Andean Pact. Data on budgetary and personnel support are shown in Table 11. These data were obtained from the respective offices of national integration. Both the Venezuelan and Colombian offices of integration are subdivisions of the Institutes of Foreign Trade. The budgets for those offices were not available; thus the figures below are estimates taken from interviews. These figures do not represent the sum total of governmental effort in each of the countries since officials in other ministries and agencies also work on subjects related to the Andean Pact. However, these figures do indicate the resources available to the central integration offices for coordinating governmental policy toward the Pact.

Surprisingly, Chile has a larger budget than any other country; however, this figure is most likely the result of skyrocketing inflation. Chilean officials indicated that the real value of the office's budget decreased frequently. Peru has considerably more professional support personnel than the other countries. In addition to differences among the members in terms of budgets and staffs, there are considerable differences in the quality of the offices and resources available. In Bolivia the offices consist of two large rooms crammed with desks. There is no library and recent trade statistics are not available. Chile's office space seems to be clearly superior to that in other countries. Each

Table 11. Characteristics of the National Integration Offices in the Six Andean Pact nations, 1975.

	Budget (U.S. Dollars)	Number of Professionals	Number of support personnel	Total
Bolivia	804,000	10*	13	23
Colombia	900,000	20	25	45
Chile	1,107,000	15	15	30
Ecuador	138,000	15	15	30
Peru	1,000,000	28**	30-40	58-68
Venezuela	1,000,000	15	25	40

*Excludes three professionals currently studying abroad.
**Excludes eight professionals currently studying abroad.

official has a private office and telephone. Recent statistics are available and easily accessible. Colombia, Ecuador, Venezuela, and Peru all have roughly similar amounts of office space. Peru has a small but excellent library devoted exclusively to the Andean Pact and LAFTA. Venezuela and Colombia also have libraries, but they are primarily oriented toward foreign trade, reflecting the fact that in these two countries the offices of integration are located within the Foreign Trade Institutes. In Chile, unlike all the other countries, officials referred constantly to the decreasing number of officials and support personnel. The number of professionals working for the office of integration in 1975 was reported to be half the number who worked there in 1973.

In terms of the overall level of activity of the six members toward the Andean Pact, Peru appears to be the most active followed by Venezuela. However, officials of other member nations tend to view Venezuela as the

most active member. A logical explanation for this discrepancy in officials' evaluations and the event data is the difference in time periods covered. Since the event data encompass thirty months during the period 1971-1975, and since Venezuela only formally joined the Pact in 1973, perhaps Venezuela is thought to be more active because it is more active in the present period. However, when the event data are analyzed for only six months in 1975 -- corresponding to the time period during which most of the interviews were carried out -- this argument is not supported. In 1975, Peru directed more positive acts toward the Andean Pact (48) than did Venezuela (38). Venezuela, however, exhibited more positive acts toward the nations of the subregion (194) than did Peru (172) during the same 1975 period.

It seems that officials think Venezuela is more active than the event data indicate because they realize Venezuela has tremendous resources available and because Venezuelan governmental officials have repeatedly stressed that Venezuela will use those resources to take an active role in the Andean Pact. As Venezuelan President Carlos Andrés Pérez stated, "We will use our oil as an instrument of international policy for the countries of the Andean Pact and for Latin American countries in general, toward the goal of being conceded the position in international trade that corresponds to us" (El Mercurio, February 22, 1974).

Colombia appears to be the third most active member in the Pact followed by Ecuador, Bolivia, and Chile. An interesting observation is the difference between evaluations of Bolivian activity by officials and the results of the event analysis. Officials seem to think that Bolivia is taking a less active role than the objective data indicate.

This may be because Bolivia is more active at home than abroad. Indeed, the data indicate that Bolivia makes a relatively high percentage of its verbal activity toward the Andean Pact in national forums rather than in international ones. The Chilean situation appears to be somewhat different than the Bolivian. While Bolivians stressed that their government was not taking an active role in the Pact because of lack of resources, the Chileans emphasized that their current lack of activity is temporary, reflecting present economic difficulties.

Supportive Attitudes toward the Andean Pact

Supportive attitudes are defined as those positive orientations held by governmental officials toward the Andean Pact. A close relationship is expected to exist between supportive attitudes and level of activity in the Andean Pact. The degree to which supportive attitudes with respect to the Andean Pact are held by officials is measured by two indicators, both of which are derived from responses to interview questions. Officials were asked to describe the extent of political support or political will (voluntad política) of their governments toward the Andean Pact. A second indicator was the officials' evaluations of the optimism their government exhibits with respect to the Andean Pact. A summary of the responses to these questions is presented in Tables 12 and 13 below.

Peruvians and Venezuelans attribute very strong political commitment to their governments. The situation in Colombia is somewhat ambiguous. Almost half of the respondents said that their government's political commitment to the Andean Pact had declined in recent years. Several also pointed out that Colombia could not be expected to continue to make sacrifices for the benefit of the group.

Table 12. Officials' Evaluations of the Existence of Political Will in their own Governments toward the Andean Pact.

	Number of Respondents	Number of respondents describing their governments as: Completely Supportive (3) No.	%	Qualified Supportive (2) No.	%	Limited Supportive (1) No.	%	Mean
Bolivia	6	1	16	2	33	3	50	1.67
Colombia	9	5	55	4	44	0	0	2.55
Chile	5	0	0	1	20	4	80	1.20
Ecuador	9	6	66	2	22	1	11	2.55
Peru	18	16	89	2	11	0	0	2.88
Venezuela	4	4	100	0	0	0	0	3.00

Mean = 2.31
Standard Deviation = .653

Surprisingly, the majority of the officials interviewed described their governments as either pessimistic or qualified optimistic. Venezuela is perceived by officials as being the most optimistic, followed by Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, and Chile. Overall, however, the general lack of optimism may lead one to question the future of the Andean Pact.

The relationship between level of activity, supportive attitudes and optimism is a close one. In order to determine the strength of this relationship, Kendall's Coefficient of Concordance, W, was used. W is a multivariate measure for ordinal level data which yields a value between -1.0 and +1.0. In the case of these three indicators --

Table 13. Officials' Evaluations of Governmental Optimism about the Future of the Andean Pact.

	Number of Respondents	Number of respondents describing their governments as: Optimism (3) No.	%	Qualified Optimism (2) No.	%	Pessimism (1) No.	%	Mean
Bolivia	7	1	14	1	14	5	71	1.40
Colombia	11	7	64	4	36	0	0	2.64
Chile	4	0	0	2	50	2	50	1.50
Ecuador	9	2	22	5	56	2	22	2.00
Peru	18	10	56	4	22	4	22	2.33
Venezuela	4	3	75	1	25	0	0	2.75

Mean = 2.10
Standard Deviation = .570

activity (as measured by the mean scores of officials' evaluations of their own governments' activity), perceived political support (as measured by the mean scores of officials' evaluations of their governments' political support), and optimism (as measured by the mean scores of officials' evaluations of their governments' optimism) -- Kendall's W equals .84.

The Impact of Membership in the Andean Pact on Foreign Policy Behavior

A third dimension of support for the Andean Pact is the effect that Pact membership has on the foreign policy behavior of its members. The founders of the Andean Pact sought to incorporate foreign policy

goals into the regional cooperation scheme. One of the most active individuals in creating the Andean Pact, the then-president of Chile, Eduardo Frei, summed up the consensus at that time on the basic objectives of the Andean Pact:

1. to obtain increased negotiating power within LAFTA;
2. to obtain increased negotiating power vis-a-vis the great industrial powers;
3. to achieve better negotiating possibilities for the individual countries and the countries as a group in financial and technological aspects; and
4. to realize the creation of an economic organization for development. (Frei, 1974: 27)

Germánico Salgado (1973a: 136), presently a member of the Andean Pact's Junta and one of the earliest proponents of integration, notes that the "interdependence of interests which integration has developed should be conscientously used in the Group's external relations as the basis for a new negotiating attitude toward the rest of the world."

The founders of the Andean Pact were conscious of the need to strive for cooperative action in the area of foreign policy. The foreign policy goals which they incorporated into the Andean Pact may be analyzed on three levels: subregional, regional, and international.

On a subregional level, the Andean Pact was designed to increase cooperation among members -- to increase interactions among political leaders, to discover new areas of mutual interest, to increase subregional understanding, and to increase the level of trade within the group. States were given the opportunity not only to interact more frequently but on a wider range of issues. The main thesis of the Andean Pact is that since the subregion's problems are shared, common solutions should

be sought. The increase in cooperation and subregional ties was also expected to promote the development of a more cohesive group, a group that would speak with more authority on the international scene.

Within the Latin American region, the Andean Pact was intended to improve the position of its members, especially vis-a-vis the larger nations. The Andean Pact was never viewed as a separatist movement from LAFTA. Indeed, the document establishing the Andean Pact emphasized that its members were to continue working toward continental integration within LAFTA. The Andean Pact may nevertheless be viewed partially as a reaction against the big country dominance within LAFTA and the perceived disadvantageous position of the countries of intermediate and lesser development. One of the implicit foreign policy goals of the Pact on a regional level, for example, was the formation of a subregional bloc within LAFTA to bargain for the subregion's interests. Officials of the Andean Pact have repeatedly stressed that by working together, the Andean countries can negotiate with Brazil and with Argentina as equals.

On an international level, the foreign policy goals were more explicit: to create a negotiating bloc to bargain with the industrialized powers. The Andean Pact was to deal as a unit with the European Economic Community (EEC), the United Nations, and the U.S. in areas of common interest in an attempt to improve the members' negotiating power.

These, then, are the principal foreign policy goals of the Andean Pact: to increase interactions within the subregion and to act as a joint negotiating bloc vis-a-vis the Latin American region and the industrialized nations. The effect of membership in the Andean Pact on foreign policy behavior may be analyzed by examining the extent to which nations

are carrying out these goals in their foreign policy behavior. As a measure of support for the Andean Pact, this dimension is concerned with the extent to which members incorporate the goals of the Pact in other types of behavior.

If the members of the Pact are being influenced in their subregional foreign policy behavior, it is reasonable to expect them to exhibit more cooperative behavior toward each other. They are also expected to interact on a wider range of issues over time. In the coding scheme used, an act is considered cooperative if it seemed desireable to the target, if it involved compatible interests of the participants, or if it involved a positive sanction by which new valued factors may be created through interaction (e.g. the increase of trade through a new trade agreement). See Appendix 2 for a complete discussion of the coding scheme used.

Table 14 presents the total number of cooperative acts among Andean Pact members for the period 1971-1975. This table differs from previous ones in that actions of members toward the Andean Pact are not included. In terms of numbers of cooperative acts directed toward the subregion, Peru is clearly the most active, followed by Venezuela and Colombia. Bolivia and Ecuador are both more active than Chile.

These data cover thirty months during the time period 1971-1975 and thus do not indicate trends or changes. If the number of cooperative acts sent to the subregion during a six month period in 1971 is compared with a corresponding six month period in 1975, the results are markedly different. Table 15 presents the percentage change in cooperative actions between Andean Pact nations from 1971 to 1975.

This table indicates several interesting trends in subregional

Table 14. Number of Cooperative Actions directed by Andean Nations toward One Another, 1971-1975.

From:	To: Bolivia	Colombia	Chile	Ecuador	Peru	Venez.	Total	Percent of Total Acts
Bolivia	-	105	132	109	158	127	631	15.9
Colombia	110	-	108	131	115	203	667	16.8
Chile	138	102	-	109	136	102	587	14.8
Ecuador	111	138	113	-	164	124	650	16.3
Peru	180	116	141	172	-	125	734	18.5
Venezuela	143	204	101	130	128	-	706	17.6
Total	682	665	595	651	701	681	3,975	100.0
Percent of Total	17.2	16.7	15.0	16.4	17.1	17.6		100.0

Mean = 662.5
Standard Deviation = 48.1

foreign policy. All nations increased their foreign policy actions toward other Andean Pact nations tremendously between 1971 and 1975. At the same time a shift is evident in the relative activity of the members. Bolivia, Chile, and Peru all decreased their percentage of total subregional acts while Colombia and especially Venezuela increased theirs. Ecuador retained about the same position. Peru and Venezuela emerged as the most active Andean Pact members in terms of subregional behavior. Chile and Bolivia are the least active. However, it is important to keep in mind that these data refer only to foreign policy actions within the subregion.

Table 15. Percentage Change in Cooperative Foreign Policy Actions directed by an Andean nation to other Andean Nations, 1971 to 1975.

	Total Number of Cooperative Acts to A.P. nations, 1971	Percent of Total sub-regional acts 1971	Total Number of Cooperative Acts to A.P. nations, 1975	Percent of Total sub-regional acts 1975	Percent Change, 1971-1975
Bolivia	66	17.4	135	13.9	105
Colombia	57	15.0	164	16.9	188
Chile	68	17.9	136	14.0	100
Ecuador	66	17.4	167	17.2	153
Peru	88	23.2	172	17.8	95
Venezuela	35	9.2	195	20.1	457
Total	380	100.0	969	99.9	155

Thus, it may be that members of the Andean Pact increased their interactions to the rest of the world as well during this time period.

Another measure of the extent to which national subregional foreign policy behavior is influenced by Pact membership is the extent to which members use joint foreign policy acts toward the subregion. A joint foreign policy act is defined as an action undertaken by two or more Andean Pact members toward a common target. Table 16 presents the number of joint foreign policy acts by Andean Pact members toward the subregion.

Joint foreign policy actions form a very small percentage of subregional interactions. While it appears that Colombia and Bolivia tend to use joint foreign policy acts more often in their relations with

Table 16. Number of Joint Foreign Policy Actions by Two or More Andean Pact members toward other Andean Nations or the Andean Pact, 1971-1975.

	Number of actions in which the actor acted with another Andean Pact member	
	Toward an Andean Pact member	Toward the Andean Pact
Bolivia	1	10
Colombia	2	12
Chile	2	8
Ecuador	1	6
Peru	2	9
Venezuela	2	8
Total	10	53

the subregion than the rest of the countries, the variation is so small that it is difficult to draw any meaningful conclusions.

When the effects of membership on foreign policy behavior are examined on the regional and international levels, even less joint foreign policy activity is apparent. During the thirty-month time period included in the analysis, there were no joint foreign policy actions between Andean Pact members toward other Latin American nations. Table 17 presents the number of joint foreign policy acts among Andean Pact members toward non-Latin American nations and the number of times an Andean Pact member directed foreign policy acts toward the Pact in conjunction with non-Pact nations.

Surprisingly, it seems that Andean nations are more likely to coordinate their foreign policies toward non-Latin American nations

Table 17. Number of Joint Foreign Policy Actions by Andean Pact Members toward the International System, 1971-1975.

	Actor acted with an A.P. member toward a non-Latin American target	Actor acted with a non-Latin American nation toward the Andean Pact
Bolivia	10	1
Colombia	10	1
Chile	10	0
Ecuador	13	2
Peru	12	3
Venezuela	11	4
Total	66	11

than toward either members of the Latin American region or the Andean subregion. Although the figures indicate that Ecuador and Peru are slightly more likely to take the Andean Pact into account in formulating its international behavior, it is difficult to derive any conclusions from such a small number of cases.

As in the other dimensions of support for the Andean Pact, Venezuela and Peru emerge as the two most active members in terms of influence on their foreign policy behavior. Chile seems to be the least active with the other three members falling into a "moderately influenced" group.

Apart from these differences, it seems clear that interactions among Andean Pact members are increasing. Unlike other studies using event data to study Latin American foreign policy behavior,[2] the results obtained

here suggest that subregional interactions are important in the subregion. There is a certain symmetry in subregional interactions -- nations tend to direct and receive actions from the same nations. While this may be due in part to the coding scheme used where reciprocal acts were coded,[3] it also seems to indicate patterns of interactions. Nations tend to direct more interactions to those nations from which they receive interactions.

Implementation

This dimension of support examines the extent to which nations support the Andean Pact by implementing group decisions on the national level. The process of implementation is a vital component of participation in a regional cooperation scheme. Puchala (1975) notes that in the case of the EEC, nations which disapprove of a particular policy will simply fail to implement it. At the present time members who fail to implement Pact decisions are rarely punished. There are no formal sanctions available to the Junta to enforce implementation. While other members may protest and indeed "force" compliance (as happened in the case of Chile in 1974), implementation of group decisions remains basically a national decision.

Not only is implementation essential to the overall functioning -- and perhaps eventual success -- of the scheme, but it reflects the degree to which members support the Pact. The degree of implementation is, in turn, hypothesized to influence both supportive attitudes and the level of activity a nation exhibits toward the Andean Pact.

In measuring the extent of national implementation of group decisions, five indicators are used: 1) the evaluation of officials as to the degree of implementation, 2) the number of public statements about work in

progress, 3) the number of concrete actions undertaken to implement Pact decisions, 4) the number of requests for exemptions from compliance with Pact policies, and 5) the number and percentage of CAF loans forfeited due to lack of implementation of the funded project.

Officials interviewed were asked to characterize their government's degree of implementation of Pact programs. Table 18 presents the summary of the officials' evaluations of governmental implementation of programs in general.

Table 18. Officials' Evaluations of Governmental Implementation of Pact Programs.

	Number of Respondents	Number of officials describing their government's implementation of programs as Complete (3) No.	%	Moderate (2) No.	%	Low (1) No.	%	Mean
Bolivia	6	1	17	1	17	4	66	1.50
Colombia	9	3	33	6	66	0	0	2.33
Chile	4	0	0	2	50	2	50	1.50
Ecuador	8	1	13	5	63	2	25	1.88
Peru	15	2	13	12	80	1	7	2.10
Venezuela	3	0	0	3	100	0	0	2.00

Mean = 1.89
Standard Deviation = .326

The results show that Bolivian and Chilean officials tend to indicate that their governments are not very active in implementing Pact programs. In the other four countries, most responses fall into the moderate category. These results suggest that relatively few officials feel their governments are completely implementing Pact programs. Officials who did indicate complete implementation tended to be very defensive in the interview situation. A Bolivian respondent, for example, flatly stated that Bolivia was having absolutely no problems with implementing all of the Pact's programs. Constant probing on the part of the interviewer made no difference in his posture.

There are several reasons why the evaluation data on general implementation are not as valuable as on other dimensions. Few respondents conceived of implementation in general terms; most officials characterized their implementation in terms of specific programs. Furthermore, there was a tremendous discrepancy in information given by officials of the same country. One official would state emphatically that all programs were being implemented completely on schedule, for example, while another would show figures indicating that only thirty percent of the necessary studies were completed on time. This seems to indicate that many officials were simply not aware of the extent to which the government was implementing Pact programs. While the respondents were able to describe national activity and to discuss governmental attitudes, the concept of implementation seemed to produce relatively few enthusiastic responses.

A second measure of implementation is the number of verbal and non-verbal actions concerning implementation of Pact programs. Most of the verbal activity consists of public statements by officials on "work in progress" in implementing Pact programs. Non-verbal actions include

such behavior as sponsoring governmental seminars to inform segments of the population about the Andean Pact, passing national laws implementing Pact decisions, and having bilateral meetings to discuss means of implementation. Table 19 presents the results of the event data analysis.

Table 19. Verbal and Non-Verbal Positive Actions reflecting National Implementation of Pact Decisions.

	Verbal	Non-Verbal	Total
Bolivia	11	17	28
Colombia	10	16	26
Chile	9	8	17
Ecuador	12	12	24
Peru	11	18	29
Venezuela	8	14	22

Mean = 21
Standard Deviation = 5.23

In marked contrast to the evaluations of officials, Bolivia appears to be taking an active role in implementing Pact decisions. And yet, officials in the other five countries continually stressed the view that Bolivia was unable to implement Pact programs. Perhaps Bolivian officials make more positive statements with respect to implementation precisely because they are aware of subregional criticism of their lack of implementation.

Another measure of implementation is the number of exemptions requested by each nation from the Junta. Excluding industrial programming and trade liberalization measures (which are discussed later in this chapter) the number of exemptions requested from the Junta is presented in Table 20.

Table 20. Members' Requests for Exemptions from Provisions of the Andean Pact, 1971-1976.

	Number of Requests
Bolivia	0
Colombia	10
Chile	9
Ecuador	0
Peru	1
Venezuela	5

Source: Acuerdo de Cartagena. Junta. Informaciones Básicas sobre el Acuerdo de Cartagena. Lima. 1976.

Colombia and Chile, followed by Venezuela, requested many more exemptions than did the other countries. Most of the requests asked that the minimum common external tariff be suspended to allow imports of specific goods.

A final indicator of implementation is the number and percentage of CAF loans forfeited due to lack of implementation. Table 21 presents the findings for this indicator.

Table 21. CAF Loans Forfeited due to Lack of Implementation, 1971-1975.

	Number of Projects	Number not used	Total amount in CAF loans	Percent of funding not used
Bolivia	25	3	17,123,180	1.8
Colombia	7	1	14,862,000	26.9
Chile	17	2	29,065,000	27.4
Ecuador	20	0	23,675,000	0
Peru	12	1	29,167,800	5.8
Venezuela	3	1	5,831,000	42.8

Source: Corporación Andina de Fomento. Cinco Años de Labor, 1970-1975. Caracas: Corporación Andina de Fomento. 1975.

Ecuador shows the least number and percentage of loans forfeited. Venezuela shows the greatest percentage of funds not utilized while Bolivia shows the highest absolute number of abandoned projects. Considerations other than lack of ability to implement may have played a role in the decision to forfeit CAF-approved loans. Yet the fact that the project was abandoned after the proposal was submitted indicates at the very least poor planning or lack of foresight. And the lack of adequate planning or foresight is undoubtedly another indication of lack of implementation.

Table 22, which summarizes the rankings of Andean Pact members on the various measures of implementation, shows considerable variation across the different indicators. One possible reason for these mixed results may be that nations implement Pact programs differently depending

Table 22. Comparison of Findings Regarding National Implementation from Different Sources.

Officials' Evaluations	Verbal Behavior	Non-verbal Behavior	Requests for Exemptions	CAF loans Forfeited
Venezuela	Ecuador	Peru	Bolivia	Ecuador
Colombia	Bolivia	Bolivia	Ecuador	Bolivia
Peru	Peru	Colombia	Peru	Peru
Ecuador	Colombia	Venezuela	Venezuela	Chile
Bolivia	Chile	Ecuador	Chile	Colombia
Chile	Venezuela	Chile	Colombia	Venezuela

on the issue, a proposition that will be discussed in the following sections. The analysis of implementation yields markedly different results than the analysis of both activity and supportive attitudes. Of the two nations exhibiting the highest level of activity, Venezuela ranks in the lower half on all measures, while Peru consistently ranks in the upper half. Ecuador ranks at the top in terms of verbal behavior and no CAF loans forfeited.

This analysis has attempted to show the extent to which nations support the Andean Pact in general. With the exception of implementation (for which no conclusive results were obtained) certain patterns of support emerge from the analysis. Venezuela and Peru rank consistently highest in terms of levels of activity, supportive attitudes, and the degree to which their foreign policy behavior has been influenced by Pact membership. Chile and Bolivia rank lowest on these three dimensions

while Ecuador and Colombia retain a "middle ground" position. There is a close relationship between levels of activity, supportive attitudes, and degree to which foreign policy behavior is influenced. Kendall's W equals .72 for measures of these three dimensions.[4] This shows that nations which exhibit high levels of activity are also likely to show high levels of supportive attitudes and high levels of cooperative interactions with other Andean Pact members.

Support by Issues

A central thesis of this study is that nations will behave differently with respect to different issues. Four issues are considered here: 1) trade liberalization measures, 2) industrial programming, 3) the Statute on Common Treatment of Foreign Capital (Decision 24), and 4) the proposed Andean Tribunal of Justice. Trade liberalization and industrial programming measures are used in an effort to tap the two main economic goals of the Andean Pact. Both of these issues require continual action. In the case of trade liberalization, members reduce their tariffs annually and are required to decrease periodically the number of exceptions taken. In the case of industrial programming measures, negotiations continue on specific sectors to be programmed. Thus, the levels of activity, supportive attitudes, and implementation can be examined in these two areas. The case of Decision 24 is somewhat different in that it refers to a decision approved five years ago. It is therefore difficult to refer to governmental activity toward the statute. Virtually all of the public statements and responses to interview questions about governmental activity with respect to Decision 24 refer to either political commitment to the decision or implementation. The Andean

Tribunal of Justice is in the proposal stage which makes it impossible to talk about implementation.

Trade Liberalization Measures

A nation's level of activity with respect to trade is measured by the evaluation of tecnicos. Event data -- in terms of verbal and non-verbal behavior -- were intended to be used in examining national activity with respect to trade liberalization measures. However, there were so few acts relating to this issue (22) that it was difficult to draw any conclusions from this data source.

In analyzing interview responses regarding governmental activity in trade liberalization measures, three categories were distinguished: very active, active, and minimally active. The results of these interviews are summarized in Table 23.

The interview data indicate that Chile and Colombia are the most active with respect to trade liberalization measures, Bolivia is the least active, and the other three members attribute roughly the same amount of activity to their governments. These findings are consistent with the national positions in the negotiations leading to the Pact's formation. Chile and Colombia have traditionally favored an accelerated tariff-reduction program and in the early years pushed actively for automaticity and speedy compliance, while the other four members attributed less importance to trade liberalization.

In seeking to determine the existence of supportive attitudes toward trade liberalization measures, officials were asked about the importance their governments attach to trade liberalization programs. A summary of these responses is presented in Table 24.

Table 23. Officials' Evaluations of Governmental Activity regarding Trade Liberalization Measures.

	Number of Respondents	Number of respondents characterizing their government's activity as: Very active (3) No.	%	Active (2) No.	%	Minimally Active (1) No.	%	Mean
Bolivia	8	0	0	1	13	7	88	1.13
Colombia	11	7	64	4	37	0	0	2.64
Chile	6	3	50	3	50	0	0	2.50
Ecuador	8	2	25	4	50	2	25	2.00
Peru	19	4	21	14	74	1	5	2.16
Venezuela	2	0	0	2	100	0	0	2.00

Mean = 2.07
Standard Deviation = .531

These evaluations correspond very closely to the findings on activity in trade liberalization programs. Peru and Venezuela tend to view trade liberalization as less important than other Andean Pact programs while Colombia and Chile view it as essential to their continued support. Similarly, Ecuadorians and Bolivians tend to emphasize that trade liberalization measures, while important, are not the most important Pact programs for their governments.

In examining implementation of trade liberalization programs, a correlation is expected to exist between implementation and both activity and supportive attitudes. Implementation of trade liberalization programs

Table 24. Officials' Evaluations of the Importance of Trade Liberalization Measures to their Governments.

	Number of Respondents	Number of respondents describing their governments' attitudes as Essential (2) No.	%	Limited Importance (1) No.	%	Mean
Bolivia	8	1	13	7	88	1.13
Colombia	11	8	73	3	28	1.73
Chile	6	6	100	0	0	2.00
Ecuador	8	3	38	5	63	1.13
Peru	18	1	6	17	94	1.01
Venezuela	3	0	0	3	100	1.00

Mean = 1.34
Standard Deviation = .417

is measured in three ways: 1) evaluation of officials, 2) number of requests for extensions, and 3) number of official trade missions sent to other Pact members. The summary of the interview responses is presented in Table 25.

Most officials described their governments as implementing trade liberalization measures. Bolivia was the only case where most respondents felt that there was little implementation of trade liberalization measures. Officials from all the other countries maintained that implementation was proceeding smoothly. These views are for the most part reflected in the data summarized in Table 25.

Table 25. Officials' Evaluations of their Governments' Implementation of Trade Liberalization Measures.

	Number of Respondents	Number of officials describing their governments' implementation as Complete (2)	Minimal (1)	Mean
Bolivia	7	1	6	1.14
Colombia	11	10	1	1.90
Chile	6	6	0	2.00
Ecuador	8	6	2	1.75
Peru	16	14	2	1.87
Venezuela	2	2	0	2.00

Mean = 1.78
Standard Deviation = .325

A second indicator of the extent of implementation of trade liberalization measures is the number of exemptions requested by each member. Ecuador and Chile each requested one exemption from the Junta in trade liberalization measures. Bolivia, while not requesting any exemptions from the Junta, requested (and received) a $265,000 grant from CAF to help implement trade liberalization measures. Ecuador received a similar grant of $112,500.

Another measure of the extent of trade liberalization measures is the number of trade missions sent by each Andean Pact nation to other Pact members in an attempt to increase trade. These official and semi-official missions primarily seek to encourage exports. Table 26 presents the number of official trade missions sent from 1971-1975.

Table 26. Number of Official Trade Missions sent by an Andean Pact Member to other Andean Pact Members, 1971-1975.

	1971	1973	1974	1975	Total
Bolivia	1	1	5	0	7
Colombia	5	1	1	0	7
Chile	1	0	5	3	9
Ecuador	0	1	0	1	2
Peru	4	3	2	0	9
Venezuela	0	3	9	1	13

This table indicates that Venezuela has been the most active in sending trade missions and Ecuador the least active. It is interesting to note that in 1974 and 1975 when Chile's activity in the Andean Pact was generally decreasing, the number of trade missions it sent actually increased.

While the relationship between activity and implementation of trade liberalization measures is relatively high (Kendall's tau = .50), the relationship between supportive attitudes and trade liberalization implementation is almost non-existent (Kendall's tau = .07). There is no close relationship between levels of general activity in the Andean Pact and activity in trade liberalization measures. Nor is there a close relationship between supportive attitudes for the Andean Pact in general and for trade liberalization measures. These findings confirm the argument that nations indeed behave differently in their support for trade

liberalization measures than in their general support for the Andean Pact.

Industrial Programming

Industrial programming has been widely hailed as one of the most innovative programs of the Andean Pact. Yet negotiations in formulating industrial programming decisions have been characterized by tremendous controversy. Each nation is reluctant to accept an agreement which effectively limits its freedom to determine industrial development. While all of the member nations profess commitment to industrial programming, there are clear differences in the relative importance assigned to industrial programming.

In looking at the level of activity in industrial programming, three measures are used: 1) evaluation of officials regarding their government's activity in industrial programming, 2) the frequency with which industrial programming is mentioned, and 3) public statements and actions about industrial programming.

A summary of the interview responses is presented in Table 27. These responses confirm the view that Venezuela and Peru are the most active nations in industrial programming, while Chile and Colombia consider themselves less active. Bolivians generally felt that their government was active in industrial programming -- a surprising finding in comparison both with their evaluations of overall governmental activity and activity in trade liberalization measures. Ecuador was considered by most Ecuadorian officials as being very active. Several of these officials stated that Ecuador was the leader of the Andean Pact in terms of industrial programming activity. This observation differs from that of officials in other member nations who view the general level of Ecuadorian activity as relatively

Table 27. Officials' Evaluations of their Governments' Activity in Industrial Programming Measures.

	Number of Respondents	Number of respondents describing their governments' activity as: Most Active (3) No.	%	Active (2) No.	%	Minimally Active (1) No.	%	Mean
Bolivia	8	0	0	6	75	2	25	1.75
Colombia	10	2	20	8	80	0	0	2.20
Chile	5	0	0	4	80	1	20	1.80
Ecuador	9	8	89	1	11	0	0	2.88
Peru	20	17	85	3	15	0	0	2.85
Venezuela	4	3	75	1	25	0	0	2.75

Mean = 2.37
Standard Deviation = .524

low. As noted above, Ecuadorian officials tended to stress the positive results of their Andean Pact policy, while officials in other nations tended to "write Ecuador off" as being too underdeveloped to take an active role.

In considering supportive attitudes of the member governments with respect to industrial programming, officials were asked to assess the importance ascribed to industrial programming by their governments. A summary of these responses is presented in Table 28.

Most of the respondents felt that industrial programming was absolutely essential to their government's support for the Andean Pact. Chile was the only member in which a majority of the respondents felt

Table 28. Officials' Evaluations of the Importance Assigned by their Governments to Industrial Programming.

	Number of Respondents	Number of respondents describing their governments' attitudes as Essential (2) No.	%	Limited importance (1) No.	%	Mean
Bolivia	9	8	89	1	11	1.88
Colombia	12	7	58	5	42	1.58
Chile	6	1	17	5	83	1.15
Ecuador	9	9	100	0	0	2.00
Peru	20	19	95	1	5	1.95
Venezuela	4	4	100	0	0	2.00

Mean = 1.76
Standard Deviation = .334

that industrial programming was of only limited importance to their government's activity. Peru and Venezuela are both considered by governmental officials to be absolutely committed to industrial programming. Colombia is a somewhat ambiguous case. While most respondents felt that industrial programming was essential to their government's support for the Andean Pact, a large minority (42 percent) felt that it was receiving too much emphasis within the Pact. Colombians seem to feel that while support for industrial programming is essential to the continued functioning of the Pact, Colombia will personally benefit much more from trade liberalization measures.

The cases of Bolivia and Ecuador are especially interesting in

light of officials' evaluations of governmental activity in industrial programming. Bolivians perceived their government as being only moderately active but absolutely committed to industrial programming. Ecuadorians, on the other hand, perceived of their government as a leader in industrial programming measures and as completely committed to industrial programs. Several Ecuadorians expressed the view that without industrial programming, Ecuador would have no reason for remaining in the Pact. Both Ecuadorians and Bolivians felt that industrial programming was the primary mechanism which would allow the two lesser developed countries to "catch up" with the other members. The reasons for the difference in Bolivian and Ecuadorian descriptions of their governments' activity in industrial programming seem to stem from their evaluations of governmental implementation of industrial programming decisions. Bolivians were most emphatic in discussing the problems involved in implementing industrial programming. Many of them stressed the view that Bolivia was just not able to implement industrial programming or to take advantage of the benefits resulting from joint industrial planning. In contrast, the Ecuadorians expressed the view that their government was implementing industrial programming decisions with some success. Officials' evaluations of governmental implementation in the area of industrial programming are presented in Table 29.

While Venezuelan and Peruvian officials' characterization of their implementation as being relatively complete was anticipated, Chile was not expected to describe its implementation in the same way. The Chilean view seemed to be "well, we're not very active in industrial programming, and it's not very important to us, but we're implementing it fully and it hasn't meant any great sacrifice."[5]

Table 29. Officials' Evaluations of Governmental Implementation of Industrial Programming.

Number of Respondents		Number of responses describing governmental implementation as: Complete (2) No.	%	Minimal (1) No.	%	Mean
Bolivia	9	3	33	6	66	1.33
Colombia	12	7	58	5	42	1.58
Chile	6	6	100	0	0	2.00
Ecuador	9	8	88	1	12	1.88
Peru	20	20	100	0	0	2.00
Venezuela	4	4	100	0	0	2.00

Mean = 1.80
Standard Deviation = .281

The event data reveal a total of 104 acts in which Andean Pact members made verbal statements or took actions with respect to implementation of industrial programming decisions. The distribution of those acts by country is presented in Table 30.

This indicator of governmental implementation of industrial programming decisions presents quite different results from those obtained in the interview data. One reason for this discrepancy may be due to the fact that the event data do not indicate the reasons or the direction of the activity concerning industrial programming implementation. The event data indicate that Bolivia has been the most active in implementing industrial programming decisions and Venezuela the least active. These findings directly

Table 30. Actions by Andean Pact Members concerning Implementation of Industrial Programming Decisions.

	Number of Acts
Bolivia	24
Colombia	19
Chile	13
Ecuador	17
Peru	19
Venezuela	12

Mean = 17.3
Standard Deviation = 4.03

contradict those based on the interview data in which Venezuela indicated its industrial programming implementation was complete while Bolivia ranked lowest in implementation of industrial programming. It may be that Bolivia exhibits a high level of activity to implement industrial programming because it is dissatisfied with the current state of implementation or because it is seeking to persuade other members that it really is making an effort to implement the industrial programming decisions. It may also be that actions which are considered "routine" when carried out by other members -- such as the submission of feasibility studies to the Junta -- are considered extraordinary and hence newsworthy when accomplished by Bolivia.

The case of Venezuela is also interesting. Venezuelans consider their government as fully implementing industrial programming decisions,

yet the event data suggest that Venezuela is the least active member with respect to industrial programming implementation. During the time period under analysis -- through August, 1975 -- Venezuela had not formally subscribed to any of the industrial programming decisions. Venezuela was still negotiating its incorporation into the metalworking industrial program. Venezuelan officials constantly stressed that negotiations were proceeding smoothly and that Venezuela was doing everything possible to speed up the agreement. Yet, officials in the other countries maintained that Venezuela was stalling the negotiations. The event data seem to indicate that this argument may have some validity. Venezuelan actions to implement industrial programming do not correspond with officials' evaluations. The question of the relative utility of the event data in measuring support for the Andean Pact will be further explored in the concluding section of this chapter.

There is a moderately close relationship between levels of activity, supportive attitudes and implementation of industrial programming measures (W = .68). This relationship is much stronger than that between the three dimensions relating to trade liberalization measures. Also, unlike the case of trade liberalization in which a slight inverse relationship was found between support for trade liberalization and general support for the Andean Pact, there is a positive relationship between support for industrial programming and for the Andean Pact in general (Kendall's tau = .64). This finding indicates that nations which are most supportive of industrial programming measures also tend to be most supportive of the Andean Pact in general.

Support for industrial programming was expected to be inversely related to support for trade liberalization measures. This relationship

was largely supported by the data (Kendall's tau = -.79 between trade liberalization and industrial programming supportive attitudes). Venezuela and Peru exhibited great support for industrial programming while exhibiting much less support for trade liberalization measures. Bolivia and Ecuador similarly expressed much more support for industrial programming than for trade liberalization measures. The nations which were most supportive of trade liberalization measures -- Colombia and Chile -- exhibited less support for industrial programming. However, as noted above, Colombia seems to be taking somewhat of an ambiguous position with respect to industrial programming, suggesting that the relationship between industrial programming and trade liberalization is not as simple as originally expected.

Statute on the Common Treatment of Foreign Investment

The Statute on the Common Treatment of Foreign Investment -- Decision 24 -- was passed in December, 1970 over the objections of opponents who argued that such a decision would decrease investment in the region. Since its passage, Decision 24 has been the subject of a great deal of controversy. As mentioned in Chapter II, Chile was charged in 1974 with not complying with the decision's provisions by the other five members and eventually agreed to change the offending law. More recently, Chile has asked that an exception be made in the application of Decision 24. One of the provisions of the decision is that governmental companies or corporations may not be divested to foreign business. The current Chilean regime is asking, in effect, that it be allowed to turn over these governmental corporations to foreign private companies. The matter has not yet been resolved. Most officials of other member countries feel an exception cannot be made for Chile; others maintain that in order

for the Pact to be successful, the members' special conditions must be taken into account. While most officials assert, both publicly and privately, that the philosophy of Decision 24 is vital to the Andean Pact, there is increasing talk of the need for certain minor changes in some of the provisions. These officials argue that Decision 24 was never intended to be a rigid provision and that events of the last five years have made certain changes necessary. The fourteen percent limit on remission of profits by foreign companies is most commonly cited as an aspect needing change.

In analyzing the activity of members toward Decision 24, an attempt was made to use officials' evaluations in much the same manner as they were used in the previous two issues. Officials were asked to describe their governments' activity with respect to Decision 24. However, the responses did not, for the most part, focus on national activity. When asked "how would you describe your government's activity with respect to Decision 24?", most officials responded in terms of either the degree of implementation or governmental supportive attitudes. Unlike trade liberalization and industrial programming measures, Decision 24 does not involve continuing negotiations; the decision has already been passed.

As in the case of trade liberalization and industrial programming measures, supportive attitudes toward Decision 24 were measured by responses to interview questions. A summary of these responses is presented in Table 31.

The findings suggest that Venezuelan and Peruvian officials attribute a high degree of support by their governments with respect to Decision 24. Bolivia and Ecuador exhibit similar patterns of

Table 31. Officials' Evaluations of their Governments' Support for Decision 24.

	Number of Respondents	Number of respondents characterizing their governments' support for Decision 24 as: Complete (3) No.	%	Qualified (2) No.	%	Limited (1) No.	%	Mean
Bolivia	8	0	0	6	75	2	25	1.75
Colombia	11	2	18	7	64	2	18	2.00
Chile	2	0	0	2	100	0	0	2.00
Ecuador	9	0	0	8	88	1	12	1.88
Peru	17	15	88	2	12	0	0	2.88
Venezuela	4	4	100	0	0	0	0	3.00

Mean = 2.25
Standard Deviation = .543

qualified support. Colombians seem to be somewhat ambiguous in their discussion of governmental support for Decision 24. While most of the officials interviewed affirmed their government's commitment to Decision 24, nearly all noted the need for some kind of change in the provisions of the decision. The Chileans interviewed were very defensive regarding the subject of Decision 24. Most officials did not want to discuss Decision 24; both of those who did comment on the decision stated that while Decision 24 was considered important to their government, the decision had received too much attention and that other measures were more important.

When respondents were asked about governmental implementation of

Decision 24, two categories of responses emerged: 1) rigid implementation and 2) problematical implementation. The responses to this question were the only ones in which there was a difference between governmental officials and private sector representatives. Accordingly, Table 32, a summary of responses to questions about implementation, distinguishes between governmental and private sector responses. Numbers in parentheses indicate private sector representatives.

These findings present evidence that private sector representatives consider governmental implementation of Decision 24 to be more rigid than do the officials of the same country. The reason for this may be that Decision 24 impacts more directly on the private sector than either industrial programming or trade liberalization. In general, there is a higher percentage of respondents characterizing their governments as rigidly implementing Decision 24 than was found for either trade liberalization or industrial programming measures. This may not reflect the fact that Decision 24 is being more rigorously implemented than the other two programs, but may reflect the nature of the decision. Since Decision 24 has already gone into effect, officials may have been reluctant to admit difficulties in implementation. And since negotiations continue in the other two areas, admission of problems may not be as crucial. While admission of problems occurring in industrial programming implementation might be perceived as actually beneficial -- in that other members might be more willing to concede other products or be more reception to relaxing compliance deadlines -- the climate surrounding Decision 24 is quite different. A country which admits that it is having trouble in implementing Decision 24 cannot expect any concessions from the other countries as the 1974 case of Chile points out.

Table 32. Officials' Evaluations of Governmental Implementation of Decision 24.

	Number of Respondents	Number of respondents describing their governments' implementation of Dec. 24 as Rigid (2)	Problematical (1)	Mean
Bolivia	8(3)	2(2)	3(1)	1.50
Colombia	10(3)	6(3)	1	1.90
Chile	2(0)	0	2	1.00
Ecuador	9(3)	4(3)	2	1.11
Peru	15(5)	10(3)	0(2)	1.86
Venezuela	4(1)	4(1)	0	2.00

Mean = 1.56
Standard Deviation = .429

One of the most useful indicators of Decision 24 implementation is the comparison of national legislation regarding foreign investment with the provisions of the Andean Pact. The Latin American Institute of Integration (INTAL) compiled the legislative comparison making this analysis possible. While such a method of comparison would have been desireable in the case of the other two programs, the costs of doing so and the lack of available data make it impossible. The data displayed in Table 33 present the most significant differences among nations with respect to the degree to which their national legislation corresponds to the provisions of Decision 24.

Decision 24 (article 6e) provided for the centralization of

Table 33. Comparison of National Legislation Relating to Foreign Investment.

Andean Pact Provision	Extent of Compliance					
	Bolivia	Colombia	Chile	Ecuador	Peru	Venezuela
Creation of one governmental institution to register foreign investment.	1 institution created	4 institutions existing	2 institutions existing	3 institutions existing	1 institution created	1 institution created
Sanctions for failure of foreign investors to register	cancel authorization to operate	none	charged with fraud; fined	none	none	pay damages; authorization cancelled
Intangible technological contributions cannot be computed as capital support	same as Dec. 24	same as Dec. 24	technological contributions can be counted	same as Dec. 24	same as Dec. 24	same as Dec. 24
Can only increase capital in joint companies when national percentage stays the same	same as Dec. 24	same as Dec. 24	increases in foreign capital can be made with special permission	same as Dec. 24	same as Dec. 24	same as Dec. 24
Sectors prohibited to new foreign investment: public services, insurance and banks, communications	public services, communications	public services, insurance	none	none	insurance, banks	public services, communications, banks

Source: Integración y Progreso. April 1975.

statistical registration of foreign investors. As the data indicate, only three members have done so. Decision 24 left the implementation of the decision up to the individual member nations.

Only three members have promulgated legal sanctions for those investors not complying with the registration requirements. Decision 24 also stipulated: 1) that foreign companies must gradually convert into joint or national ones, 2) that an increase in capital of foreign companies is allowed only when national participation retains the same percentage of total investment, and 3) that intangible technological contributions cannot be computed as capital support. On all three of these measures, Chile is the only member whose national legislation does not correspond exactly to the provisions of Decision 24.

In Decision 24 (Ch. 3, arts. 41-43) new foreign investment is prohibited in the following sectors: public services (including potable water, sewerage, electricity, telephones, post offices, and telecommunications), insurance, commercial banks and other financial institutions, and communications (internal transport companies, publicity, commercial radio stations, television stations, newspapers and magazines).

Article 44 of Decision 24 -- the safeguard clause -- stated that members could permit new foreign investment for a limited time in these areas if considered as special cases. Table 33 indicates that this safeguard clause has been widely used. None of the members has formulated national legislation prohibiting new foreign investment in all of these areas. Bolivia, Colombia, and Venezuela have prohibited foreign investment in public services; Colombia and Peru have prohibited it in insurance; and Peru and Venezuela have prohibited it in banks. All of the members restrict new foreign investment in these sectors to special cases,

subject to petitions and granted only for a limited amount of time. Venezuela appears to have completely prohibited new foreign investment in more sectors than any other member, followed by Bolivia and Colombia. Peru has prohibited new investment in only one sector while Chile and Ecuador appear to be much more cautious in doing so.

The data on dimensions of national support for Decision 24 are less complete than for either trade liberalization or industrial programming measures. Relatively low levels of activity with respect to Decision 24 were exhibited in the events data. The level of activity of a member toward an Andean Pact issue was defined as that observable behavior a nation directs toward the Andean Pact with the intention of influencing or maintaining that issue. In the case of Decision 24, a separate dimension of activity was not found. Officials did not perceive of activity as being separate from implementation or supportive attitudes. Thus it would appear that the utility of level of activity as a dimension of support is limited to only those areas where a definitive agreement has not been reached. Striking differences were exhibited in perceived importance assigned to Decision 24, however, and in the perceived need for modification of the decision. Peruvians and Venezuelans tended to attribute higher degrees of governmental support to their governments than did respondents from other nations. They also tended to evaluate their governments' implementation as being more complete. The relationship between supportive attitudes and implementation of Decision 24 is a moderately close one (Kendall's tau = .41). There is also a much closer relationship between support for Decision 24 and support for the Andean Pact as a whole (Kendall's tau = .83).

The Proposed Andean Tribunal of Justice

The issue of the proposed Andean Tribunal of Justice corresponds most closely with the issue of supranationalism as discussed by integration theorists with respect to Europe (Etzioni, 1965; Haas, 1971). This tribunal would delegate increased power and authority to the central body of the Andean Pact. National legal opinions on interpretation of Andean Pact decisions would be subject to a supranational Tribunal. As such, the indicator of support for the proposed Andean Tribunal of Justice represents a willingness to delegate national authority to a supranational power.

The issue of the proposed Andean Tribunal is not perceived as a salient one in most of the Andean Pact nations. With the exception of Colombians and a few assorted officials from other countries, the Junta's proposal for a Tribunal is regarded as just one of many Junta proposals. Most officials indicated that agreement on a Tribunal will not be achieved in the near future. Most officials reacted with surprise that the question would even be raised in an interview. This low level of salience found in the interviews is reflected in the events data. Only two acts of Andean nations were found to deal with the subject.

In Table 34, a summary of the responses of officials to questions about governmental support for the Tribunal are presented. These data indicate that while a majority of respondents support the idea of some kind of supranational judicial authority, most do not support the current proposal. In fact, only Colombia seems committed to the Junta's present proposal. In the spring of 1975 (several months before the interviews in Colombia were carried out) the Colombian Supreme Court issued a decision which not only recognized the supranational nature of the Andean Pact but

Table 34. Officials' Evaluations of Governmental Support for the Proposed Andean Tribunal of Justice.

	Number of Respondents	Number of responses describing support as Complete (3) No.	%	Qualified (2) No.	%	None (1) No.	%	Mean
Bolivia	3	0	0	2	67	1	33	1.67
Colombia	12	11	92	1	8	0	0	2.92
Chile	5	0	0	1	20	4	80	1.20
Ecuador	6	3	50	3	50	0	0	2.50
Peru	11	0	0	4	36	7	64	1.36
Venezuela	3	0	0	1	33	2	67	1.33

Mean = 1.83
Standard Deviation

also encouraged the formation of an Andean Tribunal. The Colombians pointed to this decision with pride, as a symbol of their commitment to the Tribunal. Of the Ecuadorians who responded to the questions about the Tribunal, three felt that Ecuador was the leader of the group in pushing for a Tribunal, which accounts for Ecuador's relatively high score on this issue.

Insofar as a consensus can be inferred from such a disparity in the data, there seems to be a feeling in the subregion that something needs to be done to ensure that Andean Pact decisions will be interpreted in the same manner in all of the countries. However, only in Colombia and Ecuador was there any feeling that a supranational Tribunal should have the authority to force members to comply. Within the subregion, Peru

and Chile are generally regarded as the nations which are most opposed to the creation of a Tribunal. Peru is viewed as having a long tradition of being unwilling to give up any of its national sovereignty. The situation in Chile is viewed in a different light. Officials in other countries see Chile's opposition to the Tribunal as a product of the current regime. They emphasize that Chile has a historical tradition of legalism which would, in other circumstances, manifest itself in support for a supranational authority.

Members of the Junta express absolute commitment to the Andean Tribunal. However, they do not exhibit much optimism with respect to the possibility of its being implemented soon. As one official said, "except for Colombia, there is no wide support for the Tribunal right now. Unfortunately this support will probably only be generated after we've had a few more crises like the Chilean case. It would be best to have a means for resolving those crises before they arise, but it probably won't happen."

The issue of the Andean Tribunal is felt to be very important by the Colombians who frequently raised the subject in interviews before being asked. But officials in other countries did not perceive it as being an important or even a relevant issue. There was no significant relationship between support for the Andean Tribunal and activity or support for the Andean Pact as a whole (Kendall's tau = -.07 and 0, respectively). This would seem to support the argument that the Andean Pact is a regional economic cooperation scheme with only limited chances of expanding its authority into political-legal matters.

Summary

In describing the foreign policy behavior of member nations toward the Andean Pact, a number of observations may be made. Members exhibit different patterns of support for different Andean Pact issues. Members which are more supportive of industrial programming or the Statute on the Common Treatment of Foreign Investment are more likely to support the Andean Pact in general than those which exhibit lesser support for these programs. Members which are more supportive of trade liberalization measures or the proposed Andean Tribunal are no more likely to exhibit general support for the Andean Pact as a whole than nations which are less supportive of these specific programs. High levels of national implementation of one program are not related to high levels of implementation of other programs. A nation which exhibits a high level of activity with respect to a particular program is also likely to display high levels of supportive attitudes.

It is evident from these findings that members not only support the Andean Pact to different degrees, but that they support different programs within the Pact. The Andean Pact seems somewhat like a coalition in the sense that members support the Andean Pact as a whole as a means of receiving particular policy outcomes. This question will be addressed further in the following chapter.

The fact that those members which are most supportive of industrial programming and the Statute on the Common Treatment of Foreign Investment (Decision 24) are also most supportive of the Andean Pact as a whole is a significant finding. Industrial programming and Decision 24 are two of the most far-reaching and innovative programs of the Andean Pact, differentiating it from other Latin American attempts at economic cooperation. Unlike studies of European integration which have stressed the

importance of supranational institutions (e.g. Etzioni, 1965), there was no significant relationship between national support for the proposed Andean Tribunal and the Pact as a whole. Those members which are most supportive of the Pact as a whole are no more willing to delegate increased authority to the Pact than those members which are less supportive.

The contrast between the patterns of support by Bolivia and Ecuador, the two members of relatively lesser economic development, is a striking one. In officials' evaluations of Ecuadorian activity and supportive attitudes, Ecuador was presented as an active and committed supporter of the Andean Pact. In contrast, Bolivian officials consistently depicted their government as taking neither an active role nor exhibiting very supportive attitudes toward the Pact. The difference in the patterns of support between these two relatively lesser developed Pact members suggests that the level of economic development is not sufficient to explain patterns of national support for the Pact.

Given these data on patterns of national support for the Andean Pact, certain questions about the Pact's future are raised. Most of the members tend to view the Andean Pact as a high priority issue -- in terms of officials' evaluations of the degree of existing political support. Yet, surprisingly, a majority of the respondents did not exhibit complete optimism with respect to the Pact's future. Considering the fact that the officials interviewed were those most committed to Andean cooperation, this finding raises questions as to how progress can be made in a group which is not overwhelmingly convinced that progress is going to be made.

The analysis of implementation of the various Andean Pact programs raises serious questions about the extent to which group decisions are being implemented on a national level. Bolivia faces difficulties in implementing both trade liberalization and industrial programming measures,

the two major economic programs of the Pact. What is the effect of one member not being able to implement Pact programs? While Bolivians certainly perceive it as a serious problem, few officials in the other member countries share this view. The comparison of national legislation relating to foreign investment indicates that no country has incorporated all of the provisions of Decision 24 into national law. With the exception of Chile, however, no attempt has been made to force compliance. Furthermore, the members are reluctant to enact a provision which would ensure uniform implementation of Andean Pact decisions. While interactions have increased tremendously among members over the past five years, there is little coordination of foreign policy behavior toward nations outside the Latin American region and even less toward the region.

These questions, while significant in that they point to the importance of national support for the success of the group, are not the central concerns of this study. The following chapter will seek to relate these dimensions of support to the independent variables specified in the analytical framework. What factors account for these variations in support for the Andean Pact?

NOTES
CHAPTER III

1. This result parallels the findings based on Kendall's tau between the variables: general supportive attitudes and general activity = .83; optimism and general activity = .87; optimism and general supportive attitudes = .69.

2. Petersen and Eley (1973), for example, used WEIS data to describe Latin American foreign policy and found that Latin American foreign policy is dominated by interactions with the U.S. They found little evidence of any patterns of regional or subregional interactions.

3. In the coding scheme used, acts were coded reciprocally. A report that Colombian and Venezuelan presidents met, for example, was coded as two acts: Colombian president (as initiator) meets with Venezuelan president (target); and Venezuelan president (as initiator) meets with Colombian president (target). The coding rules are spelled out in much greater detail in Appendix 2.

4. Level of activity is measured by mean scores of officials' evaluations of their own governments' activity; supportive attitudes are measured by the mean scores of officials' evaluations of their governments' political commitment. The impact of membership on foreign policy behavior is measured by the total number of acts directed toward the subregion.

5. Another measure of implementation of industrial programming measures is the number of extensions member nations requested for compliance with the decisions. Colombia, Chile, and Ecuador each requested extensions for the presentation of the feasibility studies for industrial programming on two occasions. While Bolivia did not request any such extensions from the Junta, it did request (and receive) a $47,800 grant from the CAF to carry out the necessary studies for an industrial programming decision. A similar $195,000 grant was made to Chile, a fact which contradicts the officials' evaluations that Chile has had no difficulties in implementing industrial programming decisions.

CHAPTER IV
EXPLAINING SUPPORT FOR THE ANDEAN PACT

The central concern of this chapter is to examine various determinants of national support for the Andean Pact. In the preceding chapter, it was demonstrated that member nations exhibit different degrees of support with respect to different issues of the Andean Pact. Different dimensions -- or ways of expressing that support -- were also found to exist. Given these variations in the dependent variable, the question remains as to why nations take different positions of support within the regional cooperation scheme. Why is Peru so much more supportive of industrial programming than trade liberalization measures? How can the apparent ambiguity of Colombian supportive attitudes be resolved? Why does Bolivia rank high on some supportive attitudes and relatively low on other measures?

It was suggested in Chapter I that three groups of factors would influence foreign policy behavior toward a regional cooperation scheme: 1) factors hypothesized to affect national capabilities, 2) factors hypothesized to affect national interest or desire to support a regional cooperation scheme, and 3) dynamic factors deriving from membership in the group. The first two groups of factors are considered as background conditions in that they are relatively static characteristics hypothesized to affect national policies of support for a regional cooperation scheme.

In the sections below, the hypotheses which relate these three groups of factors to the dependent variable are operationalized and

tested. Various measures of association are used in determining the relationship between the independent and dependent variables, including Pearson's Correlation Coefficient, Kendall's Correlation Coefficient,[1] and point biserial correlation. The data for the dependent variable, support for the Andean Pact, are ordinal in nature while the data for the independent variables are interval, ordinal, and nominal. The use of a particular measure in testing the hypotheses depends on the type of data of the independent variable.

One of the methodological problems in testing the hypotheses concerns the use of significance levels. Significance levels indicate the reliability of generalizing from a sample to the population as a whole. In this study, the unit of analysis is the member nation of the Andean Pact. Since all the members are included in the analysis, significance levels are not reported. While governmental officials were sampled in order to get the data for the national level of analysis, no attempt is made to generalize the findings from the sample of respondents to the population of governmental officials in general.[2]

Factors Hypothesized to Explain National Capabilities to Support a Regional Cooperation Scheme

Level of National Economic Development

The level of national economic development was hypothesized to be directly related to national support for the Andean Pact. National economic development is considered to be "the degree to which a national society has translated its industrial, agricultural, and technical potential into operative capabilities" (Rosenau and Hoggard, 1974: 22). Nations which have more resources will be able to implement Pact programs more efficiently, will be able to postpone immediate gratification more

easily, and will be capable of taking advantage of the Pact's benefits more readily than nations with less resources. The level of national economic development is measured here by a nation's gross domestic product (GDP).[3]

In testing the hypotheses posed by this study, the dependent variable of support for the Andean Pact is measured by the mean scores of officials' evaluations of their own governments' positions. Thus, general activity in the Andean Pact uses the national means presented in Table 7 of Chapter III. Similarly, in measures of the various dimensions and issues of support, mean scores of officials' responses are used. Mean scores are used as they present easily interpretable results which have been confirmed by other measures of support, as demonstrated in Chapter III of this study. The mean scores can be ranked and are generally treated as ordinal level data with hypotheses tested through the use of measures such as Kendall's tau. In an effort to make the most of the variation in the data (e.g. the difference between mean scores of 3 and 2 is greater than that between 2 and 1.9), Pearson's r is also calculated. While the results obtained through the use of Pearson's r are not much different from those obtained through the use of Kendall's tau, values of Pearson's r are included for comparative purposes. Pearson's r is widely used in social science research and the results are more easily interpreted than those based on Kendall's tau.

The level of economic development was hypothesized to be an important factor in explaining national activity and implementation of Pact programs. In testing this hypothesis, Kendall's tau and Pearson's r were calculated. The dependent variable, general activity in the Andean Pact and implementation of Pact programs, consists of the mean scores of officials'

evaluations of their own governments' activity and implementation. National GDP in 1974 is taken from the Inter-American Development Bank's Annual Economic Report (1974). These relationships are presented in Table 35.

Table 35. Relationship between GDP, General Activity, and Implementation of Andean Pact Programs.

Relationship between GDP and:	Kendall's tau	Pearson's r
General Activity	.60	.68
Implementation of:		
Trade Liberalization Measures	.83	.79
Industrial Programming Measures	.45	.54
Decision 24	.47	.56

These results clearly show that the level of national economic development, as measured by GDP, is an important factor in explaining general activity and implementation of specific Pact programs. The higher a nation's GDP, the more likely that nation will take an active role in the Pact and will successfully implement Pact programs. The relationship between implementation of trade liberalization measures and GDP is considerably stronger than the relationships between GDP and implementation of other programs. This may be due to the fact that the more developed nations have relatively more existing industries which are able to take advantage of the tariff-reduction measures. Nations which are less developed may not have enough existing industries capable of

exporting products on a large scale.

The findings support the hypothesis that nations which exhibit higher levels of economic development are more likely to be active in the Andean Pact and to implement Pact programs than nations which exhibit lower levels of economic development.

Financial Resources Available to the Government

A second factor hypothesized to affect national support for the Andean Pact is the amount of financial resources available to the government. Governments which possess ample financial resources are thought to be more capable of implementing Pact programs and, hence, of taking advantage of benefits deriving from membership in the Pact. There are several ways to measure governmental financial resources: government revenues, expenditures, revenues and expenditures as a percentage of GDP, allocation of special drawing rights in the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and change in international reserves. With the exception of the IMF's allocation of special drawing rights, these measures produce identical rank-orders for the six Andean Pact members. For the purposes of this study, government revenues for 1974 (from IDB, 1974) are used to measure financial resources available to the government.

As in the case of economic development, governmental financial resources were expected to influence both general activity and implementation of Pact programs. Kendall's tau and Pearson's r were used in determining the results which are presented in Table 36.

The findings support the hypothesis that governments which have greater financial resources will be more active in the Pact and will be more able to implement Pact programs than governments with less financial

Table 36. Relationship between Government Revenues, General Activity in the Andean Pact and Implementation of Pact Programs.

Relationship between Government Revenues and:	Kendall's tau	Pearson's r
General Activity	.73	.78
Implementation of:		
Trade Liberalization Measures	.69	.61
Industrial Programming Measures	.45	.42
Decision 24	.60	.73

resources. Government revenues, like GDP, are more highly correlated with implementation of trade liberalization and Decision 24 than with implementation of industrial programming measures. The consistency between these results and those produced from GDP is probably due to the close relationships between national GDP and governmental revenues (Pearson's r = .92).

Political Structure

A final factor hypothesized to affect national capabilities to support a regional cooperation scheme is the degree of governmental centralization. It was suggested that governments which are more centralized and tolerate little opposition would be more capable of implementing Andean Pact programs and of postponing immediate rewards than governments which are more susceptible to criticism. For the purposes of this study, nations are considered more centralized when elections are not held and when there is no independent legislative body. Within the Andean Pact, the four nations governed by the military are considered more centralized while

Venezuela and Colombia are considered less centralized. Although there are differences among the four military regimes, data that would permit measuring such distinctions are simply not available.

Since the data on political structure are nominal, point biserial correlation is used. This measure is used to calculate a product-moment coefficient which is interpreted like Pearson's correlation coefficient, but is used when one variable is interval level and the other variable is nominal level.

The relationship between national activity in the Andean Pact and degree of governmental centralization is fairly strong though not in the direction predicted ($r_{pb} = -.57$). This indicates that nations which are more centralized are less likely to be active in the Andean Pact than nations which are less centralized. The relationship between supportive attitudes and centralization is also an inverse one, though less strong than the preceding one ($r_{pb} = -.47$).

Since the degree of political centralization was expected to affect capabilities to implement Pact programs, point biserial correlation was used to determine the relationship between governmental centralization and implementation of specific Pact programs. Only in the case of implementation of Decision 24 was there a strong relationship with degree of governmental centralization ($r_{pb} = -.64$).

These findings directly contradict the hypothesis that the more centralized the government, the more likely it will be to support the Andean Pact.[4] There are several possible explanations for this finding. It may be that dichotomizing political structure in terms of democracy-non-democracy is not a sufficiently sensitive measure to tap the degree of political centralization. It may also be that democratic governments

are more likely to support the Andean Pact because democracy is more conducive to such support. Haas (1971) argues that the existence of pluralism is an important factor leading to the success of movements toward economic unity. Thus, democratic governments may be more likely to support a regional cooperation scheme because diverse interests are involved in the formulation of decisions relating to national support for the Pact.

Of the three measures hypothesized to affect national capabilities, two were found to be useful factors in explaining national support for the Andean Pact. The level of national economic development and the financial resources available to the government are related to national activity in the Andean Pact and to implementation of various Pact programs. The hypothesis that there would be a positive relationship between degree of governmental centralization and activity in the Andean Pact was not supported by the data. The data further suggest that democratic governments are more likely to be active in the Andean Pact.

Factors Hypothesized to Affect National Desire To Support the Andean Pact

Type of Economic Development Goals

It was hypothesized in Chapter I that the type of economic development sought by the government would influence the level of support for specific Andean Pact programs. Specifically, it was suggested that governments which sought economic development through development of heavy industry would be more likely to support industrial programming measures. Governments which sought to increase economic development through stimulus of existing industries and exports would be more likely to support trade liberalization measures.

Respondents were asked to describe their government's economic development goals and the responses were coded into two categories: industrialization and trade. The scheme used in coding this variable is explained in Appendix 1. It is important to keep in mind that most governments seek to use both means in achieving economic development. The responses, presented in Table 37, indicate governmental priorities for national economic development.

Table 37. Officials' Evaluations of their Governments' Economic Development Priorities.

	Number of Respondents	Respondents describing their governments' economic development goals as Industrialization		Trade	
		No.	%	No.	%
Bolivia	8	6	75	2	25
Colombia	10	4	40	6	60
Chile	5	0	0	5	100
Ecuador	8	6	75	2	25
Peru	15	14	100	0	0
Venezuela	4	4	100	0	0

Nations in which a majority of respondents described their governments as having industrialization as an economic development priority are considered as having industrialization as a primary goal. In determining the relationship between type of economic development goals held and support for specific programs, point biserial correlations are used.

The relationships between trade as an economic development goal and measures of support for trade liberalization and industrial programming are presented in Table 38 below.

Table 38. Relationship between Trade as an Economic Development Goal and Support for Trade Liberalization and Industrial Programming Measures.

Relationship between Trade as an Economic Development Goal and:	Point Biserial Correlations
Trade Liberalization Activity	.66
Trade Liberalization Supportive Attitudes	.89
Industrial Programming Activity	-.45
Industrial Programming Supportive Attitudes	-.82

These findings support the hypothesis that the type of economic development goals held by the government is an important factor in explaining which Pact programs would be emphasized by the government. Governments having the expansion of trade as an economic development priority are more likely to be active and exhibit supportive attitudes for trade liberalization measures than nations having industrialization as an economic development goal. Interestingly, the type of economic development goals held by the government is much more useful in explaining supportive attitudes for a specific program than in explaining national activity with respect to the particular measure. This is consistent with the reasoning that governmental economic development priorities are more

important in determining the importance attached to a particular program than in explaining the activity a nation actually exhibits. As will be seen in Chapter V, the implementation of trade liberalization and industrial programming measures is only slightly related to the supportive attitudes the government exhibits with respect to these programs.

There is also evidence that there are structural determinants of foreign policy behavior toward the Andean Pact. The extent to which the economy is based on manufacturing is directly related to support for trade liberalization measures and indirectly related to support for industrial programming. The relationship between the percentage of the 1974 GDP deriving from manufacturing (from IDB, 1974) and supportive attitudes for trade liberalization measures is high, with Pearson's r equal to .87. The percentage of GDP deriving from manufacturing is inversely related to support for industrial programming (Pearson's r = -.89). Thus, nations in which manufacturing is relatively more important to the national economy are more likely to support measures to increase their exports while nations in which manufacturing does not play as important a role in the national economy are less likely to support trade liberalization measures. Similarly, nations which depend on manufacturing are less likely to support the alternate development plan of the Pact, industrial programming. There is a close relationship between officials' perceptions of economic development goals and the percentage of the GDP deriving from manufacturing (Pearson's r = .87). The data indicate that officials' perceptions correspond very closely to the structural characteristics of the economy.

Perceived Importance of Foreign Investment

It was hypothesized that the perceived importance of foreign

investment in the national economy would be an important factor in determining national support for the Andean Pact generally and for the Statute on the Common Treatment of Foreign Investment (Decision 24) in particular. Since Decision 24 regulates foreign investment, it was hypothesized in particular that governments which view foreign investment as essential to national economic development would be less likely to support measures which place restrictions on, and possibly limit, that investment.

Respondents were carefully probed as to the importance of foreign investment for the nation's economic development. This was a particularly sensitive question for a North American researcher to ask and great care was taken in probing responses. The responses to this question were coded into three categories -- very important, moderately important, and not important -- in accordance with the coding scheme discussed in Appendix 1. A summary of the interview responses is presented in Table 39.

The relationship between perceived importance of foreign investment and the actual amount of foreign investment is statistically very low. Pearson's r equals -.18 and Kendall's tau equals -.20. This finding -- that in fact there is very little relationship between the amount of foreign investment in a nation and officials' perceptions of the importance of foreign investment -- is somewhat surprising. Officials in countries with relatively low levels of foreign investment are slightly more likely to perceive foreign investment as more important than officials in nations with relatively greater levels of foreign investment.

Since there was a striking difference between officials' perceptions of the importance of foreign investment and the amount of foreign investment, measures of association were calculated for both indicators with support for Decision 24 and for the Andean Pact as a whole. The findings

Table 39. Officials' Evaluations of the Importance of Foreign Investment for their Nations' Economic Development.

	Number of Respondents	Respondents describing foreign investment as Very Important (3) No.	%	Moderately Important (2) No.	%	Not Important (1) No.	%	Mean
Bolivia	7	4	57	3	43	0	0	2.57
Colombia	10	1	10	4	40	5	50	1.20
Chile	6	3	50	2	33	1	17	2.33
Ecuador	8	7	88	1	13	0	0	2.88
Peru	18	2	11	6	33	10	56	1.55
Venezuela	4	0	0	3	75	1	25	1.75

Mean = 2.05
Standard Deviation = .648

for these measures are presented in Table 40. It is clear from these data that perceptions of the importance of foreign investment have a very different relationship with measures of support for the Andean Pact than do the absolute amounts of foreign investment. This is not surprising since it has already been shown that there is little relationship between perceptions of the importance of foreign importance and actual amounts of foreign investment. Nations in which respondents perceive that foreign investment is crucial for national economic development are less likely to support Decision 24 and the Andean Pact in general than nations in which officials perceive foreign investment as being less

Table 40. Relationship between Foreign Investment, Supportive Attitudes, and Decision 24.

Relationship between:	Pearson's r	Kendall's tau
Perceptions of foreign investment and supportive attitudes on Decision 24	-.55	-.41
Absolute amount of foreign investment and supportive attitudes on Decision 24	.75	.55
Perceptions of foreign investment and general supportive attitudes for the Andean Pact	-.49	-.13
Absolute amount of foreign investment and supportive attitudes for the Andean Pact	.58	.55

important. This finding is consistent with hypothesis 6 which stated that the greater the perceived importance of foreign investment for the realization of economic development goals, the less likely that nation will be to support decisions of a regional cooperation scheme to limit foreign investment.

However, the relationship between absolute amounts of foreign investment and support for Decision 24 and for the Andean Pact seems puzzling at first. The greater the level of foreign investment in a member nation, the more likely that nation is to support decisions which limit that investment. If the cases of Bolivia and Ecuador, the two nations with the least amount of foreign investment, are considered, the relationship between the variables seems clearer. Bolivian and Ecuadorian

officials stressed that their nations do not have much foreign investment, that foreign investment is crucial for their economic development plans, and that Decision 24 was detrimental to their interests precisely because it limits foreign investment. It appears that nations which have larger amounts of foreign investment view it as less important for economic development and are thus more concerned with limiting that investment.

If this line of reasoning is valid, it is logical to expect to find nations with relatively high levels of foreign investment relatively less dependent on foreign investment for the financing of their economic development. Or, in other words, one would expect to find a strong relationship between the amounts of foreign and domestic investment. Pearson's r reveals only a moderate relationship between domestic and foreign investment in the Andean Pact countries ($r = .43$). Yet the relationship between domestic investment and support for Decision 24 is a strong one ($r = .73$). This suggests that nations which have relatively high levels of domestic investment are more likely to support measures limiting foreign investment than nations with relatively low levels of domestic investment.

These data support the hypothesis in that nations in which foreign investment is perceived to be essential for national economic development and in which domestic investment is relatively low are less likely to support decisions of a regional cooperation scheme to limit that investment.

Dynamic Factors

Four dynamic factors were hypothesized to affect national support for a regional cooperation scheme: perceptions of shared problems, perceptions of benefits deriving from the Andean Pact, changes in transactions, and perceptions of equitable distribution of benefits. In the section below, the hypotheses relating each of these factors to support for the Andean Pact are operationalized and tested.

The dynamic factors are expected to be important in explaining general levels of activity and supportive attitudes. They are also expected to be related to national support for the Andean Tribunal. The more members perceive that there are shared problems, the more their transactions with other members increase, and the more benefits they perceive as deriving from the Pact, the more likely they will be to support proposals which would expand the Pact's jurisdiction and authority. This hypothesis that national satisfaction with a regional cooperation scheme will lead to support for supranational institutions is frequently implied in the integration literature (Mitrany, 1966; Etzioni, 1964; Haas and Schmitter, 1966).

The dynamic factors considered here are not expected to explain which Pact programs a government will support. The data for perceptions of benefits, for example, are concerned with the benefits deriving from the Andean Pact in general and not with benefits deriving from specific programs.

Perceptions of Shared Problems

A common theme in the literature on prerequisites of successful integration is the importance of perceptions of shared problems within the group held by national decision-makers. Officials were asked about their perceptions of shared problems in the subregion and the responses were coded into three categories: large, moderate, and low numbers of shared problems. A summary of the interview responses is presented in Table 41.

Perceptions of shared problems were expected to influence supportive attitudes toward the Andean Pact; members which perceive that there are

Table 41. Officials' Perceptions of Shared Problems in the Subregion.

	Number of Respondents	Respondents describing the number of shared problems in the subregion as Large (3) No.	%	Moderate (2) No.	%	Low (1) No.	%	Mean
Bolivia	9	0	0	5	55	4	45	1.56
Colombia	11	4	36	5	45	2	18	2.18
Chile	4	1	25	3	75	0	0	2.25
Ecuador	8	0	0	3	38	5	62	1.38
Peru	18	0	0	6	33	12	67	1.33
Venezuela	5	2	40	3	60	0	0	2.40

Mean = 1.85
Standard Deviation = .479

shared problems within the group will be more likely to conceive of the world in "we-they" terms and thus to support the group. This expected relationship was not supported by the data. The relationship between supportive attitudes and perceptions of shared problems, as measured by the mean scores presented in Table 41, equals -.12 and -.14 according to Pearson's r and Kendall's tau, respectively. These findings indicate that there is no strong relationship between perceptions of shared problems and general supportive attitudes toward the Andean Pact. Nor is there a strong relationship between perceptions of shared problems and activity in the Andean Pact or support for the proposed Andean Tribunal.

These findings directly contradict the hypothesis that nations which

exhibit high perceptions of shared problems would be more supportive of the Andean Pact. It may be that respondents who were more concerned with divergencies and conflict in the subregion were more supportive of the Andean Pact precisely because they viewed the Andean Pact as a means of overcoming these differences. Another possible explanation is that the indicator used to measure perceptions of shared problems was inadequate. It may be that respondents were not able to describe accurately their government's perceptions of shared problems. Nevertheless, these data do not support hypothesis 7, which stated that nations exhibiting awareness of shared problems would be more supportive of the Andean Pact.

Perceptions of Benefits

A second dynamic factor hypothesized to affect support for the regional cooperation scheme was officials' perceptions of benefits deriving from their membership in the Pact. The more benefits perceived by officials as deriving from the Pact, the more likely they will be to support the Pact. This hypothesis forms the basis for many of the other hypotheses suggested in this study by suggesting that nations support a regional cooperation scheme when they perceive it to be in their best interests to do so. The more benefits perceived as deriving from national support for the group, the more their support will be reinforced. Perceptions of benefits were measured by responses to interview questions. Responses were coded into three categories and are summarized in Table 42.

The relationship between perceptions of benefits deriving from the Andean Pact and national activity in the Andean Pact is quite high. Pearson's r equals .72 and Kendall's tau equals .47. However, the relationship between perceptions of benefits and supportive attitudes toward the Pact is somewhat lower (Pearson's r = .53 and Kendall's tau = .28).

Table 42. Officials' Perceptions of Benefits deriving from Andean Pact Membership.

	Number of Respondents	Respondents describing benefits deriving from the Andean Pact as High (3) No.	%	Moderate (2) No.	%	Low (1) No.	%	Mean
Bolivia	7	1	14	3	43	3	43	1.71
Colombia	10	8	80	2	20	0	0	2.80
Chile	6	1	17	3	50	2	33	1.83
Ecuador	10	0	0	6	60	4	40	1.60
Peru	17	4	24	12	71	1	6	2.18
Venezuela	4	3	75	1	25	0	0	2.75

Mean = 2.15
Standard Deviation = .526

Finally, there is no significant relationship between officials' perceptions of benefits deriving from the Pact and support for the proposed Andean Tribunal. These findings show that nations which perceive that concrete benefits are accruing as a result of Pact membership are more likely to take an active role in the Andean Pact. However, the relationship is much weaker between perceptions of benefits and supportive attitudes. This finding was an unexpected one in that it was hypothesized that this variable -- perceptions of benefits -- would be more closely related to supportive attitudes than to activity. It may be that nations which perceive many benefits deriving from the Andean Pact are those nations which are better able to implement Pact programs and hence, take advantage of the Andean

Pact's benefits. As was demonstrated earlier in this chapter, nations with greater financial resources are more likely to be active in the Pact and to be more successful in implementing Pact programs than nations with lesser financial resources. The relationships between perceptions of benefits and both GDP and governmental revenues suggest that this is indeed the case. The finding that the perceptions of benefits variable is not closely related to support for the proposed Andean Tribunal challenges the assumptions frequently made by integration theorists that economic cooperation leads inevitably to political unity (Haas and Schmitter, 1966).

Transactions

It was hypothesized in Chapter I that as a nation increases its transactions with other members of the group, it will be more likely to support the group. Again, the role of transactions is viewed as extremely important in explaining regional units by integration theorists. Transactions are measured here by three indicators: 1) total exports to Andean Pact members, 1973 (from Organización de Estados Americanos, 1974), 2) the percentage increase in exports to Andean Pact members from 1965 to 1973 (from Organización de Estados Americanos, 1972, 1974), and 3) the percentage of all tourists going to other Andean nations, 1972 (from Organización de Estados Americanos, 1974).

The relationships between general Andean Pact activity, supportive attitudes, and support for the proposed Andean Tribunal with the three above-mentioned indicators of transactions are presented in Table 43.

These findings are somewhat confusing; they indicate that there is a positive relationship between the total volume of exports and both activity and supportive attitudes toward the Pact. Yet, the relationship

Table 43. Relationship between Andean Transactions and Support for the Andean Pact.

Relationship between:	Pearson's r	Kendall's tau
General Andean Pact activity and		
Total Andean exports	.67	.60
Increase in Andean exports	-.63	-.20
Andean tourists	.35	.33
Supportive attitudes and		
Total Andean exports	.58	.41
Increase in Andean exports	-.33	-.14
Andean tourists	.25	.14
Support for the Andean Tribunal and		
Total Andean exports	.72	.33
Increase in Andean exports	.28	.60
Andean tourists	.58	.33

between increase in Andean exports and both activity and supportive attitudes is a negative one, indicating that those nations which have most increased their exports to other Andean Pact members are less likely to support the Andean Pact than members which have not registered such increases. This finding directly contradicts the whole logic behind the concern of integration theories with increasing transactions. The largest increases in Andean trade, however, were registered by those nations having relatively low levels of trade with the other Andean Pact members. Thus, Bolivia increased its exports to Andean Pact members by 170 percent but its total Andean exports remain much less than those of Colombia, for example. This is perhaps a function of the time period analyzed. In 1965, the level of subregional trade was extremely low. By 1973, members had dramatically increased their total exports and their exports to Andean nations as well.

The relationship between movement of tourists within the subregion and support for the Andean Pact is not a close one for any of the dimensions of support examined here. However, there seems to be a tendency for nations in which a relatively high percentage of tourists go to other Andean Pact nations to be more supportive of the Andean Pact.

Hypothesis 9 is largely supported by the data in that nations which direct more exports to Andean Pact members are more likely to be active and have supportive attitudes in the Pact than nations which export less to other Andean Pact nations. The finding that increase in Andean exports is negatively correlated with activity and supportive attitudes is perhaps due to the fact that those nations exhibiting the greatest increase in Andean exports are those having the lowest amount of subregional trade.

Perceptions of Equitable Distribution of Benefits

A final dynamic factor hypothesized to affect national support for a regional cooperation scheme is the perception that the benefits and costs deriving from the Pact are being fairly and equitably distributed. Respondents were asked whether they felt that the benefits of the Andean Pact were being fairly distributed. Respondents did not perceive the distribution of benefits as being either fair or unfair (which would be a dichotomy) but as being "more fair" or "less fair" than an ideal distribution. Thus, responses were coded into two categories: more or less fair and mean scores were calculated. A summary of the interview responses is presented in Table 44.

The relationship between officials' perceptions that benefits deriving from the Andean Pact are fairly distributed and activity is a strong one. Pearson's r equals .67 and Kendall's tau equals .83. In examining the

Table 44. Officials' Perceptions of the Distribution of Benefits Deriving from the Andean Pact.

	Number of Respondents	Respondents describing the distribution of benefits as: More fair (2) No.	%	Less fair (1) No.	%	Mean
Bolivia	9	2	22	7	78	1.22
Colombia	10	8	80	2	20	1.80
Chile	5	4	80	1	20	1.80
Ecuador	9	3	33	6	67	1.33
Peru	17	14	82	3	18	1.83
Venezuela	4	4	100	0	0	2.00

Mean = 1.66
Standard Deviation = .310

relationship between perceived equitable distribution of benefits and supportive attitudes, there is a significant difference in the results depending on which of the two measures is used. While Pearson's r equals .37, Kendall's tau equals .64. This difference is undoubtedly due to the fact that Pearson's r is based on the actual numerical values and since there is relatively little variation in the mean scores on perceptions of benefits, the correlation is small.

The findings on the relationships of perceptions of equitable distribution of benefits suggest that this variable is important in explaining both levels of activity and supportive attitudes.[5]

Summary

The data presented in this chapter support the basic argument that different explanatory variables explain different dimensions of participation. Of the three factors hypothesized to affect national capabilities, two factors were found to be significant. The level of national economic development and governmental financial resources were found to be closely related to general activity and to implementation of specific programs.

The factors hypothesized to affect national interest in supporting a regional cooperation scheme -- type of economic development goals and perceived importance of foreign investment -- were found to be important in explaining support for specific Andean Pact programs. The type of economic development goals or priorities was found to be highly correlated with support for trade liberalization and industrial programming measures. The perceived importance of foreign investment was found to be inversely related to support for the Statute on the Common Treatment of Foreign Investment. The findings suggest that structural characteristics of the economy play an important role in determining which Andean Pact programs a government supports. The absolute level of foreign investment is highly correlated with support for Decision 24. The percentage of the GDP deriving from manufacturing is positively related to support for trade liberalization programs and inversely related to support for industrial programming.

The findings on the effects of the dynamic factors on national support for the Pact are mixed. Perceptions of shared problems were expected to be related to both activity and supportive attitudes; while the findings show a strong relationship between perceptions of shared problems and activity, there is no significant relationship with supportive attitudes. Similarly, there is a strong association between perceptions of benefits

received and activity but only a weak association with supportive attitudes. Perceptions of equitable distribution of benefits are closely related to both activity and supportive attitudes. The amount of trade an Andean Pact member has with other members is strongly related to both its activity and supportive attitudes in the Pact. But a negative relationship was found to exist between increase in Andean exports and both activity and supportive attitudes.

The findings presented in this chapter reveal certain relationships between the three groups of independent variables and support for the Andean Pact. The factors hypothesized to affect national capabilities are useful in examining the extent to which nations implement Pact decisions. The factors hypothesized to affect national interest in supporting the Andean Pact are useful in analyzing the specific issues within the regional cooperation scheme which are supported by a particular nation. The dynamic factors were found to be more useful in explaining general activity and supportive attitudes.

In the following chapter some general conclusions are presented as to why nations support regional cooperation schemes.

NOTES
CHAPTER IV

1. Kendall's Correlation Coefficient yields approximately the same results as Spearman's rho and Kendall's Coefficient of Concordance, W. All of these measures are used in determining correlation for ordinal scale data. When significant differences do exist between these three measures, they are presented in the text.

2. Although significance levels are not included in the text, for comparative purposes, the following observations are made:

Kendall's tau of .60 is significant at the .05 level.
Kendall's tau of .45 is significant at the .10 level.
Pearson's r of .73 is significant at the .05 level.
Pearson's r of .60 is significant at the .10 level.

3. The usual way of measuring economic development is to use per capital measures of various economic indicators. However, as O'Donnell (1973: 19-20) points out, the use of per capita measures may actually distort the findings. He argues that the use of averages is misleading in that the population living outside of the modern, developed sectors is included. For example, when one compares Brazil and Peru on indices of national economic development, Brazil ranks far ahead of Peru on all measures, a finding which corresponds with the international positions of the two countries. However, when the data are averaged by population, Peru and Brazil exhibit roughly similar levels of economic development. O'Donnell argues that when the intent of the study is to compare capabilities, it is more useful to compare the "modern sectors" of the nations involved through the consideration of aggregate indicators of economic development.

While many other measures of economic development could be used, in the case of the Andean Pact, nations having relatively high GDPs also have high levels of industrial production, telephones per capita, electrical output, etc.

4. It should be noted that Fisher's Exact Test, designed for use with nominal data and small samples, does not corroborate these findings. By dichotomizing mean activity scores and then calculating the probability that the given distribution occurs by chance, Fisher's Exact Test reveals that there is a forty percent probability that the given distribution is due to chance. However, one of the problems in using this test is that it is difficult to dichotomize objectively rank-ordered data.

5. The relationship between perceptions of benefits deriving from the Andean Pact and perceptions of equitable distribution of benefits is a very high one (Pearson's r = .77; Kendall's tau = .55). This relationship

is a logical one. Those nations in which respondents perceive that they are getting concrete benefits also perceive that the benefits are being fairly distributed.

There is also a close relationship between perceptions of shared problems and perceptions of benefits ($r = .68$) and perceptions of equitable distribution of benefits ($r = .67$). Again, these relationships are logical; nations in which respondents perceive that there are many shared problems in the subregion perceive that there are more concrete benefits deriving from the Pact and that these benefits are being more equitably distributed than nations in which respondents do not perceive that there are many common problems.

CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE UTILITY OF THIS STUDY'S ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

In the preceding chapters, the analytical framework presented in Chapter I was operationalized and tested. The purpose of this chapter is to draw conclusions as to how and why member nations support the Andean Pact. The findings presented in previous chapters suggest several alternative explanations for the interrelationships among the dependent and independent variables. There is evidence that certain clusters of factors are important in accounting for variation in foreign policy behavior toward the Andean Pact. The relationships and interrelationships are thus explored in the context of sorting out alternative explanations. A number of empirical generalizations derived from this study are then examined. Finally, an attempt is made to assess the utility of this framework for the analysis of other regional cooperation schemes.

How and Why do Nations Support the Andean Pact?

The analytical framework presented in Chapter I was largely confirmed by the findings in this study. Most of the independent variables hypothesized to influence national support for the Pact were found to be important explanatory factors. However, several questions remain as to the nature of support for the Andean Pact and the relationships among the various independent variables. What is the relationship between the various dimensions of support? How does support for specific Pact programs

relate to support for the Pact as a whole? How do the types of independent variables -- background conditions and dynamic factors -- relate to the various dimensions of support and to each other? What is the relative importance of the independent variables? In considering these questions, an examination of the interrelationships among different measures of the dependent variable, support for a regional cooperation scheme, is presented first, followed by a consideration of the relative importance of the independent variables.

The Dynamic of Support

In this study, the dependent variable of support for the Andean Pact was analyzed along four dimensions -- activity, supportive attitudes, implementation, and the extent to which foreign policy behavior is influenced by Pact membership. These dimensions were further analyzed with respect to two levels of analysis: support for the Pact in general and support for four specific programs. One of the major findings of this study is that analysis of the Pact's specific programs is crucial to understanding patterns of support. In the sections below, the dimensions of Pact support are examined and the relationships between support for various programs and for the Pact as a whole are considered.

National support

National activity in the Andean Pact consists of the observable verbal and non-verbal behavior a nation exhibits toward the Pact. National supportive attitudes are conceptualized as those predispositions to support the Pact on the part of the national decision-makers. On a general level, there is a very close relationship between activity, supportive attitudes, and optimism[1] as indicated in Figure 1.



*Kendall's Correlation Coefficient, tau, is used in all figures.

Figure 1. Relationship between General Activity, Supportive Attitudes, and Optimism.

Nations which are more active in the Andean Pact tend to be more supportive and more optimistic about the Pact than members which are less active. This suggests that nations have consistent policies toward the Pact on a general level. There is less consistency between supportive attitudes and activity in the specific programs of trade liberalization and industrial programming; Kendall's tau equals .36 for trade and .55 for industrial programming. Similarly there is little relationship between activity in trade liberalization measures and activity in the Pact as a whole (tau equals .14) and only a moderate relationship between general activity and industrial programming activity (tau = .47).[2] Thus members which are active in either industrial programming or trade liberalization are only slightly more active in the Pact as a whole. It is clear that nations which are active in one program are not necessarily more active in the Pact as a whole than nations which are less active in a particular program. Nations which are more active in industrial programming are no more likely to be active in trade liberalization measures than nations which are less active (tau equals 0).

Supportive attitudes

Several theoretically interesting findings derive from the analysis of the relationship between national support for the Pact as a whole and support for specific Pact programs. Figure 2 presents the interrelationships between supportive attitudes for the various programs.



Figure 2. Relationship between Supportive Attitudes for the Pact as a Whole and for Specific Programs.

Nations which support Decision 24 are more likely to support the Pact as a whole than nations which exhibit less support for Decision 24.[3] However, nations which are more supportive of Decision 24 are not more likely to support other Pact programs and are somewhat less likely to support trade liberalization measures than nations which are less supportive of Decision 24.

Similarly, nations which support industrial programming measures are

more likely to support the Pact as a whole than nations which are less supportive of industrial programming. Furthermore, nations which attribute a great deal of importance to industrial programming are much less likely to attach importance to trade liberalization measures than nations which exhibit less support for industrial programming.

Nations which are most supportive of trade liberalization measures are much less likely to support the Andean Pact as a whole than nations which are less supportive of trade liberalization. Finally, national support for the proposed Andean Tribunal is not related to support for any other Pact program or for the Pact as a whole.[4]

Several conclusions are evident from these findings. National activity and supportive attitudes toward the Pact as a whole, though closely related, exhibit different patterns of relationships with the various programs considered. The relationships between general support and support for trade liberalization, industrial programming, and Decision 24 are much stronger than the corresponding relationships with activity. This suggests that activity involves another dimension in addition to supportive attitudes. As will be shown below, implementation of Pact programs is an important component of national support. The fact that a nation supports one Pact program does not imply that it will support other Pact programs. In fact, national support for both industrial programming and Decision 24 is negatively related to support for trade liberalization measures. Finally, national support for the proposed Andean Tribunal is not related to support for any other program or for the Pact as a whole. This is surprising considering the assumption frequently made in the functionalist and neofunctionalist approaches to integration which suggest that the more support there is for a regional economic grouping, the more willing members will be to support an expansion of the group's jurisdiction and authority.

Implementation

In considering the relationship between implementation and the other dimensions of support for the Andean Pact, nations in which respondents evaluate implementation of Pact programs as being successful are more likely to be active, supportive, and optimistic than nations which are not implementing Pact programs as successful.[5] The relationships are much stronger between implementation of Decision 24 and support than in the case of either trade liberalization or industrial programming as shown in Figure 3.



Figure 3. Relationship between Activity, Supportive Attitudes, Optimism, and Implementation of Specific Programs.

Surprisingly, given the fact that both activity and supportive attitudes for trade liberalization are inversely related to industrial programming (see Figure 2), there is a strong relationship between implementation of trade liberalization and industrial programming measures (Kendall's tau = .62). This relationship was not wholly unexpected since implementation is significantly related to measures of national capability as will be shown in the sections below. However, no close relationship was found between implementation of Decision 24 and either trade liberalization (tau = .28) or industrial programming (tau = 0), suggesting that perhaps different factors are involved in the implementation of different types of programs.

Furthermore, nations not implementing Pact programs or having difficulty in implementation are more likely to support the proposed Andean Tribunal than nations which are not having this difficulty. This relationship is logical since one of the purposes of the Tribunal is to ensure uniform implementation of Pact programs. This finding also helps to explain the lack of a close relationship between support for a Tribunal and general support for the Pact in terms of activity and supportive attitudes. Those nations which are most successful in implementing Pact programs, and hence most opposed to the proposed Andean Tribunal, are also the members most active and supportive of the Pact.

The findings further show that the importance a nation attaches to either industrial programming or trade liberalization does not explain its implementation of those programs. However, there is a moderately strong relationship between the importance attached to Decision 24 and the implementation of that decision (tau = .41). As noted before, it appears that implementation of Decision 24 is determined by factors different from those

which determine implementation of industrial programming and trade liberalization programs.

These findings show that implementation is a significant component of national support for the Andean Pact. Implementation of industrial programming and trade liberalization are much more closely related to general activity in the Pact than to supportive attitudes.

Impact on foreign policy behavior

As discussed in Chapter III, there is little evidence that Andean Pact members are coordinating their foreign policy behavior toward nations outside the subregion. However, within the subregion certain nations are much more active in initiating foreign policy activity toward other Pact members. There is a close relationship between the number of cooperative acts a nation directs toward other Pact members and its support for the Andean Pact as indicated in Figure 4. The subregional foreign policy acts are those directed during a six month period in 1975, roughly corresponding to the time of the interviews.



Figure 4. Relationship between Support for the Andean Pact and Subregional Foreign Policy Acts in 1975.

There is some question, however, as to the importance of these results. The findings merely indicate that nations which are most active and supportive of the Pact are more likely to have active foreign policies within the subregion than nations which exhibit less support for the Andean Pact. Nations which are cooperating and interacting on a bilateral level are more likely to be active in multilateral programs as well.

Interactions among Pact members, as measured by the event data, have increased dramatically during the past five years. It appears that subregional interactions have increased more rapidly than subregional trade. Furthermore, there is a much closer correspondence between interactions and support for the Andean Pact than between Andean Pact trade and support for the Pact. Given many integration theorists' emphasis on transactions (e.g. Deutsch et al., 1957), it would be theoretically interesting to trace the relationship between interactions and transactions over time.

Perhaps the major finding of this study is that support for the Andean Pact cannot be analyzed without reference to specific Pact programs. Of the four programs analyzed, two are more related to support for the Pact as a whole though not to each other -- industrial programming and Decision 24. These two programs are considered by participants in and observers of the Andean Pact to be the most innovative of the scheme's activities. They are more far-reaching in scope than are trade liberalization measures in that they require more joint planning and coordination of sensitive issues of national economic development than does trade liberalization. It seems clear that nations which are seeking merely the provisions of a free trade area are less likely to support the Pact.

At the same time, there are certain differences among the types of

programs analyzed. Supportive attitudes for trade liberalization and industrial programming are inversely related while implementation of these two programs are positively related. Thus it seems that nations in effect choose to support one or the other of these two programs as a means of striving toward economic development. Yet evaluations of implementation of trade liberalization and industrial programming are closely related and there is little relationship between the importance attached to the program and implementation of the program. Thus it would seem that some independent variable is responsible for determining the degree of implementation of these two programs. However, in the case of Decision 24, the relationship is reversed. There is very little association between the implementation of Decision 24 and the other two programs, and, there is a fairly strong relationship between the importance assigned to Decision 24 and its implementation.

The differences between Decision 24 on the one hand and trade liberalization and industrial programming on the other suggest that decisions to support these programs are made in different ways. Both trade liberalization and industrial programming seem to represent commitments to opposing paths of national economic development. As was shown in Chapter IV, the structure of the economy plays an important role in explaining national commitment to these programs while implementation of these programs is not significantly related to their perceived importance. Implementation of Decision 24, on the other hand, is significantly associated with the importance governments attach to the program. It may be that while governments attach importance to either industrial programming or trade liberalization in relation to their economic development goals, commitment to Decision 24 represents a political-ideological decision, related to nationalistic sentiments and policies.

The proposed Andean tribunal appears to represent a third type of program, one which is not related to other Pact programs. Unlike the other three programs analyzed, the proposed Andean Tribunal was not perceived by respondents as a salient issue. However, respondents did perceive the goal of the Tribunal as being an increase in the authority and jurisdiction of the Andean Pact's central organs. There was little relationship between respondents' support for the Tribunal and their evaluation of the performance of the Pact's Junta. Surprisingly, officials who felt that the Junta was competent and doing a good job were no more likely to support the proposed Andean Tribunal than respondents who indicated that the Junta was "moving too fast" or was "overreaching its authority." This finding directly contradicts the assertions found in much of the integration literature, which hold that satisfaction with the scheme's organizational structures leads to support for their increased authority and jurisdiction.

In addition to differing on substance, the programs analyzed differ with respect to their stages of implementation. The six member nations all expressed a basic commitment to the programs of trade liberalization and industrial programming when they ratified the agreement. Yet negotiations in both of these programs continue and implementation occurs in stages. Under the provisions of the trade liberalization measures, members reduce their tariffs annually and reduce the number of products exempted from tariff-reductions periodically. In industrial programming, members are committed to joint industrial planning in certain areas and are involved in implementing those decisions. At the same time they are periodically negotiating agreements in still other industrial sectors for joint planning. In contrast, Decision 24 or the Statute on the Common

Treatment of Foreign Investment was approved in December 1970 at which time members committed themselves to implement the decision. Although there are rumors of a need to change the decision's provisions, there are no on-going negotiations to deal with the matter. The case of the proposed Andean Tribunal represents still another stage of the subregional decision-making process. The creation of a subregional judicial authority was proposed by the Junta and has been discussed occasionally in meetings of the Comisión. Yet the Tribunal has not been brought up for a vote in the Comisión and members have not been forced to take a public stand on the issue. It is perhaps for this reason that respondents expressed reluctance to describe their governments' position vis-a-vis the proposed Tribunal.

Thus, it may be that differences in implementation and commitment to the programs analyzed are related to their stage in the subregional decision-making process and not to the substantive issues with which they deal. This question is an interesting one which, unfortunately, is not tested in this study because the data collected are not amenable to the question. In order to explore this topic, one would first need to describe the decision-making process and then to categorize the Andean Pact programs in terms of that process. While such an endeavor would undoubtedly be useful, it is also clear that support for specific Pact programs is related to certain background conditions. It is to those conditions that this analysis now turns.

Relative Importance of Independent Variables

This study confirms the importance of socio-economic background conditions as the most important determinants of foreign policy behavior

toward regional cooperation schemes. Governmental revenues, GDP, and foreign and domestic investment are important explanatory variables for many of the dimensions of support for the Andean Pact. However, the correlations among these four independent variables are fairly high as is indicated in Figure 5, which suggests that virtually all of the variables are tapping the same underlying phenomenon (i.e. capabilities). Given the high correlations between GDP, government revenues, and domestic investment, the effects of GDP alone will be examined in this section, together with foreign investment. Figure 6 presents the relationships between GDP, foreign investment, and measures of activity, support, and implementation of Pact programs.

Figure 6 shows that nations with higher GDPs are more likely to be active, supportive, and implementing Pact programs than nations with lower GDPs. Similarly nations with higher GDPs are more likely to be active in trade liberalization and to be more supportive of Decision 24 than nations with lower GDPs. However, GDP is not closely associated with supportive attitudes in either trade liberalization or industrial programming.

Implementation of all three programs is strongly related to the resources available to the member governments. Simply stated, nations with higher GDPs and governmental revenues are more likely to implement Pact programs. The richer a nation is, the more able it is to implement these programs. In the cases of trade liberalization and industrial programming, the ability to implement the programs is more important in their actual implementation than is the importance attached to the programs, as discussed in Chapter IV.

While the resources available variable helps to explain the degree



Figure 5. Relationships between Background Conditions.

of implementation of these two Pact programs, it has little relationship to supportive attitudes or the importance the government attaches to these programs. As demonstrated in Chapter IV, supportive attitudes for trade liberalization and industrial programming are closely related to the governments' economic development priorities and to the structure of the national economy.

The level of foreign investment is significantly related to general activity and supportive attitudes. However, in analyzing the effects of high levels of foreign investment on specific programs, the results are mixed. Foreign investment is negatively related to support for trade liberalization and positively related to activity and implementation of industrial programming and to support for Decision 24.

These findings confirm those found in much of the literature on comparative foreign policy which single out level of national economic development as a key determinant of foreign policy behavior (Rosenau and Hoggard, 1971). In the case of foreign policy behavior toward a regional cooperation scheme, these background conditions appear to affect foreign policy behavior by determining the degree of implementation of Pact programs.

Figure 6. Relationship between GDP, Foreign Investment, and Measures of Support for the Andean Pact.

As was demonstrated in Chapter IV, the effects of structural constraints are very important in explaining the types of Andean Pact programs most likely to be stressed by a member government. The extent to which the economy is dependent on manufacturing is important in explaining support for trade liberalization and industrial programming. The levels of foreign and domestic investment, coupled with perceptions of the importance of foreign investment for national economic development are important factors in determining support for the Pact's Decision 24.

The role of dynamic factors appears to be less significant than the background conditions in explaining support for the Andean Pact. The three most important dynamic factors were found to be perceptions of equitable distribution of benefits, perceptions of benefits, and Andean trade.[6] The relationships between these three factors and support for the Andean Pact are presented in Table 45.[7]

This table shows that 1) the three dynamic factors analyzed are reasonably closely related to both general activity and general support, 2) there are surprisingly close relationships between perceptions of equitable distribution of benefits and implementation of programs, 3) Andean exports are not too important in explaining any of the specific programs except Decision 24, and 4) perceptions of benefits received are most highly correlated with importance assigned to Decision 24 and its implementation.

Empirical Generalizations

The relationships examined in the preceding section lead to a number of empirical generalizations on the nature of support for the Andean Pact. These empirical generalizations are followed by an attempt to relate them

Table 45. Relationships between Dynamic Factors and Andean Pact Support.

	Perceived Benefits	Andean Exports	Perceived Equitable Distribution
General Activity	.47	.60	.83
General Support	.28	.41	.64
TL* Activity	.41	.28	.21
TL Support	-.14	-.14	-.36
TL Implementation	.41	.28	.64
IP**Activity	-.07	.33	.28
IP Support	-.14	.28	.21
IP Implementation	.15	.00	.69
Decision 24 Support	.55	.41	1.00
Decision 24 Implementation	.60	.47	.41

*TL refers to trade liberalization
** IP refers to industrial programming

into a more general framework which can be applied to analyses of other regional cooperation schemes.

1. Nations active in the Andean Pact are more likely to exhibit supportive attitudes and to be optimistic with respect to the Pact.

2. Nations successful in implementing Pact programs are more likely to be active, optimistic, and supportive, and are more likely to perceive that benefits are being equitably distributed.

3. The more active a nation is with respect to trade liberalization measures, the less likely it is to be active in industrial programming.

4. The more importance a nation assigns to Decision 24, the more likely implementation of Decision 24 will be successful.

5. Nations exhibiting support for Decision 24 and industrial programming are more likely to exhibit support for the Andean Pact as a whole, while nations supporting trade liberalization measures are less likely to support the Pact as a whole.

6. Nations supporting the Pact as a whole are no more likely to support the proposed Andean Tribunal than nations less supportive of the Pact in general.

7. Nations supporting Decision 24 are slightly more likely to support industrial programming and less likely to support either trade liberalization or the proposed Andean Tribunal than nations less supportive of Decision 24.

8. The higher a nation's GDP, governmental revenues, domestic investment and foreign investment, the more likely it is to implement Pact programs, to take an active role in the Pact and to exhibit supportive attitudes toward the Pact.

9. The more interactions a nation has with other members of the regional grouping, the more likely it will be active in the Pact.

10. The more a nation perceives that benefits are being equitably distributed, the more likely it will take an active role, exhibit supportive attitudes, and be successful in implementing Pact programs.

11. The more trade a nation has with members of the subregion, the more likely it will take an active role in and exhibit supportive attitudes, and be successful in implementing Pact programs.

12. The more a specific Pact program is perceived as complementing national economic development priorities, the more it will support that program.

13. The more a Pact program complements the structure of the nation's economy, the more likely that program will be supported.

Implications of Findings for the Andean Pact

The major focus of this study has been on describing and explaining national support for the Andean Pact. Little emphasis has been placed on subregional characteristics or processes. Yet the findings of this study have clear implications for the future of the Andean Pact.

The Andean Pact cannot afford to focus solely on one program. This study has shown that members support different programs to different degrees. And the elimination (or more likely, de-emphasis) of one of the programs considered here will likely weaken national support by some of the members. The Andean Pact seems somewhat like a coalition with members

of the Pact supporting the Pact in general in return for specific program outputs. The elimination of any of these outputs would seriously weaken national support for the Pact.

This study has found that implementation of Pact programs is a crucial component of national support for the Pact. It comes as no surprise that those nations which are having difficulty implementing Pact programs are much less active, supportive, and optimistic about the Pact in general. This does not, of course, imply causality. Members with low levels of supportive attitudes, for example, may not be implementing Pact programs precisely because they are unwilling to commit the necessary national resources. Nor is it surprising that those nations which are best able to implement Pact programs and hence to take advantage of the Pact's benefits feel that the benefits of regional cooperation are being fairly distributed. The problem of Bolivia is especially acute in this respect.

This analysis with its finding of the importance of governmental revenues and GDP in determining national support reinforces the "vicious cycle effect of underdevelopment" as outlined by Marcos Kaplan. Kaplan (1968: 191) states "integration is supposed to promote development but the lack of national development makes it difficult to implement a successful integration policy."

The Andean Pact in recognition of this "vicious cycle" has set equilibrated national development as a fundamental goal of the group. The Pact members are committed to the concept that the least-developed Pact members must achieve a more rapid economic growth rate than the more developed members. Yet the interviews carried out in the countries clearly demonstrate that the least developed countries -- Bolivia and

Ecuador -- are not satisfied with the results of this equilibrated development policy. In fact, it is questionable whether the Andean Pact through this type of policy can successfully deal with the problem of equitable distribution of benefits. Hansen (1969: 24) summarizes the main difficulties in achieving an equitable distribution of benefits in regional cooperation schemes of developing countries as follows:

> First, the more advanced member countries are too short of resources for their own development programs to do much by way of aiding fellow-members. Second, governmental elites in the more developed countries do not wish to supply such assistance; nor are the vested interests in those countries particularly receptive to any such channelling of resources or to agreements granting others preferential treatment. Third, the factors contributing to the lagging performance of a member country. . .are often such that financial resources alone cannot restore anything resembling a balance except in the very long run.

As Cochrane and Sloan (n.d.: 42) state with reference to LAFTA and CACM: "the success of both organizations is dependent upon national reforms which will increase the capabilities of the members at a slightly faster pace than the pace which the burdens of regional integration are placed upon them."

Finally, Andean Pact members should not expect that coordination of foreign policy will be an inevitable by-product of cooperation on other economic issues. There is little evidence that such coordination is occurring.

Implications for the Literature

As mentioned above, this study confirms the findings of many of those in comparative foreign policy who stress the importance of economic factors as determinants of foreign policy behavior. At the same time, there is some support for the integration theorists who stress the important contribution of dynamic factors in the process of integration.

Dynamic factors were found to be especially useful in analyzing general patterns of activity and supportive attitudes.

The findings of this study also challenge the somewhat simplistic conceptualization of national support utilized by many integration theorists. It is not sufficient -- at least in the case of the Andean Pact -- to talk of national support or non-support for a regional cooperation scheme without an examination of specific programs and without an analysis of the ways in which nations express their support or lack of support.

The findings of this study further challenge the functionalist logic that cooperation on non-political issues will lead inevitably to cooperation on other issues. The differential degrees of support exhibited by members toward the specific programs analyzed make it obvious that nations can -- and do -- support those programs they consider most important in the context of their national economic development priorities. The evidence points to the observation that nations seek to use the Andean Pact to further their own economic development goals, enthusiastically supporting those programs believed to be useful to their goals and merely tolerating the others. Those members which are satisfied with the Pact and feel that concrete benefits are accruing to the nation as a result of Pact membership are no more willing to accept an increase in authority of the Pact in the form of an Andean Tribunal or to be active in coordinating their extra-regional foreign policy behavior with other Pact members than are nations which are dissatisfied.

In this context, it appears useful to reinforce the conceptualization set out in Chapter I of the Andean Pact as a regional cooperation scheme rather than as a movement toward integration. While the Haas-Schmitter

argument maintains that definite political implications can be associated with movements toward regional economic cooperation, in the case of the Andean Pact this argument does not hold up. Not only were respondents unconcerned with political implications of economic cooperation, but they rejected those very measures designed to strengthen the political implications of the Pact.

In a sense, I am arguing in support of Hansen's argument that too much attention has been paid to regional characteristics of integration schemes and not enough to national foreign policy decisions. As Hansen states:

> In this context, are there not some advantages to examining in far greater detail the concept and ramnifications of "compellingness?" Would it not lead to a better understanding of the dynamics of economic unions like the Central American and East African common markets than does an emphasis on political culture, present rate of transactions, elite complementarities, etc.? Would it not suggest that such economic integration schemes may be increasingly "compelled" to function -- perhaps for decades -- with rather minimal implications for political integration? Might it not shed new light on the monumental difficulties facing LAFTA, where some large member countries with sizable internal markets are far less "compelled" than others? (1969: 33)

This study has shown that it is useful to examine participation in a regional cooperation scheme as one type of foreign policy behavior by member nations. Furthermore, it has shown that foreign policy behavior toward a regional cooperation scheme is not a simple, unidimensional type of behavior, but rather a complex set of activities and attitudes directed toward specific programs of the regional cooperation scheme in the pursuit of specific economic development goals and limited by the constraints of resources.

In closing this study, suggestions are made as to ways in which the framework used in this study may be applied on a broader scale.

An Analytical Framework of Foreign Policy Behavior in Regional Cooperation Schemes

Based on the empirical findings of this study it is possible to assess the utility of this framework for analyzing foreign policy behavior toward other regional cooperation schemes. Such a framework should include 1) a systematic orientation and perspective for cutting into a subject area, 2) statements concerning the central question or types of questions that should be asked, 3) a criterion of relevance for mapping out and selecting data for analysis, and 4) some guidelines for a hierarchical ordering of both questions and data in terms of significance in the analysis (Young, 1968: 98).

The framework focuses on national foreign policy behavior toward a regional cooperation scheme. The unit of analysis is the national member government. Foreign policy behavior toward regional cooperation schemes is conceptualized in terms of the degree of support exhibited by the member of the scheme.

There are several advantages to a focus on the nation as the level of analysis. Support by the members of the regional cooperation scheme has been considered crucial for the success of the scheme. The lack of national support has frequently been cited as a reason for the failure of some attempts at regional unity. Cochrane and Sloan (n.d.: 26) state with respect to the CACM:

> Central American politicians have not accorded the movement toward integration the kind of support needed for resolving the problems now confronting the CACM. Thus, it can be argued that the main factor inhibiting the CACM is a lack of what may be called political will or political commitment -- the distribution of benefit problems, "doing the easy," concentration on "low cost" actions are mere manifestations of this factor.

Furthermore, these authors state that "LAFTA suffers from a lack of commitment from its members. Under these conditions, LAFTA cannot acquire the inscitutional capabilities of prestige and legitimacy, powers of initiative and mastery of technical expertise which are so necessary to upgrade the common interests" (n.d.: 16). Other authors have looked at the problems of regional integration and have attributed these problems to the national level. Shonfield (1965: 16) maintains that the lack of supranational institutions is due to national policies: "the weakness of the central authority in LAFTA is not accidental; it is of the essence. Only national governments which wield sufficient authority in their own territory to ignore on occasion the narrow short-term arguments of interest groups, for the sake of some larger long-term objective, are going to be in a position to endow a joint Latin American body with the authority it needs."

A focus on the national level is useful not only in the study of regional cooperation schemes among developing countries but also may be applied to regional cooperation schemes with much more ambitious goals in developed countries. Stanley Hoffman (1968: 867) states with respect to the European Community:

> The failure (so far) of an experiment tried in apparently ideal conditions tells us a great deal about contemporary world politics, about the chances of unification movements elsewhere and about the functional approach to unification. For it shows that a movement can fail not only when there is a surge of nationalism in one important part, but also when there are differences in assessments of the national interest that rule out agreement on the shape and on the world role of the new, supranational whole.

An analytical focus on national support for a regional cooperation scheme thus has the potential of contributing to the development of theory in comparative foreign policy and in integration -- two subfields which

have regrettably remained far removed from each other in the past. As Gordon and Moore (1976: 10) point out, the emphasis on the regional level in integration literature has prevented this field from contributing to the development of foreign policy theory. And it could be added that the failure, by and large, of foreign policy studies to concentrate on foreign policy behavior toward one specific target, namely regional cooperation schemes, has prevented it from making a contribution to integration theory.

The focus on national support is conducive to comparative analysis. One can compare the patterns of national support between members toward a regional cooperation scheme. One can compare a nation's support for the regional cooperation scheme in the context of its overall foreign policy behavior. One can compare regional cooperation schemes in terms of the sum total of national support generated. And along these lines, one can derive conclusions as to the minimal level of national support needed for maintenance of a regional cooperation scheme and the ways in which such support may be maintained.

Crucial to the formation of a general analytical framework of foreign policy behavior toward a regional cooperation scheme is a clear conceptualization of the dependent variable of support and a concise ordering of independent variables which seek to explain that foreign policy behavior. For whether one is comparing national support between members or comparing the overall levels of national support in several regional cooperation schemes, this framework is concerned with explaining foreign policy behavior.

Support: A Conceptualization for Analysis

In this study, four dimensions of support were examined: activity, supportive attitudes, implementation, and impact on other foreign policy behavior. The relationships between the first three dimensions were clearly drawn and form the basis of the conceptualization of support in this framework. The framework suggests that national activity is determined by both the degree of political commitment or supportive attitudes and the extent to which a member is implementing the scheme's programs. Both components are necessary for a nation to take an active role in the regional cooperation scheme. The extent to which a member is implementing group programs will greatly influence the supportive attitudes it has with respect to the scheme, and, at the same time, the degree of political commitment will play a role in determining the extent of implementation of group programs on a national level.

In this study of the Andean Pact, the impact of Pact membership on other foreign policy behavior was not found to be a very useful dimension. While there were some interesting findings regarding the attention paid by members to other members, there was little evidence that foreign policy coordination was occurring between any of the members. Yet other studies, particularly those done on the EEC (e.g. Dolan, 1976), have found such policy externalization to exist (although little work has been done on the national level of analysis). It may be that a certain length of time of successful cooperation on economic matters must pass before policy externalization can occur. Indeed, Dolan's study indicates that only after ten to twelve years did a discernible EEC foreign policy emerge. In this context, it is suggested that while it may be useful to study this dimension with respect to regional cooperation schemes

in developed countries, there is little evidence that it is a useful dimension in the analysis of more recent regional cooperation schemes.

One of the most significant findings of this study is the importance of analyzing national policies toward different programs of the scheme. In this study, four programs were analyzed -- trade liberalization, industrial programming, Decision 24, and the proposed Andean Tribunal -- and support for three of these programs was found to be determined by different factors. Thus, a general framework for the study of national support for a regional cooperation scheme must incorporate a discussion of support for specific programs as well as for the group as a whole. The selection of specific programs will depend in part on the way in which the model is to be used. For example, if one is comparing Brazil's trade policy in LAFTA and UNCTAD, the programs analyzed would probably include those relating to tariff-reductions. It is difficult to draw up a general list of programs found in most regional cooperation schemes; it is perhaps more useful to present some general guidelines as to the types of programs which should be analyzed.

An analysis of the goals of the regional cooperation scheme and the programs designed to further these goals should permit the researcher to determine which programs are at least rhetorically most important to the group. Since goals may differ from the actual importance assigned to specific programs by members, sampling may then be used. Either expert judges or a sample of respondents may be asked to rank various group programs in terms of their importance to the regional cooperation scheme. The results should give an indication of which programs are considered to be most important for the regional cooperation scheme. The most important criterion for the selection of programs to be analyzed is the theoretical

emphasis of the study. If the goal is to compare national policies of support within one regional cooperation scheme, the guidelines given above should be helpful. However, if the goal is to compare more than one regional cooperation scheme or to compare the foreign policy of one nation toward a regional cooperation scheme and another region or nation, the selection of programs to be analyzed should be made on the basis of the theoretical goal of the study.

In short, conceptualizing national foreign policy behavior toward a regional cooperation scheme should utilize at least three dimensions or indicators of support -- activity, supportive attitudes and implementation -- and should analyze different programs.

Explaining Support for a Regional Cooperation Scheme

In this study a number of factors have been found useful in explaining differences in national support for the Andean Pact. The level of economic development, governmental resources, and the extent of foreign investment were found to be significant factors in accounting for variation in implementation and activity in the Andean Pact. Structural characteristics of the economy -- the dependence of the economy on manufacturing, amount of domestic and foreign investment -- together with perceptions of national economic development were found to be significant factors in explaining the programs emphasized by member governments. Finally, dynamic factors -- perceptions of equitable distribution of benefits, Andean trade, and perceptions of tangible benefits received -- were found to be significantly related to general patterns of activity and supportive attitudes.

These findings suggest several hypotheses for a general framework of foreign policy behavior toward regional cooperation schemes:

1. The higher the level of national economic development, governmental resources, domestic and foreign investment, the more the nation will implement group programs, take an active role in the regional cooperation scheme, and exhibit supportive attitudes toward the scheme.

2. The more a specific program of the regional cooperation scheme is perceived as relating to the government's economic development priorities the more it will support that program.

3. The more a specific program of the regional cooperation scheme complements the structure of the nation's economy, the more that nation will support the program.

4. The more a nation perceives that benefits are being equitably distributed within the scheme, the more it will take an active role, exhibit supportive attitudes, and be successful in implementing group programs.

5. The greater the amount of trade and interactions a nation has with members of the regional cooperation scheme, the more the nation will support the regional cooperation scheme.

These hypotheses direct attention to certain specific factors which are posited to influence patterns of national support for a regional cooperation scheme. A final step in presenting a framework is to develop guidelines as to the relative importance of the explanatory variables. Based on the findings of this study, the following relationships are expected:

6. The level of economic development and governmental financial resources will be the most important factors in explaining implementation of Pact programs.

7. The structure of the economy and the government's economic development goals will be the most important factors in explaining which programs of the regional cooperation scheme will be supported by the members.

8. The dynamic factors -- perceived equitable distribution of benefits, perceptions of benefits received, and relationships with other members of the scheme, respectively -- will be important factors in explaining general patterns of supportive attitudes and activity in the regional cooperation scheme. However, they will not be as important as the measures of national capabilities mentioned in hypothesis 7.

The framework thus suggests that the distinction between background conditions and dynamic factors is a useful one which can be empirically tested. In the section below, guidelines for measuring and testing the model are presented.

Data for Testing the Framework

This study has used interview data from respondents in the national offices of integration of the six member countries of the Andean Pact. These data were found to be very useful in measuring the national positions of support for the Andean Pact, the dependent variable in this study. In addition to the perceptual data, event data were also used. In almost all cases, the event data confirmed the reliability of the interview data. The event data were found to be most useful in examining patterns of subregional foreign policy behavior and least useful in describing the dimension of supportive attitudes.

In measuring the dependent variable, support for a regional cooperation scheme, there are several alternative data sources. Content analysis may be used to measure the frequency with which governmental officials refer to the regional cooperation scheme and their attitudes toward it. National support could also be measured through the evaluations of expert judges. Voting records are available in some regional cooperation schemes, which would permit the analysis of national positions with respect to particular programs. Analysis of national compliance with group decisions could be carried out by comparison of national legislation or requests for exemptions or extensions.

In measuring the independent variables, perceptual data were used in this study, but the results of some of the analyses indicate that structural characteristics may be equally as valid. For example, the

structure of the economy as measured by percent of GDP from manufacturing was found to be as useful as officials' perceptions of national economic development priorities. Similarly, the absolute amount of foreign investment was as important a factor in explaining support for Decision 24 as were the perceptions of officials of the role of foreign investment for national economic development.

Suggestions for Further Research

The comparative study of foreign policy has made tremendous progress in the last decade. As Rosenau states in his reflections on the field during the past eight years, progress is definitely occurring.

> There are. . .persuasive reasons for judging these eight years of effort as more than a passing phase. The vast research output it has spawned does more than pay lip service to the comparative method. It reveals an intense, restless, and creative use of modeles, variables, and methodologies in which comparisons are hypothesized or made. The complexities of foreign policy phenomena have yielded to the scientific mode, and increasingly parsimonious conceptualization that are not bound by time and place have been built, extended, and revised. Descriptions have been supplemented by analyses, implicit assumptions have given way to explicit propositions, unrelated examples have been replaced by recurring patterns and noncomparable case studies have been complemented by careful replications. (Rosenau, 1975: 32)

The framework developed in this chapter is hopefully a step in the direction of comparative analysis through empirical research. The framework presents a systematic orientation to the subject area of regional cooperation, it offers hypotheses capable of empirical testing, and it orders the expected relationships in terms of their importance.

An attempt has been made to relate the findings of this study on the foreign policy behavior of six Latin American nations toward the Andean Pact to the literature of both comparative foreign policy and integration. Some of the findings support those of other studies; other findings

challenge the assumptions made in the literature. The results of this research serve to underscore the utility of the comparative method in the analysis of foreign policy behavior.

NOTES
CHAPTER V

1. Activity is measured by the mean scores of officials' evaluations of their governments' activity. Supportive attitudes are measured by the mean scores of officials' evaluations of their governments' political commitment. Optimism is measured by the mean scores of officials' evaluations of their governments' optimism.

2. Trade liberalization activity is measured by the mean scores of officials' evaluations of their governments' activity in trade liberalization. Trade liberalization supportive attitudes are measured by the mean scores of officials' evaluations of their governments' supportive attitudes. Industrial programming activity is measured by the mean scores of officials' evaluations of their governments' activity in industrial programming. Industrial programming supportive attitudes are measured by the mean scores of officials' evaluations of their governments' supportive attitudes for industrial programming.

3. Support for Decision 24 is measured by the mean scores of officials' evaluations of their governments' support for Decision 24.

4. Support for the proposed Andean Tribunal is measured by the mean scores of officials' evaluations of their governments' support for the Tribunal.

5. Implementation of industrial programming and trade liberalization measures is measured by the mean scores of officials' evaluations of their governments' implementation of industrial programming and trade liberalization measures respectively.

6. Perceptions of equitable distribution of benefits and perceptions of benefits are measured by the mean scores of officials' evaluations of these two indicators.

7. The relationships among the dynamic factors themselves are surprisingly not too strong. The closest relationship is between perceptions of benefits received and equitable distribution of Andean Pact benefits (Kendall's tau = .55).

APPENDIX 1
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE AND CODING SCHEME

During the actual interviews with governmental officials working in the national offices of integration, the order of the following questions was frequently changed. The interviews usually began with descriptive questions in order to make the respondent feel more comfortable. Frequently, very specific -- often technical -- questions were asked early in the interview to make the respondent aware that I had substantial background in the study of the Andean Pact and thus avoid very general descriptive responses.

After becoming familiar with the questions, a list of topics to be discussed was drawn up and referred to during the interview. Key words and phrases were recorded during the interview and the entire interview was written up immediately following. In developing the questionnaire, the first three or four interviews were completely re-worked in view of the questions which had been the most productive.

1. What role does this office (or section) play in formulating national policy toward the Andean Pact?

2. How many officials work in this office? How many support personnel? What is the annual budget of this office?

3. What is the role of the private sector in developing national policy toward the Andean Pact?

4. In view of the fact that Colombia's (substitute for other countries) trade relationships are dominated by the United States, do you think that Colombia has much in common with the other Andean Pact members? What kinds of problems do you think are shared among the Andean countries?

5. Perhaps the overall goal of the Andean Pact is to foster the economic development of the subregion. Yet each member country has somewhat different priorities for economic development. How would you characterize Colombia's economic development priorities and to what extent are they reflected in Andean Pact programs?

6. How important is industrial programming in Colombia's policy toward the Andean Pact?

How important is the trade liberalization program in Colombia's policy?

What benefits have accrued to Colombia as a result of these programs? What benefits are expected to accrue?

7. At what stage of implementation is Colombia with respect to industrial programming? trade liberalization? What have been the major problems in implementing these programs?

8. It is said that 1975 is a crucial year for the development of the Andean Pact, given the fact that industrial programming must be completed and the Common External Tariff must be approved. Are you optimistic about the Andean Pact's ability to deal with these problems? Are you optimistic with respect to what the Andean Pact can do for Colombian development?

9. What limits are there to Colombian participation in the Andean Pact? (Probe for financial problems, investment, private sector/domestic opposition, political will, resources.)

10. The entrance of Venezuela in 1973 has meant a need for restructuring many of the Pact's decisions. Do you think the entrance of Venezuela is good for the Andean Pact? What advantages and disadvantages are there for Colombia?

11. Is Decision 24 essential to the functioning of the Pact? Some experts have argued that while the philosophy of Decision 24 is essential to the Andean Pact, some modifications need to be made, either in expanding the safeguard clauses or in increasing the percentage of remission of profits. What do you think of these suggestions?

12. It is said that all attempts at integration involve sacrifice of some national goals for the achievement of common goals. In what concrete ways is Colombia sacrificing for the Andean Pact?

13. How would you describe Colombia's role in the Andean Pact? Is Colombia taking a leadership position? or complying with all of the provisions, without taking the initiative? Has Colombia's role in the Andean Pact changed over time? In what way(s)?

14. What country do you think is most active? Why? What country do you think is least active? Why? How would you rank the members in terms of their activity in the Andean Pact? (Probe for issues of activity.)

15. Do you think an Andean Tribunal is necessary to the Andean Pact? Why or why not? Do the other countries think a Tribunal is needed?

16. One of the Andean Pact's stated goals is to provide incentives for accelerated development for Bolivia and Ecuador. Do you think that preferential treatment is needed? Do you think the existing provisions are adequate?

17. What role do you see foreign investment playing in Andean integration? How important is foreign investment to Colombia's future economic development?

18. How would you characterize Colombia's relations with the Junta? Some have suggested that the Junta is too idealistic and is too removed from the actual political situations. Do you share this attitude?

What about the other Andean Pact organs -- CAF, Andrés Bello, Simón Rodriguez, CAES -- do you think they're active and effective?

Coding Scheme

Officials' Evaluations of the Activity of other Andean Pact nations (Table 8)

Respondents were first asked to rank the level of activity of other nations toward the Andean Pact. However, officials were reluctant to categorize activities of others into such a "neat" scheme. They felt that to do so was to oversimplify the situation. As one respondent astutely observed, "well, Venezuela's the most active politically, Colombia's the most active in trade, Peru's most active in industrial programming, Ecuador is trying hard to be active, there's no way for Bolivia to ever be active and Chile could be active if it can ever control its economic situation." This particular respondent then smiled and said "I'd like to see you do a Guttman analysis on that statement!"

The alternative technique was to ask the respondents to describe the level of activity of each of the other members. Four categories were used in coding the responses: most active, very active, active, and minimally active. These responses were coded in the same manner as those in which respondents described their own activity.

Officials' Evaluations of the Existence of Political Will in their own Governments (Table 12)

The method originally intended to measure the extent of supportive attitudes was to have respondents rank order five international organizations in terms of their relative importance to the government. This method was discarded because all of the respondents (in the sample interviews) ranked the Andean Pact as the most important organization. This was probably due to the fact that most respondents worked in the governmental offices of integration and thus had an inflated view of the Andean Pact's importance.

In the sample interviews carried out, the importance of political will (voluntad política) was continually stressed. When respondents were asked "why is Peru taking an active role in the Andean Pact?", the response invariably included the idea of political will, e.g. "we don't have as much to gain economically as does Colombia, but we have the political will." In subsequent interviews, this concept of political will was incorporated into the questionnaire. Respondents were asked "how would you describe your government's political will toward the Andean Pact?" Respondents clearly understood the concept and reacted quite differently from questions relating to activity. Thus, in this analysis, the degree to which officials perceive that political will exists in the government serves as an indicator of the existence of supportive attitudes toward the Pact within the government.

Three categories of supportive attitudes were distinguished in the interviews:

1. Completely supportive attitudes. Responses were classified into this category when respondents described their governments as "completely committed to the Andean Pact," "the political will to support the Andean Pact is tremendous," or "our government places the highest priority on supporting the Andean Pact."

2. Qualified supportive attitudes. Responses were coded into this category when officials described their governments as having the necessary political will to support the Andean Pact but qualified that statement by other factors. A typical response in this group was, "yes, Bolivia has the political will -- the government is committed completely to the Andean Pact -- but there are too many obstacles for that will to be implemented.

3. Limited supportive attitudes. Responses were coded into this category when officials described their governments as having low levels of political will with respect to support for the Pact. Most respondents in this group tended to compare the current government's political will with either preceding governments or other nations. Typical responses included "no, this government doesn't have much political will when it comes to supporting the Andean Pact. This government just isn't as committed as the one before," or "well, there's not really much political will in Chile today to support the Andean Pact. I wish our government did have it."

Officials' Evaluations of Governmental Optimism about the Future of the Andean Pact (Table 13)

Officials were asked whether or not they felt that their governments were optimistic with respect to the future of the Andean Pact. Responses fell into three categories:

1. Optimism. Responses were coded into this category when officials stressed that their governments were optimistic with respect to the Andean Pact's future.

2. Qualified optimism. Responses were coded into this category when officials qualified their governments' optimism on the basis of time, e.g. "the government seems to be optimistic in terms of the long-term development of the Pact, but not in the immediate future."

3. Pessimism. Responses were coded into this category when officials described their governments' outlook as pessimistic.

Officials' Evaluations of Governmental Implementation of Andean Pact Programs (Table 18)

Officials interviewed were asked to characterize their governments' degree of implementation of Pact programs. The responses to this question were more difficult to code than those relating to either activity or supportive attitudes. Officials tended to be very descriptive when talking

about implementation, often pulling out charts and figures to demonstrate the extent of their governments' implementation. From the general descriptions of the state of implementation, three categories of responses emerged:

1. Complete implementation. Responses were coded into this group when officials described their governments' implementation as "complete," "total compliance," "right on schedule," or "no problems."

2. Moderate implementation. Responses were coded into this group when officials attached qualifiers to their governments' degree of implementation or when problems in implementation were stressed. Typical responses in this group included "the government is implementing most of the Pact programs but there are lots of problems in some sectors," or "we've been very active in implementing Pact decisions but there are still some problems we have to work out."

3. Low implementation. Responses were coded into this group when officials described their implementation as either low or slow. Typical responses were "we're trying to implement Pact programs but we just don't have the resources to carry out all the studies," or "we're beginning to ralize that we can't implement everything without some outside help."

Officials' Evaluations of Governmental Activity regarding Trade Liberalization (Table 23)

In analyzing interview responses regarding governmental activity in trade liberalization measures, three categories were distinguished: very active, active, and minimally active. Responses were coded as being very active when officials described their governments as being "very active" or "most active." Responses which described governmental activity as being "active but not taking the initiative" or attached qualifiers to statements of governmental activity, were coded as being active. Responses were coded as being "minimally active" when respondents described their governments as being "not very active."

Officials' Evaluations of the Importance Assigned Trade Liberalization Measures by their Governments (Table 24)

In seeking to determine the existence of supportive attitudes toward

trade liberalization measures, an attempt was made to determine the importance governments attach to trade liberalization programs. Officials were asked: "how important are the trade liberalization measures to your government's participation in the Pact?" The responses were then probed with questions such as "do you think trade liberalization measures are essential to the Andean Pact's progress?" and "why is trade liberalization important to your government?" As might be expected, no one responded by saying that trade liberalization was not important to the government. However, there were degrees attached to the perceived importance of the Andean Pact. Two categories of responses emerged from the interviews: 1) essential, and 2) limited importance. Responses were coded into the first category when officials described trade liberalization as being "essential" or "most important" to the government's support for the Andean Pact. Responses were coded into the latter category when officials responded by saying that trade liberalization is "important, but certainly not crucial to our government's support for the Andean Pact," or "it's just one part of the Andean Pact's program and for us, not the most important part."

Officials' Evaluations of their Governments' Implementation of Trade Liberalization Measures (Table 25)

In coding the interview data, two categories emerged: complete implementation and minimal implementation. Responses falling into the first category were those in which officials stated that trade liberalization measures were being fully implemented. Responses were coded as "minimal implementation" when officials described their implementation as being low. A typical response in this category was "we're trying to implement trade liberalization programs but we are not able to take advantage of all of the tariff reductions."

Officials' Evaluations of their Governments' Activity in Industrial Programming Measures (Table 27)

In coding the interview responses to questions about governmental activity in industrial programming, three categories were distinguished:

1. Most active. Responses were coded into this category when officials described their governments as being "very active," or "the leader in pushing for industrial programming measures."

2. Active. Responses were coded into this category when officials described their government's activity as "active but not taking the initiative," or as "supporting industrial programming, but it's not our main interest."

3. Minimally active. Responses were coded into this category when officials stated that they were not "too active."

Officials' Evaluations of the Importance Assigned by their Governments to Industrial Programming (Table 28)

In considering supportive attitudes of the member governments with respect to industrial programming, officials were asked "how important is industrial programming to your government's participation in the Andean Pact?" Responses were then probed with questions like "is industrial programming essential to your continued support for the Andean Pact?" and "why is industrial programming important to your government?" As in the case of trade liberalization, all respondents affirmed the importance of industrial programming to the Andean Pact. However, two categories of perceived support were determined: 1) essential, and 2) limited importance. Responses were coded into the first group when officials described industrial programming as being "essential" or "most important" to the government's support for the Andean Pact. Responses were coded into the latter category when officials responded by saying that industrial programming "is important, but not crucial to our support" or when officials expressed the opinion that "industrial programming is getting too much emphasis in the Andean Pact while

other programs are equally, if not more important, for the Andean Pact."

Officials' Evaluations of Covernmental Implementation of Industrial Programming Measures (Table 29)

In examining officials' evaluations of governmental implementation of industrial programming, responses were coded into two categories: complete implementation or minimal implementation. Responses fell clearly into these two groups, with no responses falling into a middle ground. Officials maintained that their governments were either implementing industrial programming or else they talked of all the problems involved in implementation.

Officials' Evaluations of their Governments' Support for Decision 24 (Table 31)

In analyzing the activity of members toward Decision 24, an attempt was made to use officials' evaluations in much the same manner as they were used in the previous two issues. Officials were asked to describe their governments' activity with respect to Decision 24. However, the responses did not, for the most part, focus on national activity. When asked "how would you describe your government's activity with respect to Decision 24?", most officials responded in terms of either the degree of implementation or governmental supportive attitudes. Unlike trade liberalization and industrial programming, Decision 24 does not involve continuing negotiations; the decision has already been passed.

As in the case of trade liberalization and industrial programming measures, supportive attitudes toward Decision 24 were measured by interview responses to the question "how important is Decision 24 to your government's support for the Andean Pact?" Responses were then probed through the use of questions such as "is Decision 24 perceived by the government as being essential to the Andean Pact?", "should it be changed?", and "why is

Decision 24 important (or not important) to your government?" The responses were classified into three categories:

1. Complete support. Responses were coded into this group when officials characterized their governments' position as being "completely or absolutely supportive," and when no need for change was indicated. Typical responses included "our government sees Decision 24 as absolutely essential to our participation in the Pact," and Decision 24 is an essential part of the Andean Pact and must not be weakened in any way."

2. Qualified support. Responses were coded into this group when officials qualified their governments' support for Decision 24. Typical responses included "our government sees Decision 24 as necessary to the functioning of the Pact but certain modifications must be made" or "the philosophy of Decision 24 is essential to the Andean Pact but the actual decision itself needs changing."

3. Limited support. No official said that Decision 24 was bad in principal or that his government did not support the statute. However, a few officials did point out that Decision 24 had received too much attention and that the success of the Andean Pact did not depend on this decision. These officials seemed to indicate that their government did not place as great a priority on Decision 24 as did other members.

Officials' Evaluations of Governmental Implementation of Decision 24 (Table 32)

When respondents were asked about governmental implementation of Decision 24, two categories of responses emerged: 1) rigid implementation, and 2) problematical implementation. Responses were coded into the first category when officials characterized their government's implementation as being "complete," "strict," or "to the letter." Responses were coded into the second category when officials characterized their governments as implementing the Decision but with a great number of problems. Typical responses included "yes, the government is completely implementing Decision 24 except for a few cases where conditions aren't right yet, like oil," or "we're implementing Decision 24 as best we can but it has really been difficult."

Officials' Evaluations of Governmental Support for the Proposed Andean Tribunal (Table 34)

Respondents were asked two questions relating to the proposed Andean Tribunal: "do you think an Andean Tribunal is needed at the present time?" and "does your government support the Junta's proposal for a Tribunal?" The number of responses was relatively low on both questions. Many officials stated that they did not know anything about the Tribunal or that it was not in their domain to respond to such questions. This was in marked contrast to the other three issues discussed. An official working in industrial programming, for example, would usually have very definite opinions concerning trade liberalization and Decision 24, but would express reluctance to discuss the proposed Tribunal. The responses obtained from the two questions fell into three categories:

1. Complete support. Responses were coded into this category when officials indicated that a Tribunal was needed at the present time and that their government was supporting the proposal.

2. Qualified support. Responses were coded into this category when officials stated that some kind of supranational judicial body was needed, but that the proposal was too far-reaching. Officials in this group invariably stated that their government did not support the current proposal but was interested in some kind of modified (i.e. limited) jurisdictional authority.

3. Non-support. Responses were coded into this category when officials flatly stated that a Tribunal was unnecessary at the present time and the Tribunal was not supported by the government. These responses tended to be couched in general terms, e.g. "no one in the Pact is ready for an Andean Tribunal. It's unrealistic to even discuss the possibility. . . .No, the Chilean government isn't interested in a Tribunal."

Officials' Perceptions of Their Governments' Economic Development Priorities (Table 37)

Respondents were asked what kind of economic development their government was pursuing. After substantial probing, the following response categories

were obtained:

1. Industrialization. Responses were coded into this category when respondents stressed the need for industrialization, development of heavy industry, or need for infrastructure development.

2. Trade. Responses were coded into this category when respondents referred to the need for export promotion, import substitution, or stimulus to existing industry, particularly consumer goods.

Responses to this question were fairly easy to code because officials immediately perceived a difference between economic development priorities of heavy industrialization and of expanding exports. Most officials stressed that their governments were simultaneously following both strategies, although more emphasis was being placed on one or the other.

Officials' Perceptions of Importance of Foreign Investment for the Nation's Economic Development (Table 39)

Respondents were probed carefully to determine the perceived importance of foreign investment in the economic development of their country. Questions such as "is foreign investment essential to your government's economic development plans?", "how much foreign investment is there at the present time in your country and how important is it for this investment to be increased?" were asked.

Responses were coded into three categories:

1. Very Important. Responses were coded into this group when officials referred to the important role of foreign investment or when they stated that more foreign investment is needed.

2. Moderately Important. Responses were coded into this group when officials said that investment was important in some sectors or when they qualified the importance of foreign investment, e.g. "Foreign investment is important to us but it's more important that national investment be stimulated."

3. Not Important. Responses were coded into this group when officials described the level of investment as low or shurgged it off as non-essential.

Officials' Perceptions of Shared Problems in the Subregion (Table 41)

Respondents were asked "what problems does your nation have in common with the other Andean Pact members?" They were then probed on the balance between perceived shared problems and perceived disparities within the subregion.

The responses were then coded into three groups:

1. Large number of shared problems. Responses were coded into this group when officials named four or more shared problems and minimized disparities between the nations.

2. Moderate number of shared problems. Responses were coded into this group when officials named between one and three shared problems and minimized subregional disparities.

3. Low number of shared problems. Responses were coded into this group when officials did not perceive any shared problems as outweighing the conflicts or disparities between nations.

Officials' Perceptions of Benefits deriving from Andean Pact Membership (Table 42)

Respondents were asked what benefits had accrued from membership in the Andean Pact and then probed on the relationship of benefits to costs. Responses were then coded into three categories:

1. High benefits. Responses were coded into this group when either tangible or potential benefits were perceived as outweighing any costs.

2. Moderate benefits. Responses were coded into this group when benefits were perceived as outweighing costs, but qualifiers were attached, e.g. "well, we've gotten some benefits, but the cost has been high," or "no, we haven't received many concrete benefits but we expect to receive some in the future."

3. Low benefits. Responses were coded into this group when few benefits were perceived and the costs of support were perceived as outweighing those benefits, e.g. "no, the Andean Pact hasn't done anything for us and we don't think it will do anything in the future."

Officials' Perceptions of the Distribution of Benefits deriving from the Andean Pact (Table 44)

Respondents were asked "do you think the benefits resulting from Andean integration are being fairly distributed?" and "do you think your country is getting its fair share of the benefits?" Respondents tended to answer in terms of the benefit distribution as being more or less fair.

Responses were coded into two groups:

1. More fair. Responses were coded into this group when respondents said either "yes, they are fairly equitably distributed," or "well, they're not absolutely equal, but it's not that important."

2. Less fair. Responses were coded into this group when respondents said no, they are not being fairly distributed.

APPENDIX 2
CODEBOOK FOR ANDEAN FOREIGN POLICY ACTS

Identifying Foreign Policy Acts

For the purposes of this study, a foreign policy act is defined as a simple declarative sentence about an activity undertaken by a state or its official representative(s), or by an international intergovernmental organization (IGO) or its official representative(s), wherein it may be inferred that the actor has undertaken the activity in order to affect the behavior of the external recipient of the act.

The act must have three components: initiating actor, action, and direct target. Initiating actors are defined as any of the six member nations of the Andean Pact, the Andean Pact as a whole or any of the organs of the Pact. Targets are defined as any nation or international organization, including the Andean Pact.

Identifying Initiating Actors

By a "state" we mean the authoritative decision-makers -- de facto or de jure -- acting in their official capacity, and those individuals performing tasks under their direction. Representatives of a state include the head of government, cabinent ministers, military officials, diplomats and ambassadors, official delegations, and governmental organizations. Members of the legislature and political party officials can also be representatives of a state if they are performing their functions under the direction of the authoritative decision-makers, who are for the most part members of the

executive branch of government. Frequently, however, decision-makers are not named, but rather the collective noun "Peru" or "Chile" is used. Such acts should be abstracted.

Because we are concerned only with the actions of states and IGOs, do not abstract the external behavior of non-governmental groups in the initiating state. Similarly, do not abstract the private behaviors of governmental policy makers or their representatives. However, do abstract the "public behavior" when private behavior and public behavior are combined.

Identifying Targets

The direct target is the immediate recipient of the behavior undertaken by the initiating state. It will form the direct or indirect object of the sentence. To be abstracted, the act must have an explicit (that is, specified) direct target. An act is considered foreign and therefore to be abstracted if it meets one of the following two conditions:

> Condition 1: the explicit direct target is either 1) a governmental entity, 2) a group or organization of such entities or their representatives, or 3) a non-governmental entity external to the initiating state in those instances where the initiating state is a Latin American state. In other words, the act must be directed to, or have some intended effect upon, some entity or entities external to the initiating nation.
>
> Condition 2: the act of the initiating state is explicitly attributed as the result of some foreign source.

Identifying Actions

Foreign policy acts may be either verbal statements or physical behavior. Sometimes verbal statements accompany physical acts, thus raising the question as to whether one or two acts should be abstracted. If the verbal statement is an announcement of physical behavior, abstract the physical behavior unless 1) the action will occur later than one year from the date

of the announcement, or 2) there is some doubt (or conditions are imposed) about whether the event will actually occur.

Abstracting Foreign Policy Acts

Once foreign policy acts have been identified and recorded on an index card, it is necessary to determine the number of acts in the textual material on the card, and record each act in a simple declarative statement of the subject-verb-object form. Each act should be recorded on Item 1 of the code sheet.

General Guidelines

The act is to be recorded as a simple, declarative sentence. Such sentences are in the form of:

a) a singular, plural, or compound subject;

b) one transitive verb that states something rather than asks a question or gives a command;

c) a singular, plural, or compound direct object of the verb; and frequently,

d) an indirect object of the verb or of a prepositional phrase.

The most direct way to identify acts is to seek out in the text verbs that represent physical or verbal behavior of foreign policy actors. Once such verbs have been found, check that the actor is an Andean state or ICO, or their official representatives, and that the object of the action verb is a political entity external to the actor.

Additional Guidelines for Identifying Foreign Policy Acts

Only non-governmental sources can be used to identify any initiating actor other than one's own government. The exception to this rule is the

treatment of reciprocal acts, discussed below.

Sources identified by their bureaucratic location are considered sufficiently defined as to be actors. Similarly, spokesmen for an agency or department are considered representatives of that agency, which in turn are considered representatives of the initiating actor.

Travel is abstracted as a separate action only when the activities for which the travel was undertaken are not reported.

Multiple actors, multiple targets, and multiple issues frequently characterize the way in which foreign policy acts are embedded in textual material. The basic rule to follow in determining "how many" is that each foreign policy act can have only one actor, one target, and one action. Additional guidelines for implementing this basic rule are described below.

A special problem may arise in determining the number of actors in those instances where an actor is differentiated only on the basis of the bureaucratic location of the actor within a state. Consistent with the rule previously cited that sources identified by their bureaucratic location are considered sufficiently defined as to be actors, abstract as separate acts all statements by different bureaucratic spokesmen in the same initiating state (or IGO). This is true of acts where the content differs as well as acts where the same basic policy position is maintained by two or more officials.

Another special problem may arise in those instances where textual material does not clearly indicate who initiated a particular foreign policy act. This is especially true with acts involving meetings, negotiations, and agreements. All such acts should be treated as "reciprocal" acts. Separate code sheets should be made out for all actors and targets of

reciprocal acts. If states A and B, for example, agree to do something, one code sheet should be made out with A as the initiator and B as the target, and a second code sheet should be made out with B as the initiator and A as the target. However, actions where the initiator of the action can be determined from the textual material should not be treated as reciprocal acts. When an actor announces a future action, the action is not to be treated as a reciprocal act since it states an intention by one actor. When an actor announces an event that has already occurred, and the other conditions for reciprocal treatment are met (i.e., it is not possible to determine who initiated the act), the act should be considered reciprocal.

Determining the Number of Targets

A special problem may arise in determining the number of targets of a foreign policy act when a particular act is directed at one target but also has implications for another target. All such events should be abstracted as two foreign policy acts, with both targets specified as the direct target of the act. In cases where a state uses an IGO as a forum to direct an act toward another state, only the other state should be abstracted as the target, not the IGO. However, in those instances where the act also calls for, or implies, some subsequent action by the IGO itself or by its members (e.g. on a resolution) both the IGO and the other state should be abstracted as targets.

Abstracting Continuous Acts

An action that continues over a period of time should be abstracted only once so long as specific expectations arising out of that action are fulfilled. The failure or change in those expectations is also abstracted only once. However, all acts or presenting or accepting diplomatic credentials

are to be abstracted, even if they do not represent a change in expectations begun when diplomatic relations were established.

A special case of a continuous act is a meeting that extends over several days. Such events should be treated as one act as long as the length of the meeting is consistent with the initial expectations of the participants. If, however, a meeting continues over several days as a consequence of a change in the expectations of the participants, more than one act should be abstracted, with the precise number depending on the particular circumstances surrounding the meeting.

Abstracting Multiple Acts

The principal way to determine the number of foreign policy acts in a given text is by the number of actors and targets. However, almost any lengthy account of some activity undertaken by an actor toward a direct target raises the question of the number of different actions involved. Suppose, for example, that the agenda for an Andean Pact Comision meeting comprises nine items. Is each item a separate action? The answer is that two or more proposals or topics constitute separate actions, and therefore, separate foreign policy acts, if and only if, they differ on any one of the following criteria:

1. The proposals or topics involve different states or IGOs as either actors or direct targets, or the direct targets are two or more non-governmental entities external to the initiating actor.

2. The proposals or topics differ with respect to the point in time at which the action is to begin or become effective.

3. The proposals or topics differ with respect to the issue-area they involve. If two or more proposals clearly fall into different issue-areas, they should be treated as separate foreign policy acts. The five issue-areas are given below.

a) Security: acts that involve primarily a threat to or protection of the survival and well-being of nations and the means by which this threat or protection is accomplished.

b) Territory: acts that involve primarily questions of national control over, use of, or access to the territory of nations, including land, air, sea, and ocean floor.

c) Status: acts that deal primarily with the condition of national governments and IGOs in their external relations with each other and in their internal autonomy or dependence.

d) Human Resources: acts that deal primarily with the improvement of or harm to the well-being of human beings, individually or in groups.

e) Nonhuman Resources: acts that deal primarily with the allocation or potential allocation of financial and physical goods and services.

To summarize, when the activities of an actor toward the direct target can be differentiated by actor, target, time, or issue-area, then each activity is a separate action and is the basis for a separate event. Since each code sheet contains one, and only one, foreign policy act, a separate code sheet needs to be filled out for each separate act extracted from a single text.

Guidelines for Abstracting Announcements

"Announcements" are mong the most frequent means whereby we learn about foreign policy activities. In many cases, however, the appropriate foreign policy action -- or verb in the recorded declarative sentence -- is not the announcement itself but rather the act that is being reported.

When an announcement reports a completed act, the act is abstracted, not the announcement of it. When an announcement reports an act occurring in the present, the act is abstracted, not the announcement of it. When an announcement reports a future act, the act is abstracted if: no conditions are attached, and no doubt about the certainty of occurrence is expressed.

Guidelines for Abstracting Bilateral and Multilateral Meetings

In abstracting information about international meetings, we are interested in obtaining information about three different things: 1) the fact that a state did or did not actually attend a meeting; 2) what a state did while attending a particular meeting; and 3) in the case of IGOs, what the organization itself did. The substance of states' activities in international meetings is particularly important, but the fact of the meeting is also important since we are interested in recording the most discrete form of foreign policy behavior. The way in which information about attendance and participation is abstracted, differs depending on whether or not the meeting takes place within an IGO or outside the confines of such organizations.

International meetings outside IGOs

Abstract all statements of attendance at and participation in bilateral and multilateral meetings that occur outside the confines of an international organization. If the text identifies a "meeting" between two or more states (i.e. attendance at a meeting), that fact should be abstracted. If the text also identifies the substance of what happened at those meetings, that fact should be abstracted. The Andean Pact Comisión, the Convenio Andrés Bello and the Convenio Simón Rodriguez are all considered here as intergovernmental organizations, since they are institutionalized and were created as the product of formal written agreements. Ad hoc meetings between members of the Andean Pact, as in meetings of the Ministers of Communications, are considered international meetings outside IGOs and should be treated as multilateral meetings. Meetings between representatives of one member country and the Andean Pact's Junta are treated as bilateral meetings.

Each proposal accepted in an international meeting that differs from other accepted proposals by either actor, target, time, or issue-area (as discussed above) is a foreign policy act for each participating state. Similarly, actions taken in international meetings will frequently be abstracted as actions taken by each of the participating members toward each other.

Meetings of IGOs

The following organs are considered IGOs for the purposes of this study: 1) the Andean Pact Comisión, 2) the Convenio Andrés Bello, 3) the Convenio Simón Rodriguez, 4) the Corporación Andina de Fomento (CAF). Attendance of member nations at regular meetings of these organizations should not be abstracted. However, do abstract attendance at special or extraordinary meetings. Other organs of the Andean Pact are not considered IGOs and attendance at these meetings should be abstracted. For example, the Comité Asesor Económico Social (CAES) is not considered as an institutionalized organ of the Andean Pact in that it does not have regular meetings, nor specific rules governing its operations. Thus, attendance at a CAES meeting would be abstracted. Abstract non-attendance at IGO meetings by member nations whenever it is explicitly reported. Abstract all acts by the member nations toward resolutions, toward the organ itself, or toward other nations or IGOs. In regard to proposals and votes on proposals, the IGO is always the target of at least one act, e.g. Colombia proposed a resolution at the Andean Pact Comisión (target) meeting. If the substance of the resolution is also action directed toward a nation(s) or IGO(s), then action on the resolution is also action toward that country or IGO. When a nation sponsors a resolution, action by other nations on the resolution should also be considered acts directed toward

the sponsoring nation.

Coding Item 2: Actor, Yr/Mo/D, and Target Number

Actor

Place on the code sheet the correct four digit number for the state or IGO that is represented by the subject of the sentence. If the state or IGO acts with one or more other states or IGOs, make out a code sheet for each actor involved.

Yr/Mo/D

Code the date of the act as follows:

Year: 71 to 75

Month: 01 to 12

Day: 01 to 31

Where the exact commencement date of an act is not known, code the year and month as above and the day as 88. If the year or month is unknown, do not code the act. Make sure that the date of the act corresponds to the verb (action) being coded. Particular care must be taken in coding announcements. If the announcement, and not the act, is to be coded, the date of the announcement should be used in Item 2. If, however, the act, and not the announcement, is to be coded, the date of the act should be used in Item 2.

Target Number

The foreign policy act of any one state or IGO may be directed at one or more targets. When abstracting an act, be sure to consider how many targets the act has. If the act has one, and only one, target,

code the target number as "00." If the act has more than one target, make out a code sheet for each target up to 99 in number. Code the target number as follows: "01" for the first target, "02" for the second target, and so on.

Coding Item 3: Target Code and Target Category

Target Code

Any foreign policy act may have multiple actors and multiple targets. Every code sheet, however, has only one actor and only one target. Every substantive target has associated with it one and only one four digit code number. With the exception of transnational non-governmental entities, the first three digits in the code number uniquely identify the target; the fourth digit categorizes the target into one of the ten different generic categories. Search through the list of target codes in the tables and enter in Item 3 the correct four digit code number corresponding to the target of the foreign policy act you are coding.

Target Category

The target of the foreign policy act is someone, some group or collectivity of people, or some organization of such groups. When the target is a nation (and the last digit of the target code is 0), the target category will be coded from 01 to 18 or 98. When the target is not a nation (and the last digit of the target code is not 0), the target category will be coded from 20 to 44 or 99.

Coding Item 4: Actor Category and Actor Setting Category

Actor Category

In coding this item we wish to know who is acting on behalf of the

state. Read the act carefully and select the correct code number from the list of foreign policy actors. Place this two digit number in the appropriate space.

Actor Setting Category

The actor that you have just coded did "his thing" in some situation, setting or set of circumstances. Read the act carefully and select the correct code number from the "list of settings" that best describes the setting in which this behavior of the actor took place.

Coding Item 5: Action Category

In coding this item, we are concerned with what action is being described in the foreign policy act. The process of determining the type of action is complex but can be broken down into a series of simple questions and answers as follows:

First, examine the code chart "Categories of Actions between Polities." Note that it is organized into two rows -- conflict and cooperation -- and four columns -- verbal evaluation, verbal desire, verbal intent, and non-verbal deeds. This system gives eight boxes numbered 1 to 8. Odd numbered cells 1, 3, 5, and 7 are conflictful and even numbered cells 2, 4, 6, and 8 are cooperative. Cells 1 through 6 describe verbal behavior and cells 7 and 8 describe physical actions. The first problem you must solve, then, is to what cell does your act belong. Read the act carefully and ask:

1. Is the action engaged in verbal behavior or physical behavior? Verbal behavior is something said or written by the actor. Physical behavior involves deeds other than saying or writing something. In foreign policy behavior this may be giving or receiving aid, paying official visits, closing borders, etc. In general, if the actor's behavior involves doing something in addition to saying or writing it, it is physical behavior.

Verbal behavior can be further classified into three sub-categories: 1) the actor's stated evaluation or perception of past or current action, 2) the actor's stated desire for future action by the target, and 3) the actor's stated intent regarding its own possible future action vis-a-vis the target. These three verbal sub-categories generally represent three increasing levels of commitment to deeds or the probability that the actor's words will be followed by related deeds. Thus, read the act carefully and ask:

> 2. What is the level of commitment or apparent probability that this statement will be followed by physical action by the actor? In cells 1 and 2 the actor's evaluation or perception suggests that explicit reference to future deeds are suggested or implied. In cells 5 and 6 the actor's intention indicates that the likelihood of future deeds is explicit.

The answers to questions 1 and 2 have permitted you to place the act you are coding into one of four columns: 1) verbal evaluation and perception, 2) verbal desire, 3) verbal intent, or 4) physical behavior. You must now determine the row to which your act belongs based on the distinction between conflict and cooperation. Most actions between nations can readily be classified as either conflict or cooperation. A few kinds of actions (e.g. requests by one nation for infromation from another nation) are relatively neutral, involving verbal behavior neither strongly conflictive nor cooperative in nature. In practice, however, it is usually possible to classify such actions as conflict or cooperation according to whether the actions seem generally hostile or friendly in nature, and whether they seem generally desireable or undesireable to the target. Thus, ask and answer the following question:

3. Is the actor engaged in conflictual or cooperative behavior? If the actor directs an action at a target, that action is considered to be conflictful if it seems undesireable to the target, if it involves interests of the actor and target that are incompatible, or if it involves or suggests a negative sanction by which existing valued factors (resources, capabilities) may be destroyed through the use of military force. If an actor directs an action at a target, that action is considered to be cooperation if it seems desireable to the target, if it involves compatible interests of the participants, or if it involves a positive sanction by which new valued factors may be created through interaction (e.g. the increase of trade through a new trade treaty.)

The answers to questions 1, 2, and 3 have permitted you to place the act you are coding into one and only one of the eight cells in the matrix. As you can see from the chart, each cell contains from two to eight actual coding categories. To complete coding Item 5 you must ask and answer one more question:

4. Which category in the cell best describes the behavior of the actor? Each action category is defined in parentheses in the chart. Depending on the cell you are working in, read over the meaning of each category, answer question 4, and place the correct code number in Item 5 of your code sheet.

Coding Item 6: Issue Area

Our definition of a foreign policy act is concerned with attempts to affect the behavior of another nation or IGO. These attempts are related to something valued by the initiating actor. The major types of values for our purposes, the issue areas, are: security, territory, status, human resources, and nonhuman resources. In general, meetings, resolutions, agreements, and disputes are the means to consider or to deal with some substantive value. Always code the substantive value, consistent with the codes below, rather than the means or form.

Once you have determined the issue area that a foreign policy act falls into, turn to the appropriate chart to determine the correct five digit code number that should be assigned to the act.

Begin the process of "searching" by reading across the top of the table and determining which of the broad areas within the issue areas best describes the act you are coding. Once you have determined the appropriate column, read down the row entries on the side of the table to determine which of these entries best describes the act. Then read across the table along the row you have chosen until you reach the column you have selected. The intersection of the row and column will give you a unique issue area code number. Enter this on the code sheet in Item 6.

Coding Item 7: Andean Issue and Andean Dimension

Andean Issue

If the target for a foreign policy act is the Andean Pact or some subsidiary organ of the Andean Pact, assign one of the following numbers to the foreign policy act, depending on the issue which is referred to:

1. General references to the Pact including evaluation, intent, and desire for Andean Pact activities and progress.
2. Trade liberalization procedures. This would include all references to aspects of the Andean Pact dealing with tariff-reductions.
3. Industrial programming. This would include all references to aspects of industrial programming, including reports on progress to date and meetings.
4. Decision 24. Any references to the Statute on Common Treatment of Foreign Investment.
5. The proposed Andean Tribunal of Justice.
9. Assign this number when the Andean Pact is not a target of the act.

Andean Dimension

Read the foreign policy act carefully and determine which of the following questions best describes the act:

1. Does this act discuss the activity of the Andean Pact or the activity of any member of the Andean Pact? Most of these acts will be evaluative, discussing the Andean Pact's activity or reporting on the participation of one Pact member.

2. Does this act refer to a nation's satisfaction with the Andean Pact? This would include statements like "Chile is pleased with the progress of the trade liberalization measures."

3. Does the act suggest that this foreign policy action toward another nation was taken as a result of membership in the Andean Pact? Is the actor making a statement like "because we are members of the Andean Pact, we are seeking closer ties with country X?"

4. Does this act indicate a process of implementation of the provisions of the Andean Pact, including national actions to see that the Andean Pact programs are carried out or statements indicating work completed?

9. This number is used when none of the others are applicable.

Coding Item 8: Unilateral/Multilateral

Determine which of the following descriptions best characterizes the act you are coding. When you have done this, put the appropriate number in Item 8 on the code sheet.

1. The actor acted alone.

2. The actor acted with another Andean Pact member where the target is an Andean Pact member.

3. The actor acted with another Andean Pact member where the target is the Andean Pact as a whole.

4. The actor acted with another Andean Pact member where the target is a non-Andean Pact Latin American nation.

5. The actor acted with another Andean Pact member where the target is a non-Latin American state.

6. The actor acted with another non-Andean Pact member toward the Andean Pact.

Coding Item 9: Regime Code

Examine the actor listed in Item 1. If the actor is a nation, code as described below. If the actor is other than a Latin American nation,

code 99. To determine the regime that "was responsible" for the act you are coding, examine Item 2 and note the actor and the date. Then refer to the list of regimes and from that list place the correct two digit code number after "Regime code" in Item 9 on the code sheet.

Coding Item 10: Source, Yr/Mo, Page

In coding the source, insert number 3 in the blank after source to indicate the source used was Grupo Andino. After Yr/Mo, place the two digit number for the years 71 to 75 and then the two digit number for the months 01 to 12. Finally, place the two digit page number. Thus, Grupo Andino's December 1972 article on page 4 would be coded 3721204.

Code Chart 1. State and Actor Codes.

Actor	Code
Colombia	1000
Venezuela	1010
Ecuador	1300
Peru	1350
Bolivia	1450
Chile	1550
Andean Pact, as a whole	0445
Comision	0419
Junta	0429
Comite Asesor Economico-Social	0439
CAF	0449
Convenio Andres Bello	0459
Convenio Simon Rodriguez	0469
Convenio Hipolito Unanue	0479
Other Andean Pact organs	0489

Code Chart 2. List of Foreign Policy Actors.

Code	Actors
01	Chief of State or Head of Government
02	Foreign Minister, Secretary of State
03	Defense Minister, Secretary of Defense
04	Minister of Trade, Economics, or Foreign Trade, Finance Minister
05	Other Minister of Cabinet Rank
06	Official of Executive Branch lower than Cabinet
07	Military Official lower than Cabinet rank
08	Member of Legislature or Parliament
09	Political party official
10	Diplomat, Ambassador, Charge
11	Unspecified individual, e.g. a government spokesman
12	Cabinet or government as a whole
13	Legislature or parliament as a whole
14	An executive department (Foreign Ministry, Development Corporation
15	Military Forces (Army, Air Force, Police, Border Guards)
16	Official Delegation
17	An organization
18	An individual
19	Representative of UN or UN-affiliated international organization
20	Representative of non-UN international governmental organization, except Andean Pact officials
21	An international intergovernmental organization
22	A member of the Andean Pact's Junta
23	A member of an Andean Pact organ
24	The Andean Pact's Comision as a whole
25	The Andean Pact in general
26	National Integration Office
97	Two or more individuals acting together of the same country
98	Two or more organizations acting together of the same country
99	State or society (Chile, Peru, etc.)

Code Chart 3. List of Foreign Policy Targets.

Code	Target
01	Chief of State or Head of Government
02	Foreign Minister, Secretary of State
03	Defense Minister
04	Minister of Trade, Economics, or Foreign Trade, Finance Minister
05	Other Minister of Cabinet Rank
06	Official of Executive Branch lower than Cabinet rank
07	Military Official lower than Cabinet rank
08	Member of Legislature or Parliament
09	Political Party official
10	Diplomat, Ambassador, Charge
11	Unspecifi-d governmental representative
12	Cabinet or government as a whole
13	Legislature or Parliament as a whole
14	An executive department (Foreign Ministry, President's office)
15	Official delegation
16	Military forces (Army, Navy)
17	An organization, public, or where unsure of public-private status
18	A specific regime
19	National Office of Integration
20	International elite
21	UN organization or affiliate
22	a non-UN international organization
23	an international elected or appointed official
24	an individual of international importance other than above
25	an international public
26	an international non-governmental organization
27	a resolution of an international governmental organization
28	an Andean Pact organ
29	The Andean Pact in general
98	a state or society
99	a group or region of states, e.g. Latin America

Code Chart 4. List of Settings in which Foreign Policy Acts Occur.

Code	Setting
01	At a press conference, press briefing, interview, news release, in actor's own country
02	At a press conference, press briefing, interview, news release, abroad
03	In a diplomatic communique issued in actor's own country
04	In a diplomatic communique issued abroad
05	In a public speech, address, campaign speech, after dinner speech, in actor's own country
06	In a public speech, address, campaign speech, after dinner speech, abroad
07	At an ad hoc conference between heads or state or ministers, in actor's own country
08	At an ad hoc conference between heads of state or ministers, abroad
09	At an ad hoc conference between officials below the ministerial level, in actor's own country
10	At an ad hoc conference between officials below the ministerial level, abroad
11	At a continuing multi-national General Purpose Organization meeting, in actor's own country
12	At a continuing multi-national General Purpose Organization meeting, abroad
13	At a continuing multi-national military organization meeting, in actor's own country
14	At a continuing multi-national military organization meeting, abroad
15	At a continuing multi-national economic organization meeting, in actor's own country
16	At a continuing multi-national economic organization meeting, abroad
17	At a continuing multi-national special function organization meeting, in actor's own country
18	At a continuing multi-national special function organization meeting, abroad
19	Before a deliberative assembly, Parliament, Congress, in actor's own country
20	Before a deliberative assembly, Parliament, Congress, abroad

Code Chart 4. (Continued)

96	Abroad, exact setting unclear
97	At home, exact setting unclear
98	Ambiguous setting
99	Unknown setting, no information given on setting

Code Chart 5. Andean Regimes.

Nation and Regime	Dates	Code
Bolivia		
Gen. Rene Barrientos Ortuno and Gen. Ovando Candia	11-04-64 to 08-06-66	01
Gen. Rene Barrientos Ortuno	08-06-66 to 04-27-69	02
Luis Adolfo Siles Salinas	04-27-69 to 09-25-69	03
Gen. Alfredo Ovando Candia	09-25-69 to 10-06-70	04
Gen. Juan Jose Torres	10-06-70 to 08-22-71	05
Col. Hugo Banzer Suarez	08-22-71 to	06
Chile		
Eduardo Frei Montalva	11-03-64 to 11-04-70	01
Salvador Allende Gossens	11-03-70 to 09-11-73	02
Gen. Augusto Pinochet	09-11-73 to	03
Colombia		
Guillermo Leon Valencia	08-07-62 to 08-07-66	01
Carlos Lleras Restrepo	08-07-66 to 08-07-70	02
Michael Pastrana Borrero	08-07-70 to 08-07-74	03
Lopez Michaelson	08-07-74 to	04
Ecuador		
Clemente Yerovia Indaburo	04-04-66 to 11-16-66	01
Olto Arosemena Gomez	11-16-66 to 09-01-68	02
Jose Maria Velasco Ibarra	09-01-68 to 02-15-72	03
Gen. Guillermo Rodriguez Lara	02-15-72 to	04
Peru		
Fernando Belaunde Terry	06-08-63 to 10-03-68	01
Gen. Juan Velasco Alvarado	10-03-68 to 08-29-75	02
Gen. Morales Bermudez	08-29-75 to	03
Venezuela		
Romulo Betancourt	02-13-59 to 03-11-64	01
Raul Leoni	03-11-64 to 03-11-69	02
Rafael Caldera	03-11-69 to 03-11-74	03
Carlos Andres Perez	03-11-74 to	04

Code Chart 6. Categories of Action between Polities.

VERBAL

	Actor's Evaluation, Perception of Past or Current Action by Target	Actor's Desire for Future Action by Target	Actor's Intent Regarding Own Possible Action Vis-a-Vis Target
CONFLICT	1140 Deny (deny accusation or attributed policy) 1120 Accuse (charge, criticize, blame, disapprove, denounce, denegrate) 1020 Negative Comment (comment on situation, explain policy not desired by target)	3150 Demand (order, command, insist, demand compliance) 3130 Protest (make formal or informal complaint) 3100 Negative Propose (appeal, ask for information, aid, action in context undesireable to target) 3090 Negative Request (offer proposal, urge action, policy undesired by target)	5170 Threaten (threaten to take future action undesired by target) 5160 Warn (Warn of a future situation or action undesired by target) 5110 Reject (turn down proposal, protest, demand, refuse) 5020 Negative Intention (explain future policy undesired by target)
COOPERATION	2020 Positive Comment (comment on situation, explain policy 2040 Approve (praise, hail, applaud, endorse, support, thank)	4090 Positive Request (appeal, ask for action, aid, in context desireable to target) 4100 Positive Propose (offer proposal, urge, suggest action desired by target) 4250 Negotiate (participate in substantive talks, negotiations on specific issue or interest area)	6020 Positive Intention (explain future policy desired by target) 6100 Offer (offer to take future action desired by target) 6050 Promise (assure of future action desired by target) 6080 Agree (accept proposal, agree to future action, substantive agreement)
NEUTRAL	9020 Neutral Comment	9090 Neutral Request 9100 Neutral Propose	9020 Neutral Intention

Code Chart 6 (continued)

NON-VERBAL

CONFLICT

7220 Force (forceful or violent use of military resources, equipment to achieve objectives. Military engagement, non-military destruction, non-injury destruction)

7180 Demonstrate (armed force mobilization, movement, exercise, display, Non-military demonstration, meeting, boycott, or walk-out)

7230 Increase Military Capability (increase military spending, troop levels; develop weapons, authorize military action, reserve call-ups)

7240 Aid Opponent (give military aid to opponent of target)

7190 Reduce Relationship (cancel or postpone planned event, reduce routine international activity, recall officials, halt negotiations, break diplomatic relations)

7210 Seize (seize position or possessions, detain or arrest personnel)

7280 Subvert (aid to insurgents, non-verbal attempts to influence internal politics of target undesired by target)

COOPERATION

8010 Yield (surrender, submit, retreat, evacuate)

8030 Consult-Visit (make official visits, participate in a meeting involving foreign travel, consult with some foreign official at home or abroad)

8060 Grant (end negative sanctions, end conflictful action, end threat of conflict action; express regret, apologize, give invitation, privilege, diplomatic recognition, release, return persons, property)

8070 Reward (give economic, technical, military aid)

8260 Reduce Military Capability (reduce military spending, troop levels, reduce readiness for military action)

8270 Carry Out Agreement (implementation by actor of a previous agreement, e.g. a diplomatic, economic, cultural or military agreement. Host conferences)

8290 Increase Relationship (increase economic, technical, military aid. Increase level of diplomatic relations)

8300 Accept (accept or receive official visits, aid or support)

Code Chart I. Security Issue-Areas 00001-19999.

	Nuclear Weapons Delivery Capability	Conventional military activity and/or weapons	Guerilla/ counter-insurgency activity or weapons	Espionage	Revolution/ Intervention	Peace/unity/ detente/ tensions	Other
1. Combat use of troops, bases, or arms	01110	02110	03110				
2. Military aid	01267	02267	03267				
3. Military sales, purchase (from another country)	01367	02367	03367				
4. Arms expenditures	01435	02435	03435				
5. Loan of equipment	01367	02500	03500				
6. Training, maneuvers	01600	02600	03600				
7. Testing	01700	02700	03700				
8. Underground nuclear testing	01832						
9. Arms control, limitations	01930	02930					
10. Limitations on missiles, freeze on missiles	11133						
11. Non-proliferation Treaty	11231						
12. Force cuts	11334	02934	03934				
13. Arms races	11400	12100					
14. Espionage				04162			
15. Terrorism, torture, political kidnapping, repression			03900				
16. Revolution			13100				
17. Intervention, invasion					05129		
18. Subversion					05220		
19. Search for or proposals for peace, negotiations negotiations						06111	
20. Attempts at unity or defense						06213	
21. General tensions between states						06314	
22. Balance of tensions and detente between states						06413	
23. Use of international governmental organizations for security purposes	11351	12251	13251	04251		06351	07151
24. Alliances							07200
25. NATO, reorganization of, or other issues	11451						07312
26. Prisoners of war							07418
27. Relations or visits between defense ministers or other military personnel							07500
28. Security, not otherwise specified or more than one category							10000

Code Chart 10. Territory Issue-Area: 20000-39999.

	Airspace and Overflight	Land Rights	Water and Seabed Rights	Other Territorial Rights
1. Airspace and Overflight	21100			
2. Land rights		22140		
3. Border disputes		22240		
4. Water rights			23100	
5. Two hundred mile limit, fishing rights			23243	
6. Control of or access to or across common waterways			23373	
7. Seabed rights			23400	
8. Oil rights under the surface of the ocean floor or gulf floor			23500	
9. Territorial rights, not otherwise specified				20040

Code Chart 9. Status Issue-Area: 40000-59999.

	Diplomatic status/ support or opposition	Use of IGO's	Ideology/Autonomy/Dependency	Others
1. Status of representatives, diplomatic credentials, diplomatic immunity	41165			
2. Diplomatic or official visits (with no specified purpose; if purpose specified code in appropriate issue area)	41265			
3. Diplomatic recognition, establishment of diplomatic relations	41341			
4. Friendly or good relations, cooperation, support for another government	41417			
5. Opposition to another government, including sanctions	41500			
6. Agreements, treaties or conventions, (with no specified purpose; if purpose specified code in appropriate issue area)	41600			
7. Use of the OAS		42151		
8. Use of InterAmerican IGO's other than the OAS		42251		
9. Use of a Latin American IGO		42351		
10. Use of the United Nations or an associated agency		42451		
11. Use of other IGO's, or more than one category of IGO's		42551		
12. Independence			43141	
13. Sovereignty, autonomy, control over social and political processes by the government of a country, non-intervention			43200	
14. Dependency, external pressures, economic aggression			43300	
15. Ideology, ideological justification of nation's actions			43400	
16. Political asylum			43581	
17. Political unification				44100
18. International law				44200
19. Status, not otherwise specified or more than one category				40000

Code Chart 10. Human Resources Issue Area: 60000-79999.

	Travel/Tourism/ Culture/ Education	Information/ Communication	Human Rights/ Human Problems	Religion/ Moral Standards
1. Travel and tourism	61163			
2. Culture	61250			
3. Education	61360			
4. Student and youth exchanges	61460			
5. Sports	61560			
6. Information, news		62100		
7. News media personnel		62268		
8. Scientific knowledge		62300		
9. Scientific research, scientific exploration		62461		
10. Communication, not otherwise specified		62063		
11. Hijacking			63172	
12. Drug control			63274	
13. Refugees, immigrants, emigrants			63380	
14. Extradition			63482	
15. Expulsion, seizure, arrest, killing			63583	
16. Population			63684	
17. Human rights			63700	
18. Health			63800	
19. Religion				64100
20. Moral standards				65100
21. Human resources, not otherwise specified or more than one category				60000

Code Chart 31. Non-Human Resources Issue-Areas: 80000-89999.

	Trade	Investment	International Financial Relations	Foreign Aid: Loans	Foreign Aid: Grants	Foreign Aid: Emergency Relief	Technology/ Environment/ Transportation	Integration/ Development
1. Manufactured or semimanufactured good	81164	82164		84166	85166	86166		
2. Minerals, raw materials (excluding petroleum and foodstuffs)	81264	82264		84266	85266	86266		
3. Petroleum, petroleum byproducts	81364	82364		84366	85366	86366		
4. Foodstuffs, raw and processed (agricultural products)	81464	82464		84466	85466	86466		
5. Trade, not otherwise specified or more than one category	81064							
6. Public services, public utilities		82664		84666	85666	86666		
7. Public works, infrastructural construction		82764		84766	85766	86766		
8. Joint work on construction projects		82862		84866	85866	86866		
9. Technology, technical cooperation or technical assistance		82964		84966	85966	86966	87900	
10. Investment, not otherwise specified		82064						
11. Debt refinancing			83170					
12. Balance of payments			83270					
13. Exchange rates			83370					
14. Int'l financial relations, not otherwise specified			83070					
15. Foreign aid loans, not otherwise specified				84066				
16. Foreign aid grants, not otherwise specified					85066			
17. Foreign aid emergency relief, not otherwise specified						86066		
18. Environment, environmental quality, pollution							87071	
19. Transportation	92164			94166	95166	96166	97000	
20. Integration								88100
22. Development								88400
23. Nonhuman resources, not otherwise specified or more than one category								80000

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